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Several scholars have identified institutional and regulatory conditions under which Information 
Communication Technologies (ICT) reforms can accomplish positive public policy outcomes. 
This literature pays little attention, however, to the role of parliaments in these reforms. The 
institutional factors determining the degree and nature of parliamentary participation in ICT 
sector reforms in Africa is what this thesis examines. 
 
Drawing from the political economy tradition, this thesis explores the interplay between the 
executive, the parliament and the various sectoral interests that determine ICT sector reforms in 
developing countries. It does so by placing parliament in a conceptual framework that combines 
the concept of ICT as a complex ecosystem with that of a constellation of institutions. The 
gathered empirical evidence is studied through this conceptual lens to build the cases of 
parliamentary participation in Kenya and South Africa - two of the most dynamic ICT markets in 
sub-Saharan Africa - which are then analysed comparatively. Some of the information is gathered 
through a self-assessment survey by members of the ICT parliamentary committees and 
complemented by high-level interviews with the main sector players. The findings are 
triangulated with those from an extensive document analysis. 
 
This thesis contextualises institutional analysis in specific political circumstances of the two 
countries in order to understand the relevance of parliament in sector reforms. The findings have 
important implications for our understanding of structural and institutional constraints on 
parliaments in developing countries and nascent democracies. Parliaments lack capacity to 
simply fulfill their legislative and oversight roles, let alone creating an enabling environment for 
innovative public policy, sector investment and public interest outcomes as required by this 
dynamic sector in any modern, globalised economy.  
 
Systematic coding of the data revealed national governance and institutional arrangements as key 
determinants of an ICT ecosystem that adapts to local and international conditions, confirming 
parliament as not simply a neutral legal structure but a significant power broker, reflecting 
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competing interests at play. The formal legal system in both countries is uneven and 
underutilized, ineffective in achieving robustly-contested public interest outcomes. In order to 
manage political interests, parliament structures and serves principal agent-relationships, vetoes 
ICT policy and decision-making processes, links interest groups to government and party 
agendas, resolves conflicts and, sometimes, builds consensus among key players. The 
examination of institutional designs of both parliaments identifies critical capacity deficits that 
are at the heart of the negative outcomes in national legislative and oversight processes. In South 
Africa, the reason for these deficits is primarily that the parliamentary system promotes political 
party and executive dominance, which undermine multi-party and participatory structure of 
parliamentary processes to achieve party preferences and control outcomes.  In Kenya, whilst the 
combination of distinct separation of powers and a constituency-based electoral system provides 
a legal basis for greater parliamentary accountability, the highly fragmented sector arrangements 
compounded by lack of internal capacity to utilize parliamentary instruments and mechanisms 
constrain parliament’s participation.  
 
These weak institutional arrangements and designs, in both Kenya and South Africa, limit 
independence of parliament from the executive and sometimes industry, compromising the 
parliamentary oversight and visionary leadership expected from specialized portfolio 
committees. This calls for a transformation of arrangements to uphold and reinforce 
constitutional mandates that give parliament the power and ability to fulfill its role in policy 
reforms. 
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1.0   General introduction and background 
In the context of economic growth and development and achieving universal access to basic 
services, infrastructure industries such as water, transport, energy and telecommunications, have 
been the focus of public policy in developing countries. The convergence of information 
technology (IT), broadcasting and telecommunications sectors, known as ICTs, have created a 
new network industry. New Internet-based products and services are delivered to final consumers 
via a telecommunication infrastructure comprised of many different elements linking upstream 
supply with customers lying downstream (Romesh, 1998). ICT services normally come at high 
costs, affecting to a great extent their affordability and access. As aptly observed by McNamara 
et al.,(2008) the realisation by most governments that the absence of an enabling legal and 
regulatory environment increases the cost of ICT services, widening the digital divide, has 
influenced ICT sector reforms globally.  
 
 At the start of the reform process in Africa in the 1990s, less than 2% of the population 
connected to the fixed line network.  Fifteen years into the 21st century (ITU 1995, 2015), these 
numbers have grown but are still below global averages with less than 10% of the populace in 
Africa connected to the Internet. The mobile communications scenario looks very different of 
course, with largely private investments in networks driving the rapid uptake of voice services as 
they do for broadband now.   
 
With increasing evidence (Kenny, 2002, 2003) of far higher social and economic returns on 
investments in the information infrastructures, telecommunications shifted from being a second 
tier public utility to a strategic resource in the emerging global information economy. 
Digitisation and the Internet Protocol layer have made this shift much more possible than with 
enabled voice and fixed services as has been the case with broadcasting and telecom services 
than any other infrastructures. The liberalisation of markets enabled the entry of mobile 
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communications which drove connectivity across the global south becoming the clarion call of 
multilateral and donor agencies development agendas (Gillwald 2009). Before the turn of the 
millennium, ‘orthodoxy’ had developed around the telecommunications reform agenda.  
 
Infrastructure regulation has received much attention based on a framework that realises three 
accepted stages of operation: enactment of the law and arising institutional arrangements, 
development of a regulatory administration framework, and monitoring and enforcement of the 
legal framework (UN-ESCAP, 2001). Successful implementation of the framework depends on 
an enabling environment and supportive institutional arrangements that ensure clarity of roles 
and responsibilities of each key player and the play out of the decision-making processes within 
each sector.  Often these orthodox policy measures, of which there is evidence of success in 
OECD countries, when applied in a different context result in market failure, inefficient and anti-
competitive regulation and at times continued and undesired government ownership (Gottinger, 
2003).  
 
The increase in democratic practices in Africa in recent years has brought with it greater 
parliamentary involvement in the policy-making processes. Wang (2005) narrows down this 
participation to two important parliamentary functions of legitimation1 and decision/influence2, 
which in themselves are highly dependent on the presence or absence of some internal and 
external conditions. Externally these conditions determine the relationship between parliament 
and other stakeholders within governance processes and parliament’s capacity and ability to 
influence the policy process, while internal factors reinforce this capability. 
 
In this thesis, I analyse the determinants of effective parliamentary participation in ICT sector 
reforms to understand its relevance in developing the ICT sector. The analysis is achieved 
through the lens of a conceptual framework that combines the concepts of the ICT sector as a 
complex ecosystem with that of an institutional constellation in which parliament is centrally 
located. The idea to study the effectiveness of parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms 
                                                          
1  See Copeland and Patterson (1998) describes legitimation as the  recognition and acceptance by key stakeholders 
within the sector, of the right of parliament to act in some manner, placing an obligation on stakeholders to abide 
by the action.   
2 Influence reflects on-going bargaining with multiple veto players. 
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arose during the period 2005-2012 when I provided technical assistance to parliaments in the 
area of ICTs through SADC and United Nations initiatives. I observed that while it is accepted 
that parliament has a role to play there is much ambiguity about how this role is achieved. 
Furthermore, there are structural issues relating to how this perceived role fits in with the 
constitutional mandate of parliament. Parliaments respond to sector policy requirements by 
establishing specialised committees responsible for ICT. However, there is still a gap in 
developing inclusive institutional arrangements within the broader ICT governance arena.  In the 
thesis, I, therefore, critically examine engagement patterns, relationships and processes within 
the sector to gain better insights of parliamentary involvement in setting ICT policy objectives, 
in overseeing implementing agents and in contributing to the achievement of policy outcomes.  
 
To highlight diverse contextual and institutional factors that challenge parliament's role within 
the ICT ecosystem and institutional constellation, I use the case studies of parliaments in Kenya 
and South Africa. In each selected parliament I evaluate the existence of certain internal capacity 
elements based on a value judgment arrived at through an established and accepted 
parliamentary self-assessment. The Africa Parliamentary Index3 (API) follows a self-assessment 
methodology widely used within the parliamentary context to measure performance. According 
to the SADC-PF (2012) a self-assessment confirms the presence and or absence of critical 
capacity elements and dimensions against international standards. Furthermore, SADC-PF 
(2012) observes that a self-assessment allows parliament to self-assess, measure performance 
and prioritise areas for reform and strengthening. Self-assessment is, however, based on value 
judgments and is best done by a diverse group of people to counter any biases emanating from 
the self-evaluation.  
 
The research in this thesis takes the form of a cross-country comparative analysis of Kenya and 
South Africa as leading ICT markets in East and Southern Africa, respectively, to identify critical 
elements of parliamentary participation in sector reforms.  The two countries have swapped 
position as the African continent’s ICT leaders in the second round of reform (broadband) from 
the first, which South Africa led to the turn of the century. Both countries practice parliamentary 
                                                          
3  See www.parlcent.org / www.parlcentafrica.org for detailed methodology on the Africa ParliamentaryIndex. The API 
Reports cover seven countries in Africa of which Kenya is a part of. 
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democracy but follow different legal and political systems, and while committed broadly to the 
same public policy objectives, the two countries have to a certain extent witnessed different 
reform outcomes within the last two decades. 
 
This chapter highlights the historical and theoretical context and trends exposing key regulatory 
and institutional factors for reforming infrastructure industries and more specifically the ICT 
sector. The chapter presents the motivation for parliamentary participation as well as some of the 
key concepts that inform policy debates. It provides the rationale and context for the examination 
of parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms in the following chapters. The chapter 
concludes with the problem statement and research questions which are answered by the thesis. 
 
1.1  Sector reforms: Trends and Debates  
 
1.1.1  Regulating infrastructure industries  
Infrastructure industries are an indispensable element of the economy, providing essential 
services to all other sectors and requiring regulatory scrutiny much more than in any other 
(Ilzkovitz, Meiklejohn and Mogensen, 1999). Regulation is central to their reforms, especially as 
it supports the evolution of roles of regulatory and competition authorities to match the degree of 
liberalisation. Many countries have implemented far-reaching reforms in the past two decades, in 
recognition of the importance of infrastructure for service delivery (Kessides, 2004). The reforms 
take the form of restructuring, de-monopolisation, introducing competition policies, and 
encouraging private participation, among other strategies (Romesh, 1998).  The result is new 
regulatory requirements and regulatory reforms in the provision of infrastructure facilities and 
services, as well as the establishment of new approaches to regulation (Melody, 2005).   
 
Regulatory systems are designed to respond to natural monopolies and market failures associated 
with infrastructure industries such as electricity, gas, water, telecommunications, and transport 
(Eberhard, 2007). They combine the laws, processes and institutions to give government control 
over decisions of the enterprises that supply infrastructure systems (Brown et al., (2006).  As 
aptly observed by Gottinger (2003) public service objectives especially in these industries were 
initially guaranteed using public ownership mainly, and not through, regulation due to their 
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technical and systemic nature. As such, national laws and rules that were applied were designed 
to create public utilities. The regulation allows the state to take direct responsibility for the 
provision of infrastructure facilities and service or to nationalise infrastructure companies to 
accrue the benefits arising from the economies of scale (from the heavy fixed cost) and demand 
externalities associated with monopoly provisioning.  
 
The regulation wave which started in America and Britain in the 1980s and 1990s and spread to 
Europe in the 1990s has greatly changed the market structure and brought with it changes in the 
nature of supportive legal frameworks (Gottinger, 2003). Ultimately resulting in a constellation 
and accumulation of different institutions with the capacity to intervene and make decisions in a 
complex regulatory policy undertaking.  
 
Despite the claims of deregulation of the ICT sector over the last three decades, in what Hancher 
& Moran (1998) refer to as the ‘paradox of regulation’, there has been increased regulation of the 
ICT market with the shift from public utilities to competitive markets. Infrastructure markets, 
with their high sunk costs, sustained natural monopoly elements and associated barriers to entry, 
and asymmetries of information, can never be perfectly competitive (Gillwald 2005, 2010). 
Furthermore, the shift from monopoly regulation to competition regulation has increased the 
focus to constraining dominance of market players and ensuring fair competition (Gillwald, 
2009). Accordingly, the infrastructure markets are unlikely ever to become totally free of 
regulation or oversight since governments must continue to ensure that there is a level 
competitive playing field and deal with market failure about universal, affordable access 
(Gottinger and Takashima, 2000). 
 
Gillwald (2009) provides a useful overview of the rationale behind the regulation of the ICT 
sector, highlighting issues of universal service, standardisation of tariffs, and management of 
scarce resources such as spectrum as important policy outcomes worth pursuing. The results of 
regulating infrastructure industries are varied and uneven. Deregulation has meant that while 
responding to competitive signals and incentives infrastructure industries still have to deliver 
their essential services with reasonable security and consistency.  As observed by Romesh (1998) 
the introduction of liberalisation has challenged the continued existence of vertical integration, 
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especially in the light of technological advances experienced since the 1980s. Furthermore, while 
deregulation in Europe introduced competition in some countries, for most regulation remained 
central, creating tensions between new competitive environments and legacy monopoly elements 
in them - giving rise to many policy and regulatory challenges and problems (Li et al., 2000; 
Majone 1997; Roller and Waverman, 2001).  
 
Technological advancements have influenced the emergence of new African models of 
regulation as new forms independent states to start to appear (Majone, 1996; 1997). However, 
none is yet an accomplished model. Nation states still have the leeway to organise infrastructure, 
as delivery of services and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are still considered relevant 
and sovereign (Klimenko and Cowhey, 2001). As such similar challenges to those affecting the 
EU, frameworks are prevalent in Africa. African countries continue to battle with the history of 
monopoly control and entitlements of the incumbency; subsidies; lack of standardization, 
coordination and integration; public-service objectives; and patronage when reforming the 
network industry.   
 
Parliament is a key political institution in ensuring that the regulatory outcomes are achieved 
(Norton, 1998). The regulatory accountability in a broader setting starts with parliament 
establishing the appropriate legislation and ends with the effective parliamentary scrutiny of both 
process and outcomes (House of Lords, 2004). These are then the processes that contribute to 
building the legal frameworks required to set up the institutional arrangements and engagement 
models as well as accountability procedures in any policy arena. 
 
1.1.2 Reforming the ICT sector   
The last two decades have witnessed ICTs radically changing economic activity. Communication 
is now much cheaper, easier and faster, profoundly affecting economic development and national 
competitiveness (Kessides, 2004). ICTs have facilitated an unprecedented high level of global 
interconnectedness and interdependence, accelerating the process of globalisation that represents 
a significant shift in the socio-economic and cultural aspects of people lives. Developing 
countries look to ICTs as critical tools in their efforts to eradicate poverty, enhance human 




Within the ICT industry, the efficiencies of digitisation, in particular, has resulted in reductions 
in the cost of production. Reduction in production costs has led to removing natural monopoly 
elements in many parts of the network, particularly services, making them economically feasible 
to reproduce. Faced with competition, incumbent monopoly operators respond by privatising 
with the intention of creating productive efficiencies that would make them more competitive.  
The result has been, in many cases, that liberalisation has not accompanied privatisation, 
resulting in the emergence of private monopolies that have necessitated government regulation 
(Gillwald, 2005, 2010). Regulation has been used to introduce competition, delimit national or 
regional boundaries; increasingly make operations horizontally integrated (Finger and Varone, 
2006). These rapid changes create a new set of unique demands both in governments and 
businesses (Li et al., 2000).  
 
Governments are yet to realise an integrated, enabling and indeed the innovative approach that 
continually acknowledges the increasingly cross-cutting nature of ICTs and contributes 
meaningfully to the achievement of broader national and international development goals. Most 
African countries still face challenges of ensuring affordable access to ICTs despite the myriad 
of associated benefits and the various attempts made by governments to ensure universal access. 
These challenges are mainly due to the high cost of infrastructure, poor regulation, and 
unfavourable market conditions barring new entrants, resulting in high cost of ICT services. 
 
Traditionally the ICT sector was a monopolistic market and continues to be in some countries 
(Gillwald, 2009; Wellenius, 1997; Li et al., 2000).  Reforming the sector addresses policy and 
regulatory concerns hindering the achievement of universal and affordable access, and positions 
ICTs as an engine for development.   The demands of globalisation, the promises of information 
and knowledge societies and the challenges faced by developing countries in meeting these has 
motivated the reforms of ICT policies and regulation at national, regional and international levels 
(World Bank, 2009; Figueres-Olsen and Paua, 2003). Reforms have led to the evolution of 
national ICT ecosystems over the last two decades, with interesting outcomes. However, it has 
also brought some challenges. The ICT ecosystem represents a “rugged competitive landscape” 
that leads to a vast number of choice variables and an increase in strategic uncertainty and 
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unpredictability. Secondly, the structure of the ICT ecosystem becomes more vulnerable to 
“regime shifts” due to asymmetric, interdependent relationships of market players within a 
dynamic, fast developing ecosystem (Moore, 1996; Porter and Siggelkow, 2008; Basole and 
Karla, 2011). The outcomes have been policies and regulations that open the ICT market to 
competition, lowering costs and paving the way for the introduction of new technologies.   
 
Achieving complete reforms requires a gamut of structural changes necessary to internalise the 
expected benefits of restructuring (Ayogu and Hodge, 2001). Structural changes have the 
potential to result in the introduction of new markets, reduction of regulatory intervention after 
initially regulating market opening, and ultimately generating the benefits for consumers (Finger 
and Varone, 2006). 
     
Sector reforms across the continent have in the last thirty years shadowed broader political and 
economic reforms, which themselves have followed global economic reforms leading to the 
liberalisation of markets and establishment of independent regulatory and competition agencies. 
From the emergence of the World Trade Organisation on the global stage to the reform of the 
Organisation of African Union into the African Union and revival of regional economic 
communities, the focus has shifted to market liberalisation and economic regulation. In fact, ICT 
sector reforms have significantly altered the sector’s market structure and institutional 
framework and have been accompanied by a change in thinking on how utilities should be 
organised and regulated (Newbery, 1999; Berg and Hamilton, 2001; Gomez-Ibanez, 2003).  
 
 ICT sector reforms underway in most countries at both regional and international levels are 
characterised by new laws and policies, and the establishment (or reorganisation) of 
telecommunication regulatory agencies in a new dynamic international market environment 
(Melody, 2005). In line with global developments, countries continue to make global and 
regional commitments to open their communications markets to foreign investment and 
harmonise local legislation with that of other countries in similar geographic or economic 
situations (World Bank, ITU &Infodev, 2009). Such commitments serve as a means to accelerate 
regulatory reform, facilitate global or regional best regulatory practices, and provide ICT 




ICT indicators for Africa indicate that the ICT sector in Africa lags behind global averages4 
(Berg and Hamilton, 2001). Despite the exponential increase in international bandwidth through 
the landing of multiple terabyte undersea cables on the continent, from a terrestrial and user point 
of view Africa remains largely unconnected in terms of Internet and broadband. This is also 
despite the positive and welcome growth of the mobile phone industry which is unlocking the 
Internet for consumers in the same way as it did with voice services. There are strong historical 
issues to explain this lag, including the inadequacy of the legal and regulatory environment as 
well as the lack of capacity of relevant institutions to achieve liberalised markets, with pervasive 
infrastructure, and a reduction in prices for ICT services. Again the adoption of incorrect reform 
sequences and time frames compounded by some social, economic and political factors has 
meant that most countries in Africa have only managed to privatise partially with uneven 
liberalisation across different markets. Sections 1.1.2.1-1.1.2.3 highlights the issues impacting 
progress in Africa.  
 
1.1.2.1 Investment 
 Fair budgetary arrangements are critical to achieving sector reforms. A crucial role government 
plays to ensure successful sector reforms is attracting investors to the sector by ensuring that 
right conditions in place for regulation, competition and market entry (European Commission, 
2005). These conditions guarantee certainty to investors on the timing and nature of regulatory 
interventions while retaining a flexible enough policy environment to respond to a dynamically 
changing sector. Often this requires a mix of market forces and policy interventions appropriate 
for achieving policy objectives and a matrix of interests and institutions that are in a continuous 
state of flux (McNamara et al., 2008; Melody, 2005). Since investors prefer a hierarchical and 
stable legal and regulatory environment that encourages investment and increases consumer 
confidence, the specification of rights and obligations (i.e., the rules of the game) that apply to 
the sector is necessary. As such laws enacted by parliament, and the mechanisms for oversight 
                                                          
4 See International Telecommunication Union(ITU)  - Measuring the Information Society Reports for  2015, 2014, 
2013, 2012, 2011, 2010; Available on URL: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-




including budgetary and for representation, become a critical component in the creation and 
retention of a flexible policy environment. 
 
1.1.2.2 Sequencing  
The success of the reforms predominantly relies on its sequencing. Wallsten (2002) proposes that 
to succeed reforms should start with the introduction of the regulator, followed by liberalisation, 
and privatisation comes last. Establishing a regulatory authority before privatising is a necessary 
condition for increased penetration, investment, and access. Other views exist that are premised 
on the existence of a correlation between the performance of a country’s economy and her 
sequencing of reforms, with either privatisation or liberalisation preceding the other (McNamara 
et al., 2008). A country facing economic difficulties may choose to privatise first while a country 
enjoying a healthy growth opens various segments to local competition first. Liberalisation of the 
domestic market tends to undermine the potential market value of the carrier, whereas 
undertaking privatisation first typically entails a request by investors for a time-bound 
exclusivity in the local market, thereby delaying the possible benefits of competition. Literature 
(for example Jordana & Levi Faur, 2004; Gillwald, 2010; Li et al., 2000; McNamara et al., 2008) 
reflects that sequencing models are emerging in ICT sector reforms.  Interestingly what may be 
successful in one country may not necessarily work in another. 
 
1.1.2.3 Global governance 
The pace and success of reforms are influenced to a great extent by events in the international 
arena. Continued globalisation of markets, supported by the explosion of new communication 
networks, has fundamentally changed the nature of the state and government. This has 
necessitated international rules and codes that extend beyond national boundaries to be 
established. These rules and codes have necessitated the emergence of entirely new entities and 
multilateral agencies such as the World Trade Organization (WPO) and the Word Intellectual 
Property Rights Organization (WIPO), and the reform of United Nations bodies such as the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The existence of these entities and agencies has 
led to the devolution of power upwards into international governance with which nation states 
are required to comply; downwards into local authorities and laterally into specialised agencies 
(Gillwald, 2011). Responding to these changing systems of governance has become a critical part 
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of all political institutions.  
 
A number of frameworks established at the international level recognise the importance of an 
enabling environment in the development of the ICT sector. At the international level, there are 
processes and initiatives such as the WSIS process5, numerous ITU frameworks, the WTO 
Reference Paper of the Fourth protocol of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
These processes among others, impress upon member states the importance of a trustworthy, 
transparent and non-discriminatory environment as essential to the use and growth of ICTs in the 
developing world. These frameworks define crucial paths that structure the regulatory framework 
as required to achieve the desired environment (Levy and Spiller, 1994; World Bank et al., 2009).  
 
Examples of good practices are now emerging, but no single blueprint can be followed. Often 
regulatory models developed on best practices fail to take into account the effects of the different 
legal traditions prevalent in the country which influence the procedures and approaches taken 
upon implementation (Figueres-Olsen & Paua, 2003; Guermazi and Satola, 2005). This is 
worsened by slow and complex processes for capacity building and establishing adequate 
regulatory institutions in developing countries which often lag behind the entry of private 
operators into the sector (Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2008). 
Furthermore, most African countries continually suffer from serious institutional weaknesses that 
result in planned reforms not producing the intended benefits (Parker, 2002).  
 
1.1.3 Institutional endowments 
The answer to the issues in Section 1.1.2.3 lies in how the national and international institutional 
arrangements are implemented. The rise of the regulatory state has created new institutions 
across countries and sectors. Jordana and Sancho (2004) observe that these new institutions are 
embedded in institutional settings most likely established in previous periods and for different 
kinds of public action. Furthermore, this configuration combines institutions with various public 
policy mandates, often with different and contradictory goals. Scholarly attention has largely 
                                                          
5 See World Summit declaration and action plan, at: 




focused on the new regulatory agencies as the key player shaping regulatory outcomes, yet this 
does not provide a holistic view of the institutional arena required to build an understanding of 
the differences in policy processes and outcomes (Jordana and Sancho, 2004). This thesis hopes 
to contribute to this gap by providing a parliamentary perspective, showing how parliament as a 
significant contributor influences or constrains policy outcomes within the ICT sector.  
 
Most infrastructure industries, including energy and water, have adopted unclear reform 
strategies that are worsened by institutional arrangements that continually affect the autonomy of 
regulatory agencies and undermine their independence to perform critical functions (Gillwald, 
2011). This is compounded by the political, rather than technocratic appointments made for 
decision-making positions across the sector institutions, ministry, regulators and inherently 
parliamentary commission, which result in the absence of specialised skills necessary for 
effective policy formulation and regulation (Gillwald, 2011). 
 
As highlighted in Section 1.1.2 most ICT policy initiatives in Africa are yet to achieve their 
desired outcomes. The success of the reforms depends greatly on the willingness and ability of 
government to provide regulatory and legislative provisions that not only promote the 
development of infrastructure and service offerings but also accommodate the country's 
institutional endowments. The continent remains largely unconnected regarding Internet and 
broadband despite the positive growth of the mobile industry. This is a sign that the reforms are 
failing and that the governments continue to protect the status quo that limits market entry and 
constrains fair competition at the expense of sector development.  
 
Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996), having surveyed the performance of regulated 
telecommunications industries in different political and social environments, argue that a 
country’s institutional endowment at the macro-political level determines the scope for arbitrary 
administrative discretion, the confidence of investors that their assets will not be arbitrarily 
appropriated and, through this, the performance of regulated industries.  Thus, governments are 
key stakeholders at the macro level and have an obligation to design and adopt various 
institutional mechanisms to reform legal frameworks to support the implementation of 




 However, the structure of these legal frameworks is determined, in part, by the nature of the 
state and the legal and constitutional system of each country and how these can be extended and 
applied (Levy and Spiller, 1996). Success is to a large extent influenced by the rules that define 
who can participate and shape the various strategies that influence the outcomes and preferences 
of the actors involved in the reforms process (Steinmo, 2001). As Howell (2006) aptly observes, 
outcomes in the ICT sector are determined principally by the actions within the sphere of policy, 
law and regulation, as a consequence of the ultimate powers conferred upon them to determine 
the applications, products and services exchanged in the markets that ensue, and the distribution 
of the net benefits that arise.  
 
Numerous desirable institutional arrangements for effective regulation of infrastructure industries 
have been developed. Examples are in Melody (1997), Kerf, Schiffler, & Torres (2001), Mustafa 
(2002), Smith and Wellenius (1999), Stern (1997), and Stern and Holder (1999). These scholars 
recommend a variety of arrangements across infrastructure industries that enhance the quality of 
regulatory governance and increases confidence in the regulatory system as institutions embrace 
a very wide range of governance arrangements, roles, activities, processes and outputs. 
 
Adopting institutional arrangements for the ICT sector is a significant role for government.  
Following a governance model that allows for the participation of various actors who can define 
and agree on goals together is desirable (Song and Oh, 2012). Interaction among the different 
elements is influenced by networking principles that allow for collaboration and cooperation 
with a focus on achieving collective action. However, due to the immaturity of the market and 
civil society and the existence of cross organisational sectionalism among ministries, most 
African governments have adopted arrangements that give high authority to either a government 
ministry for the planning and coordination or distribute policy functions to several departments.  
 
The institutional approach adopted by a country fundamentally matters as it can either promote 
or constrain the participation of parliament in ICT sector reforms. Parliamentary interventions 
most times are shaped by national priorities, institutional and legal endowments as well as the 
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interactions with the main sector players during the reforms trajectory 6 (Kessides, 2004). By 
design parliaments tend to follow similar models as those within the executive, especially when 
establishing committees to oversee the ministries. Such arrangements often result in horizontal 
and fragmented coordination that does not achieve the desired collective action as parliaments 
have to contend with internal institutional designs that can hinder effectiveness.  Parliament is a 
key political institution in creating an enabling environment for sector growth. 
 
ICT reforms require a stable, open and certain environment that encourages confidence in the 
ICT market and is premised on a legal and regulatory framework that can level the playing field 
to allow key sector players to interact by introducing competition, improving conditions for 
market entry and protecting consumer interests (McNamara et.al. 2008). Such a framework 
requires policy, legal, market and social considerations that interact both at domestic and global 
levels to create conditions for ICT-led growth and innovation (Figueres-Olsen and Paua, 2003; 
Guermazi and Satola, 2005).  
 
1.1.4 An enabling environment for sector reforms  
Key players in the policy arena such as citizens, civil society, private sector (operators), and 
regulators depend on the prevalence of an enabling environment to participate successfully in the 
reform process. Critical elements to achieving an enabling environment include state 
decisiveness7 and resoluteness8, public confidence, inclusiveness, stability, transparency, 
competition, investment, innovation, and growth (Tsebelis, 2002; Figueres-Olsen, 2003; World 
Bank, 2009).  An enabling environment allows government and its branches to work at a macro 
level setting out objectives, issuing legislative provisions and addressing policy issues of national 
concern to both investors and operators. Effective governing at this level relies on the ability to 
implement policy changes effectively (state decisiveness) and to ensure the decision-making 
processes support these changes. 
 
An enabling environment feeds on effective government coordination, which speaks to the 
                                                          
6Reforms path follow from monopoly →liberalisation→competition→convergence. 
7Ability to enact and implement policy changes. 
8 Ability to maintain and commit to a policy once established. 
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ability to engage systematically and communicate a vision while maintaining an environment 
that supports growth and innovation. It requires government, as a whole, to harmonise sector 
specific policy concerns with other national issues through a variety of statutory mechanisms to 
ensure alignment with national aspirations and goals (Darwiche et al., 2007). 
 
Several challenges in shaping the enabling environment from a parliamentary perspective are 
outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. These reflect the perceived role of parliament as the 
legislative arm of government and its relationship with other state institutions and the arising 
institutional arrangements thereof. There are assumptions and expectations placed on parliament 
regarding its role in the process of guaranteeing a legal and regulatory framework that can level 
the playing field within the sector. The regulatory framework should allow for competition, 
market entry and protection of consumer interests in a way that brings stability, openness and 
confidence in the ICT market.  Such an environment encompasses a broad range of expertise and 
is informed, forward-looking and adaptive; requiring policy, legal, market and social 
mechanisms that interact both at domestic and global levels to create conditions for ICT-led 
growth (Guermazi and Satola, 2005). Achieving the enabling legal framework relies on 
institutions with the capacity to implement policies and manage a complex array of competition 
in infrastructure and services.  The result would be effective regulation of liberalised markets, 
with pervasive infrastructure, and a reduction in prices for ICT services which more often than 
not resides outside parliament (McNamara et al., 2008).  
 
1.2 Necessity for the research  
While investments in network industries in general yield greater social and economic returns 
than many other investments, investments in communications infrastructure with particular 
network effects associated with enhanced flows in information yield greater returns (Gillwald, 
2005). Despite a body of evidence (Gillwald, 2005; Roller and Waverman, 2001; Kelly, 2004; 
Qiang, 2009) providing linkages between telecommunications development and economic 
development, the reasons why these positive outcomes are elusive in developing countries that 
have pursued sector reform have not been adequately explained. Specifically and in the context 
of this thesis, what structural factors constrain the successful implementation, particularly about 




As such any findings emerging from this study are likely to apply across most, if not all, 
infrastructure industries. Just like in other network sectors, the institution of parliament is 
increasingly having a significant bearing on the outcomes of the ICT policy and regulatory 
reforms. There is a lack of studies measuring parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms in 
Africa. This provides the rationale and basis for this study. Parliaments in Africa have been the 
subject of much research in as far as their performance, institutional arrangements and power 
dynamics are concerned. Similarly, the ICT sector reform process is subject to much research in 
its own right. Scores of ICT scholars have identified the conditions under which the on-going 
ICT sector reforms can accomplish desired outcomes. However, most have not anticipated how 
parliaments can be a significant factor in achieving the reforms, neither have they considered the 
institutional challenges that may hinder parliament from effectively implementing its role. How 
the different legal systems and arising institutional arrangements influence or constrain the 
creation of an enabling environment for the ICT sector is still an unearthed area.  
 
There is little research available on how parliaments deal with the rapid changes within the ICT 
sector as a key infrastructure for modern economies. Neither has it been anticipated how 
parliaments deal with the new governance arrangements for the sector as it reforms from a public 
utility into a multiple supplier competitive environment requiring promotion and safeguarding as 
a public good. Pertinent factors such as characteristics of legislative power (its separation, source 
and values), political interests, parliamentary attributes, electoral system, political will and space 
structure political participation in governance processes to either secure policy benefits or 
negatively impact the political decision-making process. 
 
The dearth of such studies in developing countries and near absence in Africa in particular, make 
this is an important and novel area to examine. Result- oriented parliamentary research providing 
a link between parliaments and policy outcomes is of concern for both understanding and 
promoting ICT sector reforms.  A comparative analysis of the two parliaments (Kenya and South 
Africa) from two economic regional blocs of Africa with distinctly different legal systems is 
worth engaging.  These countries have swapped position as the continent’s ICT leaders in the 




 1.3 Problem statement 
Faced with the coincidence of post-cold war political reforms and the advent of the technological 
revolution that undermined traditional conceptions of the telecommunications monopolies, 
governments are constantly called upon to reform their public utilities, open markets and create 
enabling environments for infrastructure investment.  Li and Xu (2004) observe that with less 
mature democracies the establishment of democratic institutions affects the pace of reforms by 
moderating politician discretion. As such parliaments in such dispensations have met up with 
challenges in effectively applying their representative, legislative and oversight mandates 
(Aringo, 2012) in a manner that facilitates the reforms of the sector. Studies (for example Hall & 
Taylor,1996; Epstein & O'Halloran 1997; Johnson, 2005; Ernesto, 2007; Norton, 1998; Olson, 
1994) have identified some challenges impacting parliamentary participation within the ICT 
ecosystem, chief among them being; 
i. unsupportive institutional arrangements for parliamentary participation both within the 
broader political governance and in the ICT ecosystem context; 
ii. ineffective parliamentary mechanisms, designs and policy practices; and 
iii. inadequate capacity and knowledge by parliament to handle the ICT sector issues. 
 
1.4 Research question 
Arising from the problem statement above, the primary question that the research seeks to 
answer is: what role does parliament play in enabling or constraining ICT sector reform? To 
respond to primary question sub-questions relating to the institutional and governance 
arrangements, political context, parliamentary mechanisms, policy practices, capacity and 
knowledge levels of the ICT industry are examined to understand how these factors shape the 
participation of parliament in the ICT sector reforms process. The following sub-questions are 
raised to facilitate this evaluation in Kenya and South Africa:  
 
1. To what extent have the two countries implemented ICT sector reforms and with what 
outcomes? 
 
2. How has the surrounding governance context (nature of the state, the interplay between 
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state and market; the interplay between different institutions and interest groups, the 
extent of political space; the impact of global governance) supported or constrained the 
effective participation of parliaments in influencing ICT sector reforms?  
 
3. Do interest groups (government, industry, civil society) accept parliamentary legitimation 
in the sector reforms?  
 
4. To what extent has parliament applied its legislative, representative, oversight and 
budgetary mandates to influence ICT reform processes? 
 
5. How have the existing institutional capacity, political competence, and specialised 
knowledge levels concerning ICT, within parliament enabled or hampered its 
participation in developing an enabling environment for ICT sector reforms?  
 
To contextualise the primary question the study reviews existing literature on pertinent issues 
with regards to the institutional factors, arrangements and dynamics within the regulatory, 
political and economic environments. The literature explores the prevalent policy practices and 
determinants of parliamentary performance that influence or constrain the achievement of an 
enabling environment for ICT sector development in the two countries under study. This is so to 
determine contextual and institutional factors affecting the role of parliament in ICT sector 
reforms process.  
 
1.5  Significance of the research 
This investigation intends to make an original contribution to the body of knowledge in ICT 
sector reforms by applying an institutional and capacity analysis to ICT sector reforms process in 
a developing country from a parliamentary perspective. It intends to make a contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge by extending the analysis of parliamentary processes on sector 
outcomes to the ICT policy and regulatory reforms on the one hand and a developing country 
context on the other side through the gathering of detailed empirical evidence on the applicability 
of practices to policy making.  By so doing the research will enable an examination of the 
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relationship between parliament as the body responsible for ensuring an enabling environment 
and other key players in the sector in ensuring the achievement of effective ICT sector reforms, 
with practical application for African parliaments. 
 
A combination of an ICT ecosystem, institutional constellation and self-assessment framework 
provides a research methodology that may have been applied individually or in a different setting 
but is yet to be implemented in a parliamentary context. While the self- assessment has been 
utilised within the parliamentary context, in Kenya, it focused on budget process and had not 
been applied to the ICT policy making process. Combining individual concepts into a new 
conceptual framework is expected to contribute towards the development of a new approach to 
analysing the role of parliaments in policy reforms of infrastructure industries.  
 
This study will benefit ICT policies and practices and academics by contributing to the 
understanding of enablers and constraints of effective parliamentary participation in ICT sector 
reforms. The findings are likely to assist participating parliamentarians, together with the support 
staff, ministries and civil society to realise some of the gaps that require attention in their 
respective countries. The study contributes to the yawning research gap on the role of parliament 
in facilitating ICT policy and regulatory reform, particularly in the African context, and in the 
process, it is likely to identify a plethora of new research opportunities.  
 
1.6 Overview of the structure of the thesis  
The thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1, the introductory chapter, has discussed the 
historical and theoretical context for regulating and reforming infrastructure industries and more 
specifically the ICT sector, the motivation for parliamentary participation as well as some of the 
key concepts that inform policy debates. The chapter has provided the rationale and context for 
the examination of parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms that the subsequent chapters 
contain.  
 
Chapter 2 explores literature on the challenges faced by parliament in regulating infrastructure 
industries, the surrounding governance context and determinants of parliamentary performance 
(influence of parliament) in an attempt to establish the factors constraining the effective 
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participation of parliament in ICT policy and regulatory reforms.  Chapter 3 explores and 
explains relevant major contending theories and concepts’ concerning parliamentary participation 
in governance and on that basis defines a conceptual framework to address research questions 
raised by the study.  Chapter 4 presents the methodology for the study, describing the paradigm, 
epistemological and ontological approaches that have influenced the selection of methods of data 
collection and analysis.  
 
Chapters 5 presents a review of constitutional, legal, normative and strategic documents, media 
statements and reports on parliaments and the ICT sector in Kenya and SA that define the legal, 
regulatory, constitutional and institutional architecture and environment that shape parliamentary 
participation.  Chapter 6 reports on the qualitative findings of the study, from a horizontal self-
assessment complemented by deep cutting high-level interviews with key stakeholders in 
national ICT ecosystem of Kenya and SA, to investigate the key parliamentary practices, applied 
to the ICT sector through the committee system.    
 
Chapter 7 reviews evidence presented in previous chapters in light of the current practice of law 
and the state of play by parliament in the ICT sector through the lens of institutional constellation 
framework and other arising sub-concepts such as state, power, representation and interests to 
understand the different outcomes in each country. Drawing on the emerging themes and patterns 
from the findings in Chapter 5 and 6, Chapter 7 provides a cross-country comparison of the role 
of parliament in the ICT policy making processes of Kenya and South Africa by analysing the 
trends, tensions and contradictions in parliamentary participation.  Finally, Chapter 8 summarises 
the main points of this comparative analysis, presents conclusions and offers final observations 
making some policy and practice recommendations that are geared towards the academia, 
practicing parliamentary and ICT experts, government and parliament itself.  
 
This thesis presents findings that have significant implications for our understanding of the 
structural and institutional constraints on parliaments in developing countries and nascent 
democracies. Parliaments lack the capacity to simply fulfil their legislative and oversight roles, 
not to mention creating an enabling environment for innovative public policy, sector investment 
and public interest outcomes as required by this dynamic sector in any modern, globalised 
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economy. A proactive approach that follows a disciplined management practice to resolve 
capacity constraints could ultimately solve the problem of uncertain outcomes and reinvent 
parliament for accountability. The internal designs and political governance arrangements should 
evolve in a manner that upholds and reinforces constitutional mandates to give parliament the 
required power and ability to fulfil its mandates in sector policy reforms.   
 
The recommendations made at the end of the thesis highlight a relationship between effective 
parliamentary participation and positive policy outcomes in ICT reforms, specifically showing 
the importance of timely and appropriate legislative responses, underpinned by sufficient 
legislative power and capacity of parliament to act independently. Furthermore, the findings in 





DETERMINANTS OF PARLIAMENTARY PERFORMANCE 
Chapter one discussed the theoretical motivation for regulating infrastructure industries, 
especially the importance of reforming the ICT sector placing importance on the policy and 
regulatory environment of which parliament is a key player. This chapter explores the theoretical 
perspectives underlying significant challenges faced by parliament, particularly about its 
participation in sector reforms. On the basis of the challenges, the chapter then builds a set of 
critical determinants and highlights the critical capacities required for parliamentary performance 
as enablers for parliamentary participation.  
 
2.0 The political system  
Work by Tsebelis (2002) on veto theory provides a framework for analyzing political institutions, 
providing context and conditions under which parliaments operate. Tsebelis (2002) views the 
political system as a means of collective decision-making with a series of political institutions 
translating into a constellation of veto players that influence policy stability.  Accordingly 
parliament is an institutional veto player alongside the executive as assigned by the constitution.  
Decision making within this political system involves the participation of some collective veto 
players like a committee or political party. The collectiveness of the system makes decision-
making complex and requires internal decision-making rules based on a majority, qualified 
majority, or unanimity.  
 
Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or 
preferences of individuals (for example MPs seeking re-election) and the relevant transaction 
costs (Weingast & Marshal, 1998).  Weingast and Marshal describe parliament as after all, the 
popularly elected assembly with a mandate to ensure a responsive and accountability government 
to citizens. Parliament, according to the World Bank (2010), performs two vital political 
functions, namely conducting free and open political debate regarding government legislation, 





As the foundation of political life, parliament is theoretically viewed by legislative scholars 
(Kinoshita, 2008; Campbell, 2004; Parliamentary Centre, 2009) as an independent factor in 
political behavior. It consists of formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, and systems of meaning that define the context and relationships within which 
individuals, political groups, the executive, corporations, labor unions, nation-states, and other 
organisations operate and interact with each other. As summarised by Polski & Ostrom (1999) 
parliament is, therefore, constituted by a set of institutional arrangements and participants with a 
common set of goals and purposes, and who must interact across multiple action situations at 
different levels of activity.   
 
Tsebelis (2002) argues that all actors in the political system care about policy outcomes either 
directly or indirectly. Tsebelis remarks that while the system generates policy preferences and 
assures that these preferences are implemented; policy outcomes are consequently a result of 
actors’ preferences and the prevailing institutions. The outcomes are influenced by the number 
and location of veto players, the sequence with which veto players make decisions (that is, who 
makes proposals to whom), or whether it is at an individual or collective level. These factors 
affect the influences that these veto players have in the decision-making process, with individual 
veto player’s deciding by their preferences and collective (like a parliament or political party) 
depending on the rules and who controls the agenda. 
 
The above become mere definitions if parliamentary performance fails to reflect the evolution of 
these relationships at least as far as authorities, rules, procedures and resources, the 
interrelatedness of institutional arrangements and the interest and behavior of the actors are 
concerned.  Parliaments should become more and more pervasive and resilient in securing 
government accountability and policy outcomes, as observed by Rahman (2005).  While on one 
hand they remain representative bodies reflecting the sentiments and opinions of the populace, 
on the contrary, they are the prime source of law to govern a country. Accordingly as Olson 
(1994) points out the union of these two features qualifies their significance in democratic 
politics. In fact, Lijphart (1991) suggests that legislatures should probably be regarded as the 




Traditionally parliaments perform three core functions that of representation, legislative 
functions, and oversight.  Legislative scholars (Weingast & Marshall, 1998; USAID, 2000; 
Steinmo, 2001) demonstrate that the existence of parliaments is premised on three critical 
assumptions, i.e., that (1) members represent the interests located within their constituencies, (2) 
political parties place no constraint on the behaviors of individual representatives, and (3) 
majority rule is a binding constraint. Through its mandate parliament then ensures that the 
administration of public policy reflects and meets the people’s needs, and that agreed policy is 
properly implemented and delivered to target citizens (Aringo, 2012; Yanamoto, 2007). 
 
The assumption is, therefore, that parliament as an institution can impact and influence the 
behavior and outcomes of society in a number of ways.  The assumption further explains how 
and whose interests are ultimately considered in the policy-making process; the different power 
bases and reward systems within parliament and how they influence the choices and priorities as 
well as how the majority rule influences the quality of legislative outcomes (Weingast & 
Marshall, 1998).  
 
Tsebelis (2002) defines policy as the principal outcome of a political system and as such people 
participate in a political system to promote the results (policies) that they prefer. As a result, 
policymaking is necessary for political actors whether or not they have direct preferences over 
policies. The effectualness of parliament to influence policy making, and consequently ICT 
sector development, is the subject of the rest of this chapter.  
 
2.1 Challenges for parliament 
Li and Xu (2004) provide a rationale for reforming the ICT sector as, among a myriad of other 
benefits, to yield important policy implications such as a shift from state-dominated institutions 
to pro-market institutions. It is the critical role of policy and regulations in delivering ICT 
benefits to society in the face of globalization, sustainable development and poverty reduction 
that is discussed at length in ICT policy literature (Kenny ,2000; Roller and Waverman, 2001; 
Kelly, 2004; Gillwald, 2005; Qiang, 2009). Policy and regulation are by nature incremental and 
contextually shaped by local realities, making the behavioral aspects of organisations (parliament 
in the case of this thesis) responsible for policy and regulation an important element of this study. 
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The government uses policy and regulation processes as tools to achieve ICT objectives (Jordana 
&Levi Faur, 2004).  
 
The House of Lords (2004) in attempting to understand the regulatory system points out that the 
process of regulation not only starts with parliament but its ultimate responsibility rests with 
parliament. The broader regulatory accountability framework thus has to take into account 
parliamentary responsibility for establishing the appropriate legislation with the effective 
parliamentary scrutiny of both process and outcomes (House of Lords, 2004), while at the same 
time reflecting the hierarchy of regulation9 prevalent in the country. What is clear is that 
parliament often legislates for regulation that in many cases is carried out by independent 
regulators, to shield market interventions from interference from ‘captured’ politicians and 
bureaucrats.  
 
Several challenges to realizing potential benefits of ICTs are identified. Chief amongst them is 
the inadequacy of the legal and regulatory framework to create liberalised markets, with 
pervasive infrastructure, and reduced prices for ICT services. This inadequacy is compounded by 
other regulatory governance problems, political conflicts and capacity challenges of relevant 
institutions within the policy arena.  The ability of parliament as a key institution in the 
regulatory arena, the dynamics of power structures and institutional arrangements within the 
broader political context are therefore necessary conditions to respond effectively to the 
dynamism of the sector. Parliamentary participation is very much a direct outcome of a 
combination of factors that include the surrounding governance context and the arising 
institutional arrangements within which they operate. Sections 2.1.1-2.1.3 narrates the significant 
challenges for parliamentary participation discussed in governance, regulatory and political 
literature and applicable to ICT sector development.  
 
2.1.1  Parliamentary accountability and scrutiny 
Accountability and scrutiny are two critical primary control mechanisms that ensure government 
                                                          
9 Refers to how regulations relate to each other in a predetermined way starting with primary legislation- ICT law;  
followed by secondary legislation - regulations, decrees, instructions and guidelines; then lastly the authorisation 
framework- licenses, concessions, permits, registrations and notifications.  
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maintains and endorses effective regulation while identifying and exposing ineffective regulation 
(Norton, 1998; House of Lords, 2004; Wang, 2005; Staddon, 2007; Black, 2008). On one side is 
accountability a broad two-dimensional concept that embraces both answerability10 and 
enforceability11 (Schedler, 1999; House of Lords, 2004; Staddon, 2007). It is integral to the 
macro design of the regulatory system as a whole. Accountability is given effect through three 
elements: duty to explain, exposure to scrutiny and the possibility of independent review. On the 
other is scrutiny which then ensures that regulatory bodies have decision-making authority but 
can at the end effectively respond to the results either judicially or in a parliamentary committee 
(House of Lords, 2004).  
 
Government and parliament retain the responsibility to review the regulation and ensure that the 
legislation remains fit for purpose. So even if regulators are independent for particular purposes 
they still fall within the overall responsibility of government and must, therefore, be held 
accountable for their actions through a set of defined arrangements, one of which being 
parliament. What matters is more the independence of government rather than of government 
(House of Lords, 2004). The key concern is increasingly the ability to formalise relationships 
within the regulatory framework, while constraining or empowering the parties, one in relation to 
the other, as appropriate. Effectively this is done through legislative delegation outlined in 
section 2.1.2.  
 
Parliamentary accountability is derived from the legislative power conferred by a country’s 
constitution which sets the rules that define, describe and regulate the structure and operation of 
the state, its institutions, activities and officials6 (Staddon, 2007). Wang (2005) proposes an 
accountability framework that shows external factors such as the constitutional powers, social 
legitimacy, and the interests of actors as well as internal factors including the committee system, 
party groups, and the chamber as influential in parliament’s ability to hold the executive 
accountable. The House of Lords (2004) circle of accountability (Figure 1) confirms Wang’s 
factors as critical, providing an elaboration of each key stakeholder’s role in the circle. While 
each plays a different part at different times, more or less independently, the circle of 
                                                          
10 Refers to the requirements to inform, explain and justify. 
11 Refers to the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions. 
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accountability is arranged within an overall framework of an effective regulatory state (House of 
Lords, 2004).  Within this framework, parliament sets the statutory framework but legislates for 
it to be carried out by independent regulators.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Accountability and regulatory cycle. Source: House of Lords (2004). 
 
Wang (2005) and House of Lords (2004) places the internal structuring and workings of 
parliament at the center of its ability to influence policy outcomes. It is through accountability 
that parliament assigns roles to institutions and actors to distribute the power to impose in 
regulatory design activities. It is for accountability that parliament holds the government to 
account for its action and passes laws creating regulatory bodies.   
 
Griffith (2005) affirms that the expansion of modern state and the exponential growth in 
administrative activity presses upon parliament the need to exercise its accountability or scrutiny 
functions efficiently and effectively. In enforcing the desired accountability, parliament faces 
some challenges arising from political conflict created by design rules that impose obligations 
directly on individuals and organisations, and that also determine the basic forms of intervention 
and enforcing conformance.  Most often parliament lacks the mechanisms for consistent and 
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coherent scrutiny12 of regulation. This is compounded by the fact that regulatory agencies have 
multiple accountabilities13 (see Figure 1) in practice, depending on the circumstances, including 
the relationship between the interested parties to the regulator. This is further challenged by 
overlapping jurisdiction stemming from the interrelated responsibilities of parliament, ministers 
and independent regulators.  
 
2.1.2 Legislative delegation 
Extensive literature exists on legislative delegation (for example Shepsle, 1991; Majone, 1997; 
Stiglitz, 1998; Gilardi, 2002; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004 and Gillwald, 2009). According to these 
scholars, legislative delegation is the technocratic solution used to solve the lack of expertise and 
time constraints of policy makers and is currently considered amongst the most independent and 
critical methods of ensuring regulatory independence. Delegating authority to regulatory 
agencies provides specialised decision-making on technical matters that political institutions do 
not have the capacity to perform. Over and above, agencies prevent conflicts of interests within 
the government as significant shareholders in incumbent operators, providing professional 
autonomy in cases where privatization is achieved.  
 
Legislative delegation supported by both normative and positive perspectives has been the 
subject of research in political science, legal scholarship and economics (for example Rose-
Ackerman, 2007, 2008; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999). While some theories rationalise legislative 
delegation to focus on the trade-offs between the value of administrative competence and the loss 
of political control due to the mismatch between the objectives of bureaucrats and their political 
principals (Bawn, 1995; Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Bendor et al., 2001). Others yet view 
delegating authority to regulatory agencies as enhancing the ‘credibility’ of government in 
certain policies to attract investors in the face of unpredictable electoral cycles and increasing 
                                                          
12 Capacity to effectively conduct parliamentary scrutiny is essential as it is not just a question of the answerability 
of regulators to parliament, but also ensuring that parliamentary scrutiny is not fragmented and inconsistent with no 
means of establishing a coherent overview of the regulatory regime or regulatory burden. General trend has been 
that scrutiny is dependent on individual committees deciding that inquiry is necessary into a particular regulator or 
regulatory decision.  
 
13  The House of Lords (2004) describes a 3600   view matrix of accountability where the regulators account multiple 
stakeholders including parliament, government, judiciary, citizens, interest groups, regulated companies, 
consumer representative bodies, and customers and consumers.  
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international interdependence (Wellenius, 1997). Consequently, the capacity of experts to 
credibly commit themselves is much greater than that of democratically elected politicians 
(Gilardi, 2002; 2005). 
 
At the very least, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) that report to the legislature are 
viewed in principle as more independent than those that report to the sector ministry. Their work 
is much less associated with the volatility in governmental or ministerial changes and political 
parties and views (Brown et al., 2006; Andres et al., 2008). Wesrup (2007) observes that such 
institutional model has emerged as the paradigm of an infrastructure regulator, as opposed to 
cases of high concentration of executive authority, a corporatist style of policy making where 
parliament has low interest in oversight, and the evolution of regulatory governance can take 
time and follow an uneven path. 
 
Legislative power as enshrined in a country's constitution is a critical determinant of effective 
legislative delegation. Sector reforms heavily rely on the existence of regulatory institutions 
supported by strong parliaments with an ability to exercise its powers and delegate authority to 
these institutions. However, literature identifies significant challenges faced by parliament in 
enforcing legislative delegation worth noting. The first is guaranteeing the independence of the 
delegated agency, failure of which regulation can be subjected to “political capture”. Since 
statute creates regulatory functions, ideally regulators should carry out only regulatory functions 
designed and passed into legislation by regulatory. Secondly, while legislation may, in theory, be 
used to empower regulators, political expediency can undermine regulatory independence as 
government often finds other ways of influencing regulators. The result is goals are distorted to 
pursue political ends, a sign of failed legislative delegation (Stiglitz, 1998).  
 
Thirdly ‘trust is given to some institutions and actors and is withheld from others’ (Jordana and 
Levi-Faur, 2004:13) a declining public confidence in political institutions is proving a major 
hindrance to the effectiveness of legislative delegation. They argue that while the regulatory state 
can be impelled by business investment concerns and expertise in the policy process, there is a 
critical gap that relies on a trust-building process between social and political actors.  The trust 
between politicians and the public amidst scandals, catastrophes and public pressure, especially 
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in the establishment of independent regulators, may contribute to progress in the regulatory 
reform processes and enhance understanding of the institutional design of the regulatory state 
(Jordana and Levi- Faur, 2004). 
 
Epstein & O’Halloran (1999) identifies a political challenge with minimizing the tradeoff 
between the advantages of having an independent agency and the apparent threat to the proper 
process of democratic accountability. This trade-off is related to the principal/agent relationships, 
derived largely from the economics of organisations. The government and parliament are 
considered principals and the regulators are considered the agents (Weingast & Moran, 1983; 
McCubbins and Schwarz, 1984; Moe, 1984; Rose-Ackerman,2007). The principals seek to 
minimise “agency losses’14. The “degree of independence is thus ultimately shaped by ex-ante 
mechanisms such as the legislative mandate that describe the role and objectives of the regulator 
and by a series of ex-post mechanisms15 requiring the regulator to report on its actions to the 
principals”(Wesrup,2007:8).  
 
2.1.3 Independent regulation  
A universal feature of indirect government in a regulatory state and an outcome of effective 
legislative delegation is the creation of independent16 regulatory agencies (Baudrier, 2001; 
OECD, 2002; Maggetti, 2009; Rommel, 2009) and ensuring their formal independence from 
politicians both functionally and structurally. Brown et al., (2006), argue that this increase 
independence credibility, transparency and long-term sustainability of the regulator; validating 
sector management approaches, ensuring compliance with international standards and in the 
process increasing sector attractiveness.  
 
Regulatory independence is largely based on the strength of legislative delegation, supported by 
legal guarantees enshrined in an act of parliament. The outcome is a distinct relationship between 
                                                          
14 Defined as a situation where agents act contrary to the preferences of the principal, because of “shirking”, where 
agents act to pursue their own preferences( Wesrup,2007)   
15 Legislative committees can choose between two styles of oversight: police patrols or fire alarm. In the case of 
police patrol, regulatory oversight is “-centralised, active and direct” and includes legislative hearings and special 
inquiries, whereas fire alarm is less active and indirect, and encourages -citizens to bring agency discretion to the 
attention of principals (McCubbins and Schwarz, 1984). 
16 The ability of the regulator to act independently from the executive arm of the government while allowing the 
legislative branch to be in charge of appointments and reporting (Wesrup, 2007). 
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the executive and parliament compounded by substantial autonomy for the regulator in the 
allocation of resources; structuring of internal arrangements including accounting and personnel 
management (Baudrier, 2001; Gilardi, 2002, 2005). Furthermore, the independence gives 
regulatory agencies powers to prevent unfair competition, block mergers and even control prices 
in that particular sector and enforces legal requirements (Thatcher, 2005; Gilardi, 2005). 
 
Challenges often arise when the defined formal independence differs in substance from the 
perceived or actual autonomy (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005, 2006; Maggetti, 2007, 2009). 
Christensen & Lægreid (2005, 2006) and Maggetti (2007) observe that regulatory framework 
influences the autonomy of the regulator as much as does the formal and actual relations with 
politicians.  Since no actor has full competence over a sector, actors become dependent upon 
each other. As the players function and share competencies with others, the capacity of single 
regulators to intervene is constrained by the mandate and powers of other actors in the arena. 
 
2.2 Determinants of parliamentary performance  
To overcome the challenges as identified in section 2.1 parliamentary participation is largely 
based on its ability to perform functions effectively. The level of parliamentary performance 
influences the quality of design of regulations contributing to the completion of tasks, 
assignment of roles to institutions and actors, and distributing power to impose obligations 
(Jordana et al., 2004). 
 
The literature identifies a number of factors that influence parliamentary performance. Some of 
the literature (for example Copeland & Patterson, 1998; Norton and Olson, 1996; Johnson 2005; 
Staddon, 2007; World Bank, 2010; Jana, 2014) suggests that parliamentary attributes are 
prescribed in the country's constitution. These attributes delineate aspects of several key 
parliamentary characteristics, such as its organization, how it carries out its basic functions and 
the extent of the parliament’s powers vis-a-vis that of other political institutions. These 
characteristics are implemented by parliament adopting laws that delineate the electoral system; 
its role in the budget process; and access to information (Johnson, 2005). Furthermore, 
parliaments adopt internal rules, such as by-laws and rules of procedure, that dictate how the 




Attributes such as the typology are important determinants of parliamentary performance and 
predominantly matter when measuring the strength, capacity and effectiveness of parliament in 
policy making (Mezey, 1979; Norton, 1998; Rahman, 2005).  Similarly, the constitutional and 
government structures, power and authority bases, and dynamics of the party system are factors 
influencing the effectiveness of parliament. All these factors shape political outcomes, with 
important implications for party caucuses, committees, individual legislators, legislative leaders 
and staff (USAID, 2000). Moreover, the continuity and strength of a parliament depend on the 
existence of a support system that incorporates socio-economic forces such as civil society, 
media and interest groups; institutional history; political cultures; and the economic environment.  
 
This section provides a theoretical overview of parliamentary performance as a critical 
determinant of parliamentary participation in policy making in general and in the ICT sector 
development in particular. Fundamental to parliamentary performance is its relationship with 
other state institutions as prescribed by the constitution.   
 
2.2.1 Surrounding governance context  
The interrelatedness of key aspects with the governing context and attributes of parliament 
provide insightful information on how parliament conducts its business, a useful variable in 
understanding better the role of parliament in sector reforms.  ICT sector reforms in different 
parliamentary traditions and systems provide insight on the interconnectedness of rules in place 
that shape public decision-making, including shared interpretative structures and how these 
affect the patterns of decision-makers within the sector (Ostrom, 1994; Jordana & Levi-Faur 
2004). 
 
Surrounding governance is concerned with the nature of the state, the interplay between state and 
market, between the different institutions and interest groups, the extent of political space and the 
impact of global governance. It alludes to the institutional arrangements that define the rules that 
structure political participation. The surrounding governance is concerned with how expertise 
and information on policy flows between state institutions from sources independent of the 
executive, identifying as stable the specialised system of committees, as a necessary condition 
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for legislative strength regardless of what political system in place (Norton, 1994; Schuttemeyer, 
1994; Strom, 1998). 
 
It is the governance context that allows parliament to exercise legislative authority by delegating 
state power to the regulator (Berg & Hamilton, 2001; OECD, 2002; Westrup, 2007). The rules at 
play very much influence the nature and level of delegation. Delegation is defined by law that 
prescribes a neutral environment free from partisan political considerations for a regulator to 
exercise duty (Westrup, 2007; World Bank et.al, 2009). As highlighted in Chapter 2 § 2.1.2 
delegation of state powers to an agent is meant to solve the lack of expertise within parliaments. 
It caters too for time constraints and the problems of political credibility and insulate politicians 
from the fallout of unpopular decisions by shifting blame to the regulator ( Levy & Spiller, 1996; 
Majone, 1997, 2001). This level of delegation poses other challenges, chief amongst them is the 
creation of the third layer of decision making not directly accountable to the electorate, and that 
also challenges the essence of democratic governance, which is parliament's core business 
(Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Westrup, 2007).  
 
2.2.1.1 Predefined role in government  
According to O’Neil (2007: 2) formal institutions are “explicit and concretized in written 
documents (e.g. constitutions, laws and regulations, commercial and civil service codes and 
procedures) physical structures (e.g. ministries, legislatures, courthouses) and public events 
(elections, council meetings)”. On the other hand informal institutions are explicit and based on 
unwritten understandings such as social cultural norms, routines and traditions, with the belief 
that the rules they give to rise will be enforced (O’Neil, 2007).   
 
It is quite common within the African polity to have informal regimes that are “based on the 
giving and granting of favours” (Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005:2) existing alongside the formal 
institution as described in this section. This makes the separation in policy of public and 
privately motivated decisions and resource distribution hard to distinguish.  This common 
phenomenon is supported by what O’Neil (2007:2) describes as an “institutional hybridity” 
where informal patrimonial practices occur alongside formal legal rational rules or institutions 
that are often dysfunctional, incompatible, multiple, unpredictable, and contradictory and are 
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supported by a strong often rhetorical elite commitment to the separation of public and private 
spheres.   
 
Formally, constitutional provisions predefine the role of parliament in government conferring 
legislative authority that make other state institutions accountable to it. However, the strength or 
weakness of parliament in this role is measured by its ability to command political resources for 
the purpose of influencing public policy (Edelman & Zelniker, 1973). Mezey (1978) and Gilardi 
(2005) confirm that the strength of parliament is frequently connected to its capacity to resist or 
modify policy initiatives emanating from the executive branch. When the legislature has no such 
capacity, its policy-making role is said to be weak; in contrast to legislatures with strong policy-
making roles which can resist the executive influence. 
  
The role of parliament is influenced to a vast extent by the governance context within which it 
operates. As Johnson (2005) observes the political system under which government operates on a 
daily basis is based on interactions with other practicalities, precedents and habits. Variables such 
as the relationships between the state, the market and civil society, the extent of political space 
and support for active citizenship become key to the way parliament conducts its business.  
Political and colonial conditions (whether parliamentary or presidential; west-minister, 
congressional or mixed), electoral systems (whether constituency based, proportional 
representation or mixed), determine the formal parliamentary powers, political will and political 
spaces that enable parliament to perform its role (Copeland & Patterson, 1998; Johnson, 2005).  
 
Effective policymaking reflects a certain degree of cooperation between government and 
parliament based on predetermined rules at constitutional and operational levels of a country that 
establish practices and principles including separation of powers. In modern democracies, a 
country's constitution formally structures decision making and interaction between the executive 
and parliament (Mezey, 1998; Johnson, 2005; Staddon, 2007). Johnson (2005:1) points out that 
“parliament requires the capacity to monitor the executive, and the executive must be willing to 
comply with legislative enactments”. The reality, however, is that parliament operates in a world 
of complexity, contradiction, and confusion often with minimum access to information required 




According to Jordana (2004), in most jurisdictions congressional actions are confined to the 
political environment and institutional settings provided by governments, which in turn define 
the institutional networks that shape the behavior of state actors.  For this  reason, functions of 
parliament, its practices, and mechanisms are essential elements of the governance process. The 
downfall in many cases is a result of parliament not possessing the specialised expertise needed 
to perform the policy testing, implementation and budgetary oversight functions that may 
mitigate any negative policy outcomes (Gillwald, 2011). As such, as highlighted by Johnson 
(2005), the political and colonial conditions above including the political and electoral system, 
formal legislative powers, political will and political space, and technical capacity culminate into 
three functions of parliament as described below.  
 
Parliament is mandated with a legislative function in government. This function is underpinned 
by the degree of involvement in and the ability of parliament to facilitate legislative processes 
through debate, amend, approve or reject, formulate and pass legislation.   According to 
legislation literature (Weingast & Marshal, 1998; Johnson, 2005; USAID, 2000; World Bank, 
2010) procedures followed for processing bills vary depending on the volume of bills being 
processed and on whether or not a parliament has established a committee system. The 
committee system, in turn, is influenced by whether the parliament follows a Westminster or 
congressional system of government.  In most instances the legislature refers the bills to the 
committee with jurisdiction over the legislation. The effectiveness of such an undertaking, 
however, depends first and foremost on the capacity of the MPs and staff to read and draft laws 
and amendments to interpret any policy changes and analyze proposed new rules. It also depends 
greatly on the committees' access to external expertise to assess the exact scope of a draft law 
and its consequences from diverse perspectives (for example legal, social, economic or 
environmental). 
 
The will of the people gives parliament authority strongly linking representation to the legislative 
function (Agora portal, n.d). The distribution of seats in parliament makes members directly 
accountable to a constituency. It is this close association to citizens that provide a basis for 
parliaments’ representative function. Johnson (2005:2) views legislators as being “responsible for 
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representing the differences in society, and for bringing these differences into the policy-making 
arena”. Thus the parliament, as the sum total of these differences, is said to represent the beliefs 
and ideas of a nation.  
 
As Aringo (2012) reflects, effective representation is highly influenced by how citizens view 
their interactions with representatives, often requiring engagement to express their opinions and 
perspectives (i.e. legislating, participating in debates, authoring questions,  voicing the resulting 
ideas). For this reason, it is important for parliaments to be equipped with institutional capacity 
and to have powers to fulfill the requirements for effective representation when dealing with 
issues of access to ICTs.  
 
The parliamentary oversight role is one of the cornerstones of democracy. As Kahyrara (2012) 
observes oversight is a means of holding the executive accountable for its actions and policy 
implementation. He reflects further that existence of robust monitoring of the executive by the 
parliament is an indicator of good governance. Through oversight parliament can ensure a 
balance of power and assert its role in maintaining the people’s interests (Aringo, 2012; World 
Bank, 2010).   
 
The oversight tools and mechanisms are outlined in the constitution and operationalised by 
parliament through parliamentary bylaws and/or internal procedures. As observed by Kahyarara 
(2012), oversight powers depend on the existence of a legal framework, to consolidate the 
position of parliament as an oversight institution which guarantees its powers and independence 
within the political system (Aringo, 2012). Therefore most parliaments in a bid to improve 
performance and budget permitting tend to improve their oversight capacities by reforming their 
rules and procedure to introduce good practices such as, for example, assigning a single 
committee to each government ministry. Success from a parliamentary perspective depends on 
the parliament’s capacity to play its oversight role especially regarding allocation of resources 
and funding for the reforms. 
 
The assertion of neopatrimonialism provides an understanding of the varying degrees of 
formalisation and informalisation of parliament as a political institutions at different stages of its 
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development. O’Neil (2007) identifies as key the concentration of power in one individual with 
charisma used to legitimize authority. Given this, the political leaders resort to both formal 
institutions (e.g the state) and informal rules, norms and practices (e,g personalism, patronage, de 
facto centralised control of state resources)  to gain legitimacy and advantage.  The coexistence 
of informal and formal power structures influences to a great extent the role of parliament in 
policy making at it defines how parliament relates to its members, capabilities, resources and 
how the relationship between different stakeholders is sustained.   
 
2.2.2 Rules in use in the political arena 
According to Steinmo (2001), the success of legal frameworks to support the implementation of 
policy is largely influenced by the rules that define who participates and shapes the various 
strategies that influence the outcomes and preferences of the actors involved in the reforms 
process. The role of parliament in policy-making process is thus influenced by the formal and 
informal rules prescribed in the legal framework that direct behavior in that policy arena. 
Compliance and non-compliance behavior to the rules ofby the individuals or organisations 
whose behavior is being controlled or influenced provides an understanding of the determinants 
of the incentive structure in a policy arena.  
 
Three levels of rules are distinguishable that cumulatively affect the actions taken and outcomes 
obtained in any policy situation. Kiser and Ostrom (1982:19) describe these rules as operating 
rules, collective-choice rules and constitutional rules. “Operating rules affect participants’ day-
to-day decision-making in specific political and economic settings, collective-choice rules 
determine who is eligible to participate in an activity affecting the operating level and how 
operating rules may be changed, and the constitutional rules determine who is eligible to 
participate in crafting collective-choice rules and how these rules may be amended”. Effectively 
rules are frequently nested in other sets of rules that define how lower-level rules function.  
 
The effects of formal rules at any of the three levels: operational, collective choice and 
constitutional influence parliamentary participation in ICT policy and regulatory reforms.  The 
focus is ultimately on the source, application, and scope of the operating and constitutional rules 
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applicable to parliament.  Ostrom (1994) identifies seven types of rules that explain policy-
related actions, interactions, and outcomes (Table 1) Of importance is what these rules are, the 
source of each of the rules, and the reasons for adherence or non-adherence.   
 
Table 1: Rules in use in a political arena 
 
Rule  Description  
Position  Specify the set of positions or roles that participants assume in an action 
situation and the number and type of participants who hold each position. 
Boundary  Exit and entry rules specifying which participants enter or leave positions 
and how they do so. 
Authority  Specify the actions participants in given positions may take. 
Aggregation  Determine how decisions are made in an action situation. 
Scope  Specify the jurisdiction of outcomes that can be affected and whether 
these outcomes are or are not final. 
Information Affect the amount and type of information available to participants in an 
action arena. 
Payoff Determine how costs and benefits are meted-out in the action arena. 
Source: Ostrom, 1994. 
2.2.3 Institutional development and capacity    
A third, yet important, factor determining the performance of parliament is its level of 
institutional development. As identified by Gottinger (2003) and World Bank (2010) the degree 
of institutional development varies widely depending on a number of political, social and 
technical factors. 
 
Three distinct levels of institutional development that impact on parliamentary participation are 
worth noting from existing legislative literature (Norton, 1998; Johnson, 2005; Rahman, 2005; 
World Bank, 2010; Parliamentary Centre, 2011; Aringo, 2012; Kahyarara, 2012). These authors 
agree on the levels and characteristics of each level of development. At the bottom of the 
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pyramid, is where rubber stamping parliaments are found. These parliaments are consisting of 
one political party with legislative activities and decision-making processes that are dominated 
by the executive. Rubber stamping parliaments are characterised by low levels of legislative 
activities, severely constrained debates, slight influence on government and little effectiveness in 
representing the concerns of citizens. Sitting in the middle are the emerging democratic 
parliaments, largely still dominated by one political party but with an opposition starting to make 
an impact (Parliamentary Centre, 2011). Emerging democratic parliaments are viewed as by-
products of the process of democratization witnessed over the last decade and are characterised 
by increasing political space for debate, rising level of legislative activities, growing influence 
with government, and growing interest and effectiveness in representing citizens. At the top are 
stable democratic parliaments that vary greatly in power but are characterised by multi-party 
competition, intense partisan debate, high level of activity with varying degrees of influence on 
government, and well-organised services for constituents. 
 
What is evident from the above literature is that the institutional development plays a significant 
role in shaping regulatory reforms (Weingast & Marshall, 1998; Johnson, 2005; Jordana and 
Sacho, 2004; IPU, 2006). Like in many other policy processes, the legal framework has a 
significant impact on the role of institutions in governance processes. Howell (2006) asserts that 
powers granted to regulatory bodies (policy-makers, regulators and legislators) to bind all other 
participants to act according to the will, confers upon them, the ability to support, direct and 
constrain all current and future technological and economic opportunities arising from 
interactions in the sector. As a consequence, the success of ICT sector reforms relies on the 
ability of parliaments to manipulate their representative, legislative and oversight prerogative 
within predefined institutional arrangements. These arrangements are influenced by the strength 
of separation of powers within state institutions.  
 
Another critical development essential, from an institutional development perspective that has 
brought significant changes in parliamentary performance in the last decade, is the rise of 
specialised committee systems. Committee systems have increased parliamentary involvement in 
decision making as they permit parliament to stretch its resources both in terms of people and 
time to inquire into issues in ways that the full house would find cumbersome. Committees 
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provide parliament with an ability to follow and investigate the trends of governmental activity 
as they take shape and make a significant contribution to policy development, possibly ahead of 
the work of government (Weingast and Marshall, 1998). In these smaller groups, members can 
utilise or develop expertise in a committee specialty such as ICT, or Environment or Energy for 
example. 
 
Following a wave of parliamentary reforms committee systems have been established in most 
democratic dispensations as parliament is necessary organizational structures and loci of power 
(Mattson & Strom, 1995).  The impact of a legislature today is largely dependent on its 
committee arrangements and its policy making power depends on how highly developed the 
committees are in generating policy expertise (Mezey, 1979; Blondel, 1990; Shaw, 1998). 
Committees aim at increasing the capacity of parliament to implement its mandate. To do so, a 
number of models utilised include the establishment of dedicated committees as part of the 
integrated ministerial model that allows effective shadowing of ministerial level arrangements. 
As a result, the recent emergence of committees responsible for ICTs within most parliaments 
reflects similar arrangements as adopted for ICT governance by ministries in several African 
countries.  
 
Weingast & Marshall (1998) and Shaw (1998) view strong committees as a necessary pre-
condition for effective parliamentary participation in the governance processes. Establishing 
specialised parliamentary committees with application to the ICT sector has potentially 
contributed to the creation of the much needed enabling environment. Weingast & Marshall and 
Shaw both confirm that committees provide a less adversarial atmosphere, an alternative 
institution for legislators’ exchanges to gain greater durability. Committees allow for the critical 
examination, commenting and monitoring of the performance of ICT policy matters by 
parliament. Through committees parliament can stretch its resources both in terms of people and 
time to inquire into issues in ways that a full house (plenary) would find cumbersome. 
Furthermore, committees allow the utilization or development of expertise in a committee 
specialty which facilitates effective follow-up and inquiry into the trends of governmental 
activity as they take shape. The establishment of committees has influenced the performance of 





However, there are a number of important institutional designs that influence the effectiveness 
and sustainability of committee systems. Most importantly is how the committees are the 
organised and established, with significant implications for assigning of membership, source of 
power and values, the property rights systems associated with committee positions and the 
exchange mechanisms over these rights. Others factors include how new policies are provided 
and enforced, what problems arise from delegating power to other stakeholders and what 
motivates the subsequent level of debate in plenary (Weingast & Mashall, 1998; Johnson, 2005; 
Wang, 2005; World Bank, 2010).  
 
A critical determinant of committee effectiveness and in no way less important is how the goals 
that MPs pursue in conducting their business are structured. More often than not, the goals are 
centered on re-election. To realise the goals MPs attempt to provide benefits to their 
constituencies, but often realise they cannot do it acting alone. So in combination with the 
diversity of interests they use committees to generate gains from exchange and cooperation. In 
this way committees effectively lower the transaction costs of enforcement, problems of 
exchange found in most vote trading models17, allowing for gains of exchange and making the 
passage of stable legislation possible while assisting to solve collective action problems that may 
confront parliaments (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Moreover, committees provide a veto point that 
influences decision making underpinned by the ability or inability to make choices (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996). Choices of interests can influence votes trading and increase the marginal impact 
of ICTs within a member’s constituency. A high marginal impact will determine the importance 
of ICTs in the legislative agenda as well as the ultimate implementation of enforcement 
mechanisms for their policies.  
 
Other critical factors that influence the performance of parliament in policy making include the 
individual and compound knowledge, capacity and skills resident within parliament to 
implement effective legislative actions. The capacity of MPs and staff to read and draft 
                                                          
17 Non-contemporaneous benefit flows and non-simultaneity  
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legislation and amendments to interpret any policy changes and analyze proposed new rules 
effectively enhances legislative outcomes.  As Ostrom (2005) aptly observes, if the individuals 
who are crafting and modifying rules do not understand how particular combinations of rules 
affect actions and outcomes in a given environment, rule changes may produce unexpected and, 
at times, disastrous outcomes. In the absence of such capacity, committees tend to access 
external expertise to assess the exact scope of a draft law and its consequences from diverse 
perspectives: legal, social, economic or environmental (World Bank, 2010).  
  
Effectiveness is further enhanced by certain demographic attributes of members such as the 
educational and other qualifications levels, age and gender. Furthermore, performance is 
influenced by the number of members of parliament sitting in the cabinet, parliament’s ability to 
determine own budget and the level of information asymmetry as a resource upon which the 
relationship among politicians, regulators and stakeholders are based (UNECA, 2007; World 
Bank, 2010)18.    
 
The above insights are confirmed by a number of authors (for example. Majone, 1994; Stiglitz, 
1999; USAID, 2000; Gillwald, 2002; Stork &Vetter, 2006; McNamara et al., 2008; World Bank, 
2010).  Stork & Vetter (2006),  in their studies on ICT policy making, demonstrate that having 
adequate capacity to analyze policy and regulatory issues and adapt global experience to local 
realities, is essential and required in creating enabling environments for expanding affordable 
access to ICTs in developing countries. Gillwald (2002) observes introducing competition, 
without the regulatory capacity or political will to oversee a competitive framework, has a 
potential of being counterproductive to the achievement of the liberalization goals. Majo (1994: 
81) emphasises that “regulation is not achieved simply by passing a law, but requires detailed 
knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated activity”. Thus, the quality and 
effectiveness of policy-making depend to a large extent on the quality of knowledge bases upon 
which decisions are founded (Stiglitz, 1999). This quality of knowledge is in turn determined by 
the political, institutional and cultural environment in which information and knowledge is 
produced, disseminated, and exchanged among the various stakeholders (Stiglitz, 1999).   





The constitutional knowledge and legal expertise described above are crucial in the production of 
coherent and consistent laws but are not necessarily sufficient in designing appropriate and 
“implementable” laws.  The effectiveness of the legal and regulatory framework heavily relies on 
the capacity of parliament to utilise instruments, mechanisms and tools at its disposal to engage 
citizens, to legislate and oversee the executive. Tools and mechanisms such as the committee 
systems, questions to ministers, budgetary oversight and commissions of inquiry and the debates 
in plenary structure parliamentary participation ensuring effective representation and oversight of 
the policy making process (Johnson, 2005). These instruments and tools, depending on the model 
of power, enable parliament to act independently to provide avenues for debate and analysis of 
public policy.  
 
Detailed and sector specific regulation can either block technological developments by locking 
the development in certain paths or can be overtaken by technological advancements (Henten et 
al., 2002). Thus, capacity is a critical element relevant to the ICT sector is parliament's capacity 
to develop laws that adapt to dynamic changes in the environment such as convergence and 
divergence, either in the immediate term or in anticipation of trends19 (World Bank et al., 2009). 
Due to the rapid growth of the ICT sector, ICT scholars (World Bank et al., 2009); McNamara, 
2008) emphasise elements of flexibility and foresight as critical in the process of designing new 
legislative frameworks. Inadequate capacity can result in laws that are of low quality, varying 
incompatibility, uniformity (for example, legal terminology) and applicability, and frequently 
having severe inconsistencies and shortcomings needing immediate amendments (Staranova & 
Mathernova, 2003). Considering that the market of new technologies changes often, legislators 
are advised to be mindful not to develop legislation that may rapidly become outdated or 
redundant.  
 
The increasingly complex legislation process requires specialised knowledge, expertise, and 
careful analysis to design appropriate laws, and parliaments tend to rely on external consultants 
                                                          




to assess and draft laws. The literature seems to suggest that as developing countries move 
further along the ICT reforms trajectory, in the context of rapid technological changes, their 
capacity needs become more complex, more context-specific, and more focused on ongoing 
problem-solving than on one-off acquisition of technical policy or regulatory skills (McNamara 
et al., 2008). Often parliaments lack expertise in specialised areas such as ICT and depend on 
external expertise to solve arising problems. However  Staranova & Mathernova (2003) warn 
that the practice of relying on external consultants has a danger of ‘state capture’20; where the 
hired consultants come from interest groups and, often, the low capacity of the parliamentary 
officials disables them to detect concepts or strategies  that may be beneficial solely to these 
interest groups.  
 
To address the lack of expertise parliaments seek training opportunities for both members of 
parliament and staff. However, as noted by McNamara et al. (2008), the bulk of capacity 
building efforts currently in place are aimed at a narrow range stakeholders, for example with 
inadequate attention given to other key interested parties in the broader ecosystem. Effective and 
locally appropriate policy and regulation depend on the participation and capacity of 
parliamentarians to analyze, adapt and advocate for appropriate measures to achieve national 
development goals. Furthermore, given the step-by-step and contextual nature of most policy and 
regulation, the "one-off" training and capacity building approach used for policy makers does not 
adequately equip them to make sequential, complex and locally-  contextualised decisions 
necessary to guide a long and complicated process of sector reform (McNamara, 2008).  
 
Lobbying for policy and regulatory reform in ICT, like any other policy, should be based on 
evidence, facts, and figures from respective constituents. According to Stiglitz (1999), 
developing legislation is thus a time-consuming process that requires careful and in-depth studies 
before deciding on which regulations or combination of laws and regulations are appropriate and 
suitable. It, therefore, follows that the law making process (ICT laws included) should be guided 
                                                          
20 Obtains when a small number of firms (or such entities as the military) is able to shape the rules of the game to 
its advantage through massive illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to officials and politicians. 
Examples of such behaviour include the ability to control legislative votes, to obtain favourable executive 
decrees and court decisions. 
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by a participatory process if parliamentarians are agents representing the interests of their 
constituents.  Such an assumption brings to the fore the capacity of parliament to conduct its 
representative mandate effectively.  Parliament utilises a number of mechanisms such as public 
hearings and opinion polls to capture the knowledge and opinions of respective constituencies 
for inclusion in the legislation process.  
 
The emergence of the e-parliaments21 in the last few years as a concept provides parliaments 
with the opportunity to engage systematically with the development of ICTs as well as their 
governance.  Such international organisations as the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) the Global 
Centre for ICTs in Parliaments, agree that an appreciation of technology is crucial for 
parliaments to engage effectively with ICT policy related issues. The definition pursued by the 
SADC-PF (2008) of an e-parliamentarian clearly articulates the responsibility, motivation and 
leadership roles that parliamentarians “should” play in reforming the ICT sector. However, the e-
parliament concept does not necessarily provide the knowledge required for understanding the 
sector reforms. It is, therefore, important to analyze both the e-parliament processes and the ICT 
law-making process to observe the linkages that exist between having knowledge and capacity of 
the ICT industry and the subsequent quality of the legislative outcome. 
 
2.3 Role of parliament in sector investment and institutional arrangements 
2.3.1 Sector investment  
ICT sector investment is a critical area for parliamentary participation in sector reforms. 
Throughout the developing world, due to significant costs associated with establishing and 
maintaining a telecommunications infrastructure, monopolistic or oligopoly markets continue to 
exist and fail to meet the mandates of universal and affordable service, quality service provision 
to users and product innovation (Stork & Vetter, 2006; Gillwald, 2002). Reforming the ICT 
sector is a necessary but expensive undertaking requiring careful budgetary and oversight 
considerations for successful implementation. Given the importance of ICT for socio-economic 
and political development governments continually seek to ensure there is a semblance of 
universal and affordable access for all citizens (Melody, 2005). Successful reform requires an 
                                                          
21 A recent development modelled along the lines of e-government  
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investment climate and opportunities shaped by policy and regulatory decisions with clarity for 
state involvement. Recent trends show that some African countries fund and specially license 
state-owned networks, and some governments are increasing their direct involvement in the 
operations of fixed and mobile operators (Melody, 2005; Msimang, 2009).  Such actions pose a 
threat to an otherwise stable regulatory environment. 
 
What is evident in literature is that countries investing sufficiently in reforming the ICT Sector 
are starting to realise the benefits. World Bank (2009), through its International Development 
Association (IDA) projects, reports that IDA countries that have implemented significant sector 
reforms generated around US$30 billion in investment between 1997 and 2007, catering for 
around 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The benefits are a result of an investment 
worth almost US$1 billion of IDA22 funds between 1997 and 2009 to support ICT sector reform, 
regulatory capacity building, and infrastructure investment, in addition to a significant amount of 
advisory services.   
 
Scores of authors on ICT policy and regulatory reforms have increasingly raised concern over 
the lack of sustainable ways to support the implementation of the policy objectives of the ICT 
reforms (Gillwald, 2002; Melody, 2005; Msimang, 2009; Labelle, 2010). These authors seem to 
suggest that funding is critical in securing universal access to ICTs and that there is a need to 
define a funding model especially in circumstances where not doing so is likely to increase the 
digital divide. Msimang (2009) proposes that to fund universal access to ICT infrastructure upon 
which broadband, wireless and other information technologies are based, governments need to 
provide lending support, and implement proper regulation to lower costs. 
 
Labelle (2010) and Msimang (2009) acknowledge the existence of challenges faced by many 
governments in ensuring funding for developing the ICT sector.  Amongst these challenges is the 
limited financial and technical means to embark on meaningful ICT projects. The initial ICT 
reforms - the first round of privatization and liberalization - has not demonstrated significant 
                                                          




gains either. Multiple reasons unique to the political economies of different countries are 
identified. Chief amongst them is the absence of the necessary capacity and resources to enforce 
restructuring policies. The effectiveness of competition as a regulatory tool to contribute to 
public interest outcomes of access, affordability, quality and choice of service is dependent on 
the existence of capacities and resources to implement monitor and enforce the relevant policies. 
Policymakers need to create conditions that are sufficiently certain and predictable to secure the 
investment necessary for infrastructure development (Gillwald, 2002).    
 
The menu of possible strategies and options23 that governments can tap into to fund infrastructure 
development for ICT has become a consistent feature of ICT literature (for example Msimang, 
2009; Melody, 2005; Gillwald, 2002; Labelle, 2010).  What seems to be a challenge in the 
majority of cases, however, is the importance for the government to retain power over the design 
and implementation, and providing financial incentives while also implementing non-financial 
strategies (Msimang, 2009). Furthermore, Misuraca (2007) points out that the global public 
goods approach has become an important alternative framework for justifying financing 
mechanisms that go beyond what the market supplies. Misuraca (2007) argues that extending 
access to the information society in developing countries is a global public good that benefits 
everyone because of the value of network externalities24. The ICT regulatory reform literature 
(including Labelle, 2010; Mimicopoulos, 2004) also suggests other funding sources that can be 
considered. 
 
Parliament plays a significant role in allocating the country's budget in line with set priorities 
shouldering the responsibility of adequately providing funding and creating frameworks that 
attract sufficient investment for ICT sector reforms. Parliament has a number of budgetary and 
oversight instruments at its disposal to ensure sustainable financing for ICT. These, include 
                                                          
23 Options include public treasury financing, universal access/service funds, philanthropic contributions from the 
private sector; foreign direct investment (FDI) venture capital, international financial institutions, debt swap 
financing and transnational corporations; ceding concession to the private sector through a contract based on a 
public private partnership (PPP).  
 
24 The global economy runs on global information networks to create a global marketplace, the private sector in 
developed countries stands to benefit from the extension of ICTs in developing countries and should help pay for 
ICT for development as a global public good. 
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allocating adequate resources for the achievement of key policy objectives (access and 
affordability), overseeing the privatization of incumbents, as well as monitoring efficient and 
effective utilization of resources by the executive (Johnson, 2005). Parliament’s ability to 
establish and oversee independent reform institutions, infrastructure development plans and 
sustained enhanced competition within the sector, support parliament’s legitimacy in this process 
(Jana, 2014). 
 
 It is quite clear that parliament's oversight mechanisms are essential for the effective 
implementation of ICT sector reforms and ensuring that projects and programmes embarked on 
remain focused on public interest. Given that such a large menu of funding possibilities exists, 
parliament should carefully analyze options to propose a sustainable legal approach; an approach 
they have jurisdiction to oversee and at the same time one that ensures that public interest 
remains relevant. The political economy underlying ICT sector development tends to be highly 
sensitive, both due to vested interests and because of labour and revenue implications of 
restructuring, privatization and competition (McNamara et al., 2008). This increases the 
relevance of policy makers and brings to focus their need to design creative incentives to 
increase consumer and investor confidence in the sector (Msimang, 2009).  
 
Parliaments, through the committee systems, are increasingly having a bearing on budget 
allocations and expenditure. Different parliaments use different approaches relevant to the level 
of power supporting their ability to monitor government spending. Essential to this process is the 
existence of capacity of parliament to utilise the tools available for them to engage in oversight. 
For example, budget analysis skills are required to ensure that when the ministry presents its 
budget, it is linked with national priorities and that it will, in fact, achieve policy goals. An 
understanding of the process by which parliaments approve funding options proposed by the 
executive, incorporates public opinion and finally decides on which options to pass into effect 
can highlight significant institutional arrangements needed by parliaments to play effective 
oversight on the reforms.  
 
2.3.2 Sector institutional arrangements  
House of Lords (2004) clearly demonstrates that the process of regulation not only starts with 
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parliament, but its ultimate responsibility rests with parliament. Parliament utilises mechanisms 
at its disposal to play a critical role in every phase of the reforms process. For effective 
participation parliament has to be recognized as a key part of the sector arrangements.  
 
Model ICT sector institutional arrangements emphasise, among other things, clarity of roles and 
objectives of the regulator, independence (autonomy) of the regulator, participation in the 
regulatory process by interested parties, transparency of regulatory decisions and accountability 
of the regulator for its decisions (Figure 2). Two approaches the ministerial and supra-ministerial 
to defining sector arrangements have made an impact on the adoption of internal designs and 

















Figure 2: Parliament role in the reforms process. Source: Author Synthesis 
 
Two proposals that can influence sector arrangements and typology are defined by the United 
Nations (UN) through its Asia and Pacific Centre for ICTs (APCICT), and by the Organization 
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for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)25. According to the World Bank (2010) 
both proposals highlight important of local realities for adopting institutional arrangements that 
work. Furthermore the proposals acknowledge the widespread understanding that regulatory 
institutions are essential to move forward the regulatory agenda. Lastly the proposals are aligned 
to s good practice, but there is little empirical knowledge on how developing countries are 
establishing institutions and processes that reflect their unique reform priorities, stages of 
development, political challenges, and broader contexts (World Bank, 2010).   
 
The United Nations (UN) proposal develops ICT models based on the realization that strategies 
for institutionalising ICT sector reforms differ among countries. While some countries prefer to 
have policy functions integrated under one ministry, in other countries the functions are shared 
across several ministries (Song & Oh, 2012). The supra-ministerial approach adopts a rationalist 
perspective that gives formal authority of the processes to the president or prime minister of a 
country. The ministerial approach follows an incrementalism perspective, that favors policy 
functions distributed to several ministries, with a centralised role of a higher level authority 
being absent or weak. The UN defines an accepted approach described in Table 2 emerging as 
best practice sector arrangements for ICT sector governance globally. The approaches are the 
supra-ministerial approach mostly prevalent in developed countries with mature markets and 
stable democracies, and the ministerial approach mostly prevalent in developing countries where 
the market is still immature (Song & Oh, 2012). The Ministerial approach utilises one or some 
mix of the four models described in Table 3. 
                                                          
25 International organization helping governments tackle the economic, social and governance challenges of a 




Table 2: ICT Models based on the Supra-Ministerial Approach 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Song and Oh (2012) 
The OECD model is based on a typology; of the most commonly found institutional 
arrangements for regulatory reform that focuses on four different institutions, as follows: 
 
 Regulatory oversight bodies located within the executive branch and charged with 
driving and managing regulatory reform efforts across government on a day-to-day 
basis (UK, Italy, Serbia, US and Kenya).  
 High-level committees for regulatory reform charged with leading and guiding 
reforms from the political level (Canada, Denmark and Bangladesh). 
 Advisory and/or advocacy bodies charged with challenging and advising the 
government’s regulatory reform policy (Croatia, UK, and Australia). 
 Ad-hoc institutions established to spearhead specific tasks and regulatory review 
(Mexico, Vietnam and Kenya). 
 
                                                          
26 Committees take various forms in terms of title (e.g., committee, commission, council), format (e.g., formal vs. 
informal; regular vs. ad hoc) and function (e.g., resolution or decision, deliberation, advice, argumentation, 
advocacy). Committees can include representatives of political parties and stakeholders such as trade union, 
employers’ associations, and non- governmental organisations, as well as experts from think tanks and academia.  
Model Critical element 
Chief executive staff model Staff members develop policies under the direct control 
of the president or prime minister e.g. UK and USA. 
Cabinet committee model Cabinet committees consisting of relevant ministers 
dealing with various policy areas are brought together 
to plan and coordinate cross-cutting policy activities 
e.g. Canada. 
Supra-ministerial committee model Establishes committees26 under the direct control of the 
president, prime minister or vice prime minister e.g.  
Republic of Korea. 
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Table 3: ICT Models based on the Ministerial Approach 
Model Critical elements  
Planning and budgeting (finance 
and treasury) 
Utilises ministries in charge of finance, budget and planning by 
letting them control the ICT budgets required by other ministries 
and thus integrating ICT policy into long-term economic 
development plans and expenditure frameworks e.g. Australia and 
Finland 
Administrative process model 
(public services and interior 
affairs) 
Utilises the plans of the public service ministry to improve front 
office services and back office management e.g. Japan) 
Techno- industrial model 
(science, technology, industry  
and trade) 
Exploits the loosely networked relations among organisations 
(players)27 in the public and private sector that share common 
interests in ICT policy and  consider ICTs as a strategic tool for  
industrial competitiveness and vitalizing domestic and global e.g. 
Canada and the USA 
Integrated ICT model A specific ministry is given full authority over and responsibility 
for most ICT policy functions. Such a ministry can be established 
by either transforming an existing organization or by forming a 
new “niche” ministry with the role of planning and executing ICT 
policy e.g. India, the Republic of Korea (1995-2007) and Saudi 
Arabia 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Song and Oh (2012) 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Parliament is a constitutionally mandated institution that performs a number of functions which,  
reflect formal powers to hold the executive to account, represent the nation in its diversity of 
interests, make laws for the good governance of the country (SADC-PF,2010. Furthermore, 
parliament is expected to ratify and domesticate policy, approve the national budgets, taxation 
policy and monitor public expenditure.  
                                                          
27 Government agencies, universities, research centers and firms,  leading the wide spectrum of ICT policy issues 
such as R&D, and industrial and market  development 
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This chapter has highlighted significant challenges faced by parliament in facilitating consistent 
and non-fragmented support for policy making through effective accountability and scrutiny to 
hold the government to account for its actions. Another challenge stems from an inability to 
enforce delegation to regulatory agencies and guaranteeing independence from political 
influence.  The challenges reflect among other factors the existence of interrelated and multiple 
accountabilities placed on government bodies, ministries and parliament. The challenges reflect 
withheld and declining public confidence as well as the minimised tradeoffs between having an 
independent agent against the threats to the proper process of democratic accountability. 
A set of critical determinants to solve the above challenges is identified in this chapter. These 
include having a political governance context where the role of parliament in government and the 
rules in use are clearly articulated understood and enforced by all impacted stakeholders. The 
governance context determines the relationships between the state, the market and civil society, 
the extent of political space and support for active citizenship and impacts the way parliament 
conducts its business. The level of institutional development and the institutional capacity 
influences the degree of executive dominance, legislative knowledge, flexibility and adaptability 
of parliament, and especially the committee, to respond and deal with ICT-related policy issues. 
The establishment of specialised committees’ increases parliamentary involvement in decision 
making as it permits parliament to stretch its resources both regarding people and time, to inquire 
into issues in ways that the full house would find cumbersome.  
 
Parliament plays a critical role in a number of areas especially in defining an enabling 
environment for sector reforms. There are fundamental institutional designs and institutional 
arrangements required for effective parliamentary participation in the ICT sector reforms 
processes. Mainly, because the ICT sector represents a complex ICT ecosystem where the 
interplay of different institutional arrangements calls for a enabling environment, to ensure 
effectiveness reform processes.   
 
ICT literature points to the governance context, political and colonial conditions, political 
interests, power relations, as significant to the ability of parliament to command political 
resources,  exercise oversight, strength to delegate authority, clarity of rules to define roles and 
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responsibilities as factors that influence parliamentary participation and effectualness. 
Noteworthy from the literature is how the representation function influences MP incentives and 
structures political participation based on the principal-agency relationships established. It is this 
function that then structures how the interests of the citizens are captured and linked to 
government decision making. The establishment of committees has allowed parliament to 
become pervasive and resilient in its role. Through committee systems parliament can stretch its 
resources, provide a less adversarial atmosphere for consensus building, and develop the capacity 
to deal with expert issues such as ICT.  
 
The theoretical perspectives underpinning parliamentary participation discussed in this chapter 
will be weaved together with the main concepts discussed in the next chapter to develop the 







THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Whereas there is a wide body of literature on ICT sector reforms (for example Majone, 1994, 
1990; Li et al., 2000; Berg and Hamilton, 2001; Gillwald, 2002, 2005, 2010; Gottinger, 2003; 
Melody, 2005; Pasha, 2005; Jain, 2006; Stork, 2006; McNamara, 2008: Infodev, 2008) and 
parliamentary development and performance (Weingast & Marshall, 1998; Norton,1998: 
USAID, 2000; Johnson, 2005; Rahman, 2005; Wang, 2005; Staddon, 2007; Yamamoto, 2007; 
World Bank, 2009, 2010; Jana, 2014) and indeed on institutionalism (Giddens 1981, 1984; 
North, 1990; Immergut, 1998; Ostrom, 1990, 2005, 2007; Steinmo, 2001), there is very little 
literature on the intersection between parliament and ICT policy and regulatory reforms.  
 
This chapter reviews this literature to draw out the contending theories and concepts in these 
distinct areas and to weave them together into a conceptual framework to address research 
questions raised in chapter 1§ 1.4.  The literature review locates the research in this thesis within 
the political economy tradition, as it seeks to provide an understanding of the interplay of the 
institutionalist and political perspectives that determine the context, sector processes, established 
institutions and practices; agency and  interests (Drazen, 2008; DFID, 2009; Mosco, 2009; 
Tompson & Price, 2009; Palan, 2013; Poulton & Douarin, 2014) within different social and 
economic systems that influence outcomes in the ICT sector, defining key institutional factors for 
effective parliamentary participation.  
 
As pointed out in chapter 2 parliaments are political institutions reflecting diverse interests, 
actors and decision-making processes to influence policy outcomes. As the central institution in 
my analysis, it is important at this juncture to contextualise the institution of parliament by 
attempting a definition in advance of conducting a review of its participation in ICT sector 
reform.  I draw upon some definitions of parliament that have been put forward by scholars (for 
example Weingast & Marshall, 1998; Johnson, 2005) to define parliament as a polity with rules, 
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policy practices, planning and budgeting principles that structure the patterns of interaction 
internally and externally with other institutions, with intended and unintended outcomes.  
 
This definition assumes that parliament has a set of working rules for actors in the political 
decision-making process to refer to when they decide on policies for implementation in a 
country. The rules determine who is eligible to participate, make and veto decisions, what actions 
are allowed or constrained, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must 
not be provided, transaction costs and payoffs will be assigned to individuals as a result of their 
actions (Weingast & Marshall,1998; Ostrom, 1999). With these characteristics, parliaments are 
then a set of institutional arrangements with the power to shape policy outcomes (Poulton & 
Douarin, 2014). To understand the role of parliaments in policy formulation, systematic way to 
analyze these arrangements and power dynamics to generate and compare alternatives, is 
required, an element of which political economy enables an analysis. 
 
3.1 Political economy tradition  
To examine the complex interrelations within the ICT sector, I draw extensively on insights from 
the political economy tradition. More specifically those insights applicable to the ICT sector 
reforms (Mosco, 1995; Winseck, 1995; Li et al., 2000; Gillwald, 2009; Tompson & Price, 2009; 
Palan, 2013; Spruyt, 2013). Political economy is concerned with how political forces influence 
the economy and the economic outcomes (Poulton & Douarin, 2014)28.  Poulton & Douarin 
(2014) locate political economy at the intersection of economics, culture and political relations; 
where it draws upon economics, sociology, and political science to explain how political 
institutions, the political environment, and the economic system—capitalist, socialist, or 
mixed—influence each other. As Mosco (2009) observes, the focus is on the social relations, 
particularly power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and 
consumption of resources as well as the drivers for reconsidering a wide range of established 
institutions and practices in an effort to increase potential output ( Tompson & Price,2009).   
                                                          
28 The interactions, however, run both ways. It is economic activity that generates the resources that are required to 
sustain political activity.  Policy might lead to a certain economic activity prospering, and this can generate interest 






A useful, political economy perspective that this study draws upon is that of Palan (2013), 
grounding political economy in the theory of the state to concentrate on how order or change 
comes about. Change is a perspective that enables an understanding of why states perform as 
they do by focusing on critical concepts such as the interplay between state and power. These 
same concepts allow for an exploration of the interaction between political and economic 
processes within society to examine how policy-makers acquire power (Drazen, 2008). The 
concern is centred on the production, distribution, exchange, consumption and usage of different 
types of values and power, built upon the fundamental forces and processes at work in the 
marketplace (Collinson, 2003; Mosco, 2009). The above-mentioned perspectives are useful in 
investigating parliamentary processes as a critical element in state decision-making processes, 
given its centrality to managing the power dynamics that influence policy outcomes.  
 
The political economy tradition focuses the analysis on who the political actors are – specifically 
the policy-makers and in particular for this study the parliamentarians and the citizenry or the 
electorate. Their interests and objectives as well as the political mechanisms and constraints in 
place- to set the 'rules of the game' for the selection of leaders and those that structure the process 
by which policies are made (Drazen, 2008; Poulton and Douarin, 2014) are major perspective for 
this thesis. 
 Central to any political analysis, the structure and agency debate provides a framework that 
explains the dynamics of interaction between agency, structure and social change to attribute 
causation (Kleine, 2010; Sibeon, 1999; Aston, n.d). Aston further alludes to the fact that political 
theory needs “abstraction and over-simplification to explain phenomena and change” (Aston, 
n.d: 9). As Ostrom (2005) asserts, opportunities and constraints faced in any particular situation, 
the information and benefits obtained or excluded from, and the reasoning capacity about the 
situation are all affected by the rules or absence of rules that structure the situation. 
While same structures can exist as a result of reform agency of individuals, collectives can 
change processes and outcomes.  Parliament as an individual resource-based agency can operate 
within a given structure to achieve desired outcomes. However, the ICT sector is by nature 
linked to different elements and embedded in structures that influence the agency’s ability to 
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make decisions.  A well-resourced agency, able to support the participation in decision-making of 
a broad range of interests with a lenient standard for judicial review, will be far less dependent 
for information on well-resourced and well-represented interests and is required to meet a very 
high judicial standard for upholding its decisions. On the other hand “…an agency which has a 
broad range of responsibilities but which repeatedly follows the orientations of the parliament or 
politicians has little effective power” (Jordana & Sancho, 2004:309).    
 
McCubbins et al.(1989) having investigated political manipulations of some of the structures and 
processes that appear to allow for independent decision-making, identified ways in which rule-
making can be influenced by an agency’s structure and processes.  The ways in which the 
structure and processes are set up for the agency affect their dependence on information critical 
to decision-making. However, the way in which processes are manipulated to alert politicians to 
non-compliance by administrative agencies often requires lengthy processes before decisions can 
be made.  As McNollgast (1989) argue, this provides politicians with an opportunity to avert 
non-compliance with the preferences, which is always much less costly than a formal reversion 
of regulations.  
 
Through the use of economic tools to examine political phenomena, analysis of the impact of 
self-interest of political agents in generating policy outcomes (Poulton and Douarin, 2014; Palan, 
2013; Spruyt, 2013) political economy provides a useful framework for defining factors of 
parliamentary effectiveness. This makes this research a concentrated analysis of “a specific set of 
social relations organised around power or the ability to control other people and processes even 
in the face of resistance” (Mosco 2009:24) providing a firm foundation for the analysis of 
parliament as a political institution that contributes to how public policy is created and 
implemented.  
 
Important elements of the political economy that underpin this study are analytically described in 
the sections that follow.  
 
3.1.1 Neopatrimonialism 
As Lopes (2015) observes any analysis of African politics is bound to be complex, given the 
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variety of contextual and societal factors concerning the intrinsic nature and cultural 
underpinnings of the African context.  Countries differ in “form and content depending on how 
the configuration of class and  social context, coalition building, alignment and realignment of 
political actors, agencies and political outcomes contribute to defy any strict characterization of 
African politics” (Lopes 2015:13). 
 
This research adopts an analytical approach and methodology that take into account the history, 
social structure and context, political agency and institutional framework of the political action 
and policy. Whilst the departing colonial powers patterned modern state institutions such as 
parliament on Western models as defined in Chapter 2, this only provides a normative framework 
for the analysis of the formal behavior, political context and authority, domination and legitimacy 
of most nascent democracies. In the African context the political setting can be further 
understood through a number of paradigms including that of neopatrimonialism, derivations of 
which are discussed below.   
 
Neopatrimonialism identifies a “pathology of African politics” and describes a ‘haven of patron 
client relationships’ (Lopes 2015:6). It remains the most ‘complete explanation of nature of 
African governance and perceived failure of its evolution to democracy’ (Nyaluke 2014: 1). 
Mkandawire (2013) supports O’Neil’s observations in describing it is a system of social 
hierarchy where patrons use state resources to secure the loyalty of the general population. 
Furthermore the element of informality in the patron-client relationship can reach high levels 
within state structures and down to individuals at village levels. Mkandawire’s observations 
provide an empirical basis for predictions and policy prescriptions that argue that 
neopatrimonialism is descriptive of the social practices of the states and individuals that occupy 
different positions. These perspectives ultimately constitutes important elements of attitudes and 
knowledge of those dealing with government. This analysis should assist in placing the case 
studies of South Africa and Kenya into a more appropriate theoretical and empirical setting.   
 
Neopatrimonialism literature is mainly derived from Weberian sociology with a vast scholarship 
in different areas and disciplines (for example Erdmann and Engel , 2007; O’Neil  2007; Bach & 
Gazibo, 2012; Mkandawire, 2013; Gray & Whitefield, 2014; Lopes 2015,)  Common to these is 
60 
 
the location of the logic of patrimonialism in social relations that reflect the precolonial traditions 
and differing experiences in the genealogy of each country to define its democratic footprint, 
distribution of power and political legitimacy. As such the different effects of apartheid and the 
colonial regime in South Africa and Kenya respectively matter in shaping its current political 
economic and democratic conditions. These scholars assert historical, contemporary perspective 
and concepts such as precolonial traditions and practices, colonial encounters, post-colonial 
nation building, state civil relationships, political transitions, social movements, parties and other 
political institutions as critical to the political trajectory of each country.  
 
It is the assertion of these scholars that while colonialism disrupted existing traditional patterns 
of authority, reconstructed and reconfigured clientelism survived and can explain the continued 
existence of traditional power relations and the prominence of informal rules with the ‘big man’ 
presiding over weak societies ( O’Neil, 2007; Bach & Gazibo, 2012) . In the big man rule 
scenario autocratic leaders accumulate wealth and maintain order by relying on patrimonial 
authority over citizens to solidify political support and cohesion among political elites. State 
resources are used to reward supporters for their loyalties but also for the personal enrichment of 
leaders and the state is autonomous from society. Neopatrimonialism underlays the bureaucratic 
structure of the state as it defines the source of power as connections rather than positions  
 
Political legitimacy is a critical element of neopatrimonialism in that imported nature of African 
states at independence disrupted pre-existing institutions (O’Neil, 2007). To maintain power, 
political leaders use neopatrimonial strategies to secure the loyalty of competing elites on the 
assumption that there are groups of elites with the right to rule. Thus contesting the right to rule 
and making legitimacy dependent on a variety of factors including state performance.  In 
instances where the internal configuration of power and desires of polity have not been catered 
for, unitary systems of government are used to manage diversity in plural societies, concentrating 
and centralising power around political leaders both institutionally and operationally. The 
outcome is a political landscape characterised by multi-party democracy is some instances and 
one party systems in others as influenced by the imperatives of state-building.  
 
Both Lopes (2015), and Mkandawire (2013) argue that the conditionality of these imperatives 
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imposed on democracy represents the most sophisticated form of regulation and the basis of 
politics and power as the means of allocating scarce resources in political communities. This 
contributes to the conceptual framework used to analyse parliamentary development in Africa by 
providing insight into how parliament in a policy making ecosystem to appreciate how 
parliament makes and sustains relationships with other key stakeholders through informal 
relations. Even though the quality and progress of democracy in Africa may be limited, the 
nature of politics is changing. Though outcomes are uneven, developments on the continent over 
the last decade have seen democratic tendencies, multi-party perspectives, observance of the rule 
of law, and increased institutional checks and civil political participation. Parliament and other 
institutions of democracy are as a result challenging the administrative fiat of the executive and 
redefining their dominance in the public sphere. 
 
While neopatrimonialism has become the conventional wisdom as the pathology of African 
politics and is considered the “convenient, all purpose, and ubiquitous moniker for African 
governance” both Lopes (2015:7) and Mkandawire (2015) feel it fails to provide the analytical 
content and explanatory capacity that would advance knowledge on nature of politics, economy 
and society or provide predictive value with respect to economic policy and performance. 
Building on Mkandawire there is a need to better understand the state in order for it to better 
perform its role in economic policy and performance. Futhermore Bach & Gazibo (2012) 
observe that while concepts from neopatrimonialism may shape and impact broader society the 
nature of the African state at all levels remains somehow absent from the narrative. There is still 
a sense that overall the complexity and context of the African  state has been  missed  as  there is 
very little consideration for how the traditional elites still exist and intertwine with the workings 
of the state (especially at local levels), for example.  
 
3.1.2 Political Economy of Communications (PEC)  
The ICT industry has become one of the fastest economic sectors and produces highly valuable 
goods (ICT infrastructure and the information) in the world marketplace.  However, significant 
economies of scale are required to upset several characteristics that make ICT services 
untradeable in markets and unlikely to deliver optimal and economically efficient prices and 
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quantities (CDRF, 2007).  
 
Technological advancements have dramatically transformed the telecommunications sector, with 
the existence of privatised firms increasing especially in developing countries over the last 30 
years (Li et al., 2000). Accordingly, the rise of privatization has reduced state involvement in 
areas where historically the state was directly involved in building infrastructure, setting 
technical standards, regulating market access and directly providing services and allowing the 
private sector to provide services (Mosco, 2009). The implications of the changing nature of the 
state, and consequently the changing nature of infrastructure industries giving rise to new 
regulatory requirements and approaches, are elements which the political economy perspective 
embraces.  
 
There are both theoretical and methodological considerations that make the work by Mosco 
(2009) appealing to this study.  Mosco (2009) highlights political economy of communications 
(PEC) as providing an entry point into the social analysis by providing a substantive focus for 
thinking about characteristic social practices. He anchors PEC in an inclusive and subjectivist 
epistemological framework in which causality favors ‘multiple, dynamic interactions’ because 
the reality is constituted by many sources and cannot be reduced to either economics or culture.  
Mosco’s (2009) approach is anchored in the belief that concepts, ideas and observations guide 
our thinking, rejecting the view that only our ideas or only our observations, but not both, are 
real.  Mosco’s (2009) approach follows an ontology that stresses structures and institutions rather 
than ‘change, processes and relativism’, bringing to the fore concepts of social change, social 
processes, and social relations, even if that means “re-evaluating the emphasis that political 
economy has traditionally placed on social institutions” (Mosco, 2009:1) .  
 
3.1.3 Political interests  
The general assumption by political economists (North, 1990; Collinson, 2003; Poulton & 
Douarin, 2014) is that the ‘public interest” that policy seeks to promote can be reasonably 
defined. Interest is linked to the correction of market failures in pursuit of economic growth, 
poverty reduction or general welfare (Poulton & Douarin, 2014). The rationalist perspective that 
has for so long dominated policy analysis assumes the state to be a rational and calculating actor 
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(Palan, 2013). This point of view may provide useful explanations for legislative behavior by 
allowing for the generation of a testable hypothesis linking the motives of individual 
parliamentarians, institutional structures and policies (Saalfeld, 1995; Hall & Taylor, 1996). It is 
however too simplistic a notion and does not adequately explain nonlinear, complex process, 
vested and conflicts of interest associated with policy outcomes. In reality, it is nearly impossible 
to define a single 'public interest' in a complex world of multiple actors, interests and imperfect 
markets (Palan, 2013; Poulton & Dourain, 2014). As such decisions have to be taken about 
competing interests and claims on scarce resources. 
 
Furthermore, as observed by North (1990) the political elites, of which parliamentarians are a 
part of, are the ultimate determinants of national policy. North (1990) argues that elites tend to 
set policies that serve their interests first and foremost, without much consideration of who 
benefits. The powerful interest groups, visibly working at the macro governance level, have the 
ability to influence policy to further their own economic and/or political interests. A good 
example of this is seen in how non-government actors are concerned with economic outcomes 
and government actors with own private economic interests such as retaining positions of power.  
Political economy models allow for an in-depth analysis of the macro level interests, rules of the 
game facing top political player and functions of the highest level political institutions (Palan, 
2013).   
 
Some political scientists (for example Bates, 2002; Palan, 2013) have further argued that power 
is the missing element in a rational choice approach. This emphasises the potentially destructive 
nature that power can have. Therefore, suggestions have been put forth to integrate ‘power’ into 
the rational choice perspectives. It is this limitation of the rational choice perspective that 
promotes an investigation on the conditions under which rational individuals cooperate in 
collective action problems. The rational choice theory makes the institutions - the underlying 
political powers, bureaucratic agencies or social and private organisations - a critical part of a 
political analysis.  However, as emphasised by the power based perspective, cooperation (as is 
assumed in rational choice models) does not always lead to beneficial outcomes for all. Instead, 




Again, political behavior is influenced by ideologies. When constrained by multiple realities or 
bounded rationality, and when they cannot assess all possible outcomes from all different 
choices, individuals tend to get guidance from ideologies consistent with their fundamental 
beliefs and values in life (DFID, 2009). Incorporating ideology into political economy models 
allows for the inclusion of other relevant factors, supporting the fact that some political action is 
motivated by factors other than pure self-interest. 
 
3.1.4 Institutions  
Institutions matter in the policy making process, but they matter differently depending on how 
the institution is defined and what scope is applied (Riker, 1982; Ostrom et al., 1994). 
Institutions are the formal or informal 'rules of the game' that structure human behavior and the 
incentives facing political actors (North, 1990; Poulton & Douarin, 2014). Institutional theorists 
provide differing perspectives on what constitutes an institution (Giddens, 1981, 1984; North, 
1990; Ostrom, 1990; Saalfeld, 1995; Immergut, 1998; Steinmo, 2001) which this study draws 
upon in analyzing relationships, behaviors and choices made in parliament.  
 
What is common to all these perspectives is their agreement on the difficulty of defining 
institutions.  There is on one hand, the view of institutionalist such as Song & Oh (2012), and 
Ostrom (2007), who define institutions as organizational entities such as the parliament or a 
government ministry in a narrow sense. On the other hand, the broader definition of shared rules, 
norms and strategies operating within or across organisations is more widely shared although 
Yoo (2008) observes that the definition varies depending on the purpose of the research. Riker 
(1982) defines institutions as “rules about behavior, especially about making decision”. North 
(1990) on the other hand defines institutions as “....the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.  Ostrom (1986, 1999) 
defines institutions as” rules (working rules or rules-in-use) that refer to prescriptions commonly 
known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships that 
produce outcomes affecting those individuals and potentially affecting others.” The 
amalgamation of the above definitions provides this study with a definition of an institution that 





Defining institutions in this study allow for an analysis of the behavior, decision making 
processes, structures, interaction patterns and organization of parliament. That will, however, not 
be sufficient as the context of the above still requires an understanding of the formality with 
which the defined institutions operate. A formal institution is understood in relation to the legal 
sphere, with constitutions, regulations, and statutory bodies and the entities that these refer to - 
public and private institutions. These define matters such as how leaders are chosen and how a 
new policy can be introduced. An informal institution is a set of norms, conventions, moral 
values, religious belief and traditions, and other behavioral norms that determine individual 
behavior in pursuit of their aim (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1986, 1990).  In practice, informal norms 
and ways of doing things might be as influential in shaping actual outcomes. 
 
Institutions are important for policy reform precisely because they are “intentional constructions 
that structure information and create incentives to act or not to act in a particular situation” 
(Polski & Ostrom, 1999).   In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic.  Thus, research that perceives institutions as an important 
underlying factor would look to both the various rules and laws related to a defined policy area 
(Ostrom, 1986; 1999) but also extend to how they function by examining the informal factors 
that influence outcomes.  
 
Implementing institutions require arrangements that dynamically capture the essence of both the 
formal and informal regimes and coalitions for collective action and inter-agent coordination 
shaped by economic exchange, socio-cultural norms and political regimes (Geels, 2004). 
Institutional arrangements are shaped by national and international contexts and tend to mutually 
influence each other within a framework of complex interlinkages and strategic feedbacks. At the 
core interest are the exogenous and endogenous drivers of change with implications for policy 
processes, self-interest, and power and enforcement coordination.  
 
It is upon these understandings of institutions, together with those of legislative institutions 
specific to the work by Weingast & Marshal (1988), Norton,1998, Rahman, 2005; Wang, 2005  
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that I draw on to conceptualise the contextual factors that influence behavior,  decision making, 
interaction and  participation in ICT sector reforms from a parliamentary perspective.  
 
3.1.5 Institutional constellation  
As the nature of the state changes and power shifts from the centre to specialised agencies, 
power is formally delegated to them to deal with an increasing complexity of decision making 
under rapidly changing conditions. To analyze these changing conditions a ‘constellations 
perspective’ has emerged in the literature which implies that the regulatory chain (i.e. rule-
making, licensing, monitoring, enforcement) is no longer performed by a single organization. 
Although all components should still be present in the sector, it is likely that functions are spread 
across several bodies. From a purely organizational perspective, an institutional constellation can 
be defined as the set of formal organisations that are mandated to perform one or several 
regulatory tasks within a particular field (Rommel, 2009). It is the “aggregate level that 
assembles different single institutions interacting because of decisions related to the same policy 
area” (Jordana & Sancho, 2004: 298).  
 
Since regulations are a product of the interplay between several bodies, the constellation of 
institutions perspective provides a mechanism for placing a focus on parliament’s regulatory 
capacities and enrolment procedures as an actor involved in the regulatory system (Hood et al., 
2001; Black, 2003).Moreover, the fact that institutional constellations “shape to a great extent the 
problems of governance and policy change in regulatory policies, distil political conflict, and 
connect sector policy-making to other sectors’ problems and priorities’ (Jordana & Sancho, 2004: 
299) in essence reflects parliament’s goals for participating in policymaking and creating an 
enabling environment to ensure policy outcomes.  
 
Jordana & Sancho (2004) provide a conceptual matrix to analyze regulatory configurations by 
“institutional constellations” through three key dimensions of institutional diversity, distribution 
of responsibility and power structure as detailed in Table 4. Jordana and Sancho’s matrix (Table 
4) reflects many arrangements that are used in an institutional structure, ranging from complete 
government control to self-regulation with consequences of fragmentation, high dispersion of 
responsibilities and hierarchical or centralised power structures. Even collective and individual 
67 
 
decision-making procedures and the political culture29 embedded in any institutional 
constellations aid the understanding of parliamentary participation.  
 
   Table 4: Jordana and Sancho matrix for analysing regulatory configurations 
    





Institutional diversity Number of institutions 
involved. 






Allocation of policy 
decisions to different 
institutions. 






Power structure Institutional capacity to 
control policy decisions. 




Source: Jordana & Sancho (2004). 
 
Jordana & Sancho in the matrix (Table 4) present concepts that facilitate the institutional analysis 
of parliament in a number of ways.  These concepts allow the incorporation of measures of 
power with factors that can better influence effective autonomy over decision-making, such as 
the power to veto or reverse decisions, or the anticipation of preferences. Furthermore, decision-
making processes can then be explored empirically through an examination of the laws that 
delegate powers to the agency to regulate a particular sector, the appointment and dismissal 
procedures, and whether the appointments are primarily on the basis of patronage or technical 
ability; the resources at the agency’s disposal, including human and financial; final control or 
who the agency is ultimately accountable to - the judiciary, the legislature or the executive.  
 
Jordana & Sancho (2004) extends the analysis of regulatory configurations to the “whole 
institutional arena”, which was previously confined to just the new agencies, as it is the whole 
that makes a difference in policy processes and outcomes. The focus on institutions consequently 
                                                          
29 Policy dominance, consensus formation and policy coherence. Policy dominance refers to the common understanding about 
who controls the policy area; whilst consensus relates to informal joint-decision systems among the players involved in a 
regulatory arena, and coherence reduces flexibility to ensure policy consistency (Jordana & Sancho, 2004: 310-311). 
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offers “deep discussions of some of the consequences of different configurations for policy-
making” (Jordana & Sancho, 2004: 298) that can facilitate such a cross-country comparative 
analysis of regulatory designs as sought by this thesis.  Furthermore, it facilitates an institutional 
analysis of the impact of institutional structures on the actors involved in the polity. Parliament is 
indeed a “fundamental actor in the regulatory game” (Jordana & Sancho, 2004: 298) representing 
diverse interests, constrained by institutional mechanisms and structures with effects on the 
decision-making processes relevant for policy outcomes. However in doing so, a major 
shortcoming arises, as identified by Rommel (2009). The shortcoming is that the general 
structure of such constellations, as well as the task divisions between its members, is still largely 
unclear. So while conceptualizing institutions within constellations is useful analytically, 
analyzing institutions through the formal interplay between those in a constellation may fail on 
its own to explain how they work. As discussed above the informal interplay between institutions 
- the informal power relations and interests at play and the informal resolution mechanisms - can 
be equally or more important.  
 
Gillwald (2009) extends the Jordana and Sancho matrix (Table 4) to developing countries in 
particular by incorporating the Levy & Spillers (1994) concepts of institutional endowment and 
capacity as factors influencing policy outcomes. Gillwald demonstrates that wider institutional 
ability to transform the economy and society, and the human capacity and competencies, are 
required within the ICT sector for reform efforts to be successful. Furthermore, her framework 
synthesises Jordana and Sancho’s matrix and Campbell’s (2004) institutional change to allow for 
a “structure to analyse the changing nature of state-sector relations, the re-arrangements of 
institutions to consolidate power and negotiate conflict, and the impact that this had on sector 
outcomes.’’(Gillwald, 2009: 360). The integration of these two concepts enables a richer 
understanding of the interplay between the national and sector levels by identifying the 
institutional mechanics at play in the processes of policy formulation and implementation. In 
doing so, she exposes the structural determinants of policy outcomes, such as the conflicts of 
interest in the institutional arrangements, extending a largely economic analysis of a sub-optimal 




To overcome the shortcomings of Jordana & Sancho (2004), in this thesis I draw on this 
intellectual evolution of the notion of institutional constellations by building on Gillwald’s 
(2009) application of Jordana and Sancho’s matrix to developing country contexts (with greater 
emphasis on the interplay between formal and informal power relations). I do so 
specifically by locating parliament in the identified institutional constellation. 
 
This thesis brings a focus on the role of parliament in the institutional constellation responsible 
for regulatory reform in South Africa and Kenya.  As an important veto player, power broker, 
interests’ negotiator, law custodian, and conflict resolver, parliament potentially influences the 
different elements of the institutional constellation and outcomes within the ICT sector.  To 
change any policy parliament, through its mechanisms has to influence individual and collective 
actors to agree to any proposed amendments based on the configuration of veto players in the 
country’s political system (Tsebelis, 2002). Parliament is an agenda setter and often has to make 
proposals acceptable to the other veto players such as ministries with significant control over the 
policies that replace the status quo. Parliament structures the sequence of veto players in specific 
ways to make policy decisions, and it is inversely related to policy stability.  
 
To understand the realities of parliamentary participation in a complex policy environment with 
the power dynamics of multiple actors, interests and institutions such as in the ICT sector reform, 
this thesis places parliament in a conceptual framework that combines the concept of ICT as a 
complex ecosystem (Fransman, 2007, 2008, 2010; Gillwald, 2012) with that of a constellation of 
institutions (Jordana &Sancho, 2004; Gillwald, 2009), the interplay among which influences 
reform outcomes.    
 
3.2 New institutionalism  
This study adopts a new institutionalism approach, specifically historical institutionalism.  New 
institutionalism acknowledges that political economy is a principal factor structuring the 
collective behavior of actors to achieve distinct outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996).  This allows the 
research to escape from a purely structural type analysis that views institutional arrangements as 
based only on economic, cultural variables and presents politics rather as a process than just a 
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decision system oriented to output production (Immergut, 1998; Lecours, 2005).  
 
By adopting a historical institutionalism approach the thesis allows for an analysis that construes 
the relationship between institutions and behavior in broader terms than interests and outcomes, 
as well as between politics, state and society in a particular historical period explaining the 
process by which institutions originate or change (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998).  
Interactions are structured to generate distinct “national trajectories” that emphasise the impact 
of national political institutions on the structuring of the relationship between legislators, 
organised interests, the electorate and judiciary (Lecours, 2005). Furthermore, it provides the 
research with a basis for understanding how the organization of parliament structures conflict so 
as to privilege the interests and preferences of certain groups, specifying the mechanisms through 
which it shapes the parameters of choice and emphasizing the asymmetries of the associated 
power (Immergut, 1998; Lecours, 2005).  
 
Consequently new institutionalism provides a perspective for understanding the political system.  
The polity is viewed as an overall system of “interacting parts”, where the behavior of actors in 
the system depends on institutional constraints within which they act (Immergut, 1998; Lecours, 
2005). Such an approach facilitates the integration of other factors and ideas into the analysis as 
important determinants of political outcomes.  It allows for the diffusion of processes and 
institutional arrangements, with the nature and functioning of regimes and associated institutions 
with the organisation and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organisations (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996; Lecours, 2005).   
 
Historical institutionalism, especially as applied to the ICT sector, aids the analysis of institutions 
and behavior, explaining the process by which institutions change (Majone, 1994, 1997; Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; Jordana & Sancho, 2004; Gillwald, 2009; Rommel, 2009).  Understanding of the 
nature and outcomes of state intervention within the ICT sector is fundamental to identifying the 
determinants of effective parliamentary participation. 
   
3.2.1 Changing nature of state  
The nature of the state as the primary institution that formulates policies matters to contextualise 
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parliamentary participation in the ICT sector and provide an understanding of the arrangements 
and linkages within state institutions. One of the primary roles of the state in economic 
development is correcting market failure through effective policy - for example, removing 
barriers to market entry or introducing competition in previously monopolistic markets. It is, 
therefore, assumed that the state will regulate private market activity, provide public goods or 
services and establish institutions that facilitate information exchange, assist contract 
enforcement and protect property rights (Poulton & Douarin, 2014).  
 
Continued globalization of markets, supported by the explosion of new communication 
technologies, has fundamentally changed the nature of the state and market engagement. With 
increasingly globalised markets new forms of governance that extend beyond national 
boundaries have emerged. These rules and codes have necessitated the emergence of entirely 
new entities and multilateral agencies, such as the WTO and the World Intellectual Property 
Rights Organization (WIPO), and the reform of United Nations bodies such as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). The existence of these entities and agencies has led to the 
devolution of power upwards into international governance (with which nation states are 
required to comply), downwards to local authorities, and laterally into specialised agencies 
(Gillwald, 2011). Responding to these challenging systems of governance has become a critical 
part of all political institutions.  
 
Investigations and arguments by political economy scholars on the nature of state can be broadly 
divided into three categories- developmental, regulatory and predatory. Drawingg on Gillwald 
(2009) consideration of these different forms of state about the development of the ICT sector in 
different contexts, and South Africa in particular, the three categories are examined below. 
 
Both Kenya and South Africa claim to be developmental states. However, there is little evidence 
to explain what is understood by this from a policy perspective. The literature, suggests that 
neither country can be described as in a developmental state as there is no evidence of the 
characteristics outlined below. The developmental state is a phenomenon of state-led 
macroeconomic planning that has been prevalent in East Asia since the late twentieth century. By 
definition, it is a state that is focused on economic development and takes necessary policy 
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measures to accomplish that objective (Mosco, 2009). The state has more independent or 
autonomous political power, as well as more control over the economy and is characterised by 
having strong state intervention, as well as extensive regulation and planning (Cohn, 2002). A 
developmental state intervenes more directly in the economy through a variety of means, to 
promote the growth of new industries and to reduce the dislocations caused by shifts in 
investment and profits from old to new industries (Denny, 2006; Rommel, 2009).  
 
On the contrary, the regulatory state governs the economy mainly through regulatory agencies 
empowered to enforce a variety of standards of behavior to protect the public against market 
failures of various sorts, including monopolistic pricing, predation, and other abuses of market 
power, and by providing collective goods that otherwise would be undersupplied by the market ( 
Moran, 2001). While developmental states can pursue industrial policies, regulatory states 
generally cannot. The global liberalization of ICT markets from the 1980s onwards has happened 
in the context of shifting from centralised states to regulatory states characterised by devolution 
of power to specialised agencies that deal with the complexities of modern economies. 
 
In a predatory state, power is concentrated at the top. The personalization of networks of a 
delegation of this authority is rampant, which leads to the instability of political institutions and 
the replacement of the institutions with exclusive relations based on personal and ethnic loyalties 
(Castells, 1999a: 98). The “predatory” state can result in lower levels of both output and popular 
welfare as it may provide public goods, such as protection, and hence may superficially resemble 
a contractual state. However, the ability to offer such goods can reduce public welfare. 
Moreover, the kinds of public goods that predatory states provide are those that increase revenue, 
not necessarily welfare (Mossell & Polak, 2001). Castells (1999) identifies exploitation of 
ethnicity and tribalism for capital accumulation as a major difference between many predatory 
states in Africa and the developmental states in Asia where it is either absent or has been 
managed.  Castells (1999) further explains that the absence of a shared geography, history and 
culture as a result of arbitrary colonial determination of boundaries and political power allows 
for this level of exploitation, unlike in many parts of the Asian Pacific where, despite waves of 




The current development of the world suggests that the second perspective, the regulatory state, 
which will be the prime position of this thesis, is a more reasonable assumption in Africa; at least 
in a foreseeable future.  
 
3.2.2 Regulatory State 
Regulatory reform is happening since the 1980s, such as privatization, liberalization and re-
regulation have given rise to the regulatory state.  The rise of the regulatory state has involved 
the creation of new institutions across countries and sectors (Jordana & Sancho, 2004; Rommel, 
2009). As observed by Majone (1994), while the traditional welfare state was concerned with 
redistribution of income and macroeconomic stabilization, the regulatory state is mainly 
concerned with the correction of market failures via rule-making instead of direct production 
(Rommel, 2009).  
 
The regulatory state entails a new mode of governance, not only with changes in state functions 
(from distribution to regulation) but also with new institutions (Rommel, 2009; Majone, 1997). 
Its diffusion takes into account different existing adaptations and variations of the procedures and 
legal traditions of the decision-making processes (Jordana & Sancho, 2004).  By its nature, the 
regulatory state relies on indirect government, where powers are delegated to a “complex web of 
specialised organisations and the separation of regulatory activities from policy preparation and 
implementation signals credibility” (Rommel, 2009:3).  
 
Regulation increases the number of actors and institutions involved in separating tasks increasing 
the complexity of decision making as n of different institutions with the capacity to intervene 
accumulate. Furthermore, the nation-state increasingly shares authority with sub-national and 
supranational actors, leading to a system of multi-level regulatory governance (Denny, 2006; 
Rommel, 2009).  
 
Two critical and central features of the regulatory state that influence sector arrangements are 
identified by Rommel (2009). These include operating in complex, fragmented constellations and 
having regulatory autonomy from the minister. These are critical components of the research 
seeking to understand how parliament ensures accountability of state and other actors and reflect 
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the diversity of interests of its principals through scrutiny and oversight based on the principal-
agent relationships which it structures.   
 
3.3 Sector arrangements  
According to Weingast & Marshall (1998), issues that make it on the legislative agenda reflect its 
marginal impact on an interest group and constituency. Thus, the marginal impact of ICTs will 
depend on the underlying choices of interests, and vote trading models in place to negotiate 
diverse interests and goals.  This brings to the fore the nature of sector arrangements and how 
they are organised to solve collective action problems that parliaments may confront and allow 
for consensus building. When faced with enforcement problems such as those of exchange found 
in vote trading models30 legislators may devise alternative institutions such as committee systems 
to provide their exchanges with a greater degree of durability.  
 
The United Nations (UN) proposed ICT institutional model discussed in Chapter 2 § 2.3.2 is 
fundamentally based on institutional arrangements that draw from concepts of rationalism, 
instrumentalism and interactionism as underlying principles in policy making (Song & Oh, 
2012). The UN presupposes that adopting a model is critical in ‘circumstances where ICT policy 
issues, cutting across the traditional boundaries, call for functional integration and vertical 
coordination between ministries’ (World Bank, 2010:17).  For better results considering various 
conditions of developing countries, where the “market and civil society are not sufficiently 
mature, and where organizational sectionalism among ministries prevails, supra-ministerial 
approaches would be more favored” (World Bank, 2010:13).   
 
Song & Oh (2012) present three arrangements that are useful for the analysis of parliamentary 
participation.  The first arrangement is modeled on a centralised authority with authority over all 
policy issues including their funding. All goals are set and coordinated centrally, favoring 
planning and coordinating organisations with a higher authority and integrated by the 
implementing ministry. Success is about attaining formal goals already formulated, and failure 
                                                          
30 Non-contemporaneous benefit flows and non-simultaneity (Weingast & Marshall, 1998). 
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occurs due to unclear goal setting, resistance from implementing agencies or clients, and lack of 
information and control.  
 
The second arrangement is modeled on a decentralised authority with ICT policy functions 
distributed to several ministries, with a centralised role of a higher level authority being absent or 
weak. In this model, the interests of local actors are regarded with a worm’s eye-view 
perspective, where according to World Bank (2010:12)  
“Ministries or agencies can exert autonomy and discretion within their jurisdictions and 
defined policy domains. … This approach may fail if local actors are excluded from 
policy formulation, if there is too little discretion, or if resources are insufficient. The 
policy process can be improved by increasing the autonomy and discretion of ministries 
as well as by providing more resources”.  
 
The third arrangement follows an inter-ministerial organization with a cabinet committee or 
ministerial board being responsible for policy. This follows an interactionism philosophy which 
considers policy making to be constituted by various actors and no ministry coordinating other 
ministry with more frequent horizontal interaction among the ministries. Establishing a common 
goal is about collective action, where failure can be a result of no common vision. ;. This view 
supports the notion that various institutional arrangements are “rich mixtures of public and 
private instrumentalities” (Ostrom, 1999:182; World Bank, 2010).   
 
The above three sector arrangements influence to a large extent the decision making process in a 
sector for which parliament is an agenda setter.  The perspectives above define the participation 
mechanisms of key role players including parliament, obviously depending on the model. They 
equally influence the incentives and information flows that facilitate decision making for the 
sector. This makes the nature and organization of sector arrangements a critical component for 
the analysis of parliamentary participation.   
 
3.4 ICT ecosystem  
Formal overlaps have been identified in how systems of species and systems within the ICT 
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sector are organised and in how they interrelate (Lansiti & Richards, 2006; Platt, 2011). The 
definition of an ecosystem highlights the network of interactions by key and essential elements 
interacting within a system, either collaboratively or in competition, as being critical to business 
outcomes. The ICT ecosystem is thus in essence an integrated perspective of markets, networks, 
services, applications and content and the determining governance, legal and regulatory 
frameworks. Gillwald (2012) expands the eco-systemic perspective to ICT in general and links 
access and affordability to institutional arrangements up to global and regional governance, 
structure and processes. According to this concept, the ICT ecosystem is characterised by a large 
number of participants who depend on each other for their mutual effectiveness and survival 
(Figure 3). It is organised as complex networks of firms whose integrated efforts are necessary to 
deliver value to end customers.  
 
The ICT industry today consists of a rapidly evolving and massively interconnected network of 
organisations, technologies, products, and consumers. In contrast to the vertically integrated 
environment of the 1960s and 1970s, today's industry is divided into a large number of segments 
producing specialised components, systems, and services. The degree of interaction amongst key 
players is very high, with hundreds of organisations frequently involved in the design, 
















































































































           Affordability










(unions, industry associations, NGOs)
 
 
Figure 3: The ICT Ecosystem.  Source: Gillwald, 2012  
 
The ICT ecosystems differ in each country in terms of objectives, configurations, modus 
operandi and performance. Due to the high costs of ICT services regulation now plays a critical 
role in the governance of the ICT sector.  However, the policy making and monitoring the role of 
government differ in each country because of factors such as the international competitiveness of 
local companies, influence of domestic institutions which themselves are molded by an internal 
organization with the power to change them, and political institutions and processes (Fransman, 
2010).  
 
Similar to the natural life ecosystem, the ICT ecosystem allows for an assessment of the linkages 
between processes, essential elements and the relationships that exist among key players in that 
ecosystem. It is comprised of players31, symbiotic interactions and institutions32 that reflect the 
                                                          
31 Corporate, private consumers- users, government policy-makers, and regulators 
32 For example regulations that determine what firms can do or not do, legal frameworks defining legal institutions, 
macroeconomic conditions under which players interact  
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joint responsibility of different stakeholders each with own perspective and none with a holistic 
conceptualizing of it as a whole (Fransman, 2008, 2010; Madikiza, 2011; Gillwald, 2012). The 
ICT ecosystem offers a conceptual vehicle for the analysis and strategic implementation of 
changes within the digital landscape and helps inform the development of appropriate corporate 
strategies and government policies.   
 
The manner in which this system is operated and constructed recognises the interplay between 
governance, citizenship, knowledge, communication, and innovation allowing for an analysis of 
how the different ICT ecosystems in the various countries evolve and mature with different paces 
and outcomes. It also allows for a discussion of the different global and regional and national, 
legal and policy arrangements that bring stakeholders together to define the technology 
environment.  Furthermore, the ICT ecosystem explicitly allows the definition of the 
coordination role of government providing an understanding of the necessary integration of 
operational capacities of key stakeholders. However, of note is that government bureaucracy and 
institutional fragmentation makes it difficult to coordinate vital stakeholder capacities, resulting 
in inconsistencies within the sector. Parliament is thus expected to play an important role in 
ensuring government accountability to the sector.   
 
While the ICT ecosystem framework has the potential to assist scholars to understand the 
interrelationship within the sector, effectively contextualizing the ICT ecosystem within the 
political domain requires drawing extensively from institutional theories (for example the 
rational and public choice). Institutions are neither a mere reflection of other forces (e.g. 
technological or social), nor are they neutral arenas within which political behavior, driven by 
more fundamental factors, occurs. Parliaments affect the power of groups, shaping the way ideas 
circulate to influence policy and coordination of public decisions by affecting the context of 
debate and the power of actors wishing to reform policymaking. The appropriateness of the ICT 
ecosystem lies in that it provides scope for understanding the context of interactions amongst 
different key actors in the sector. 
 
The ICT ecosystem framework is useful in defining institutional factors and identifying 
stakeholder to establish the essential elements within the ICT sector. It subtly provides direction 
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on who should participate in this study providing the logical and methodological framework to 
be used for data collection and analysis. Furthermore, the framework offers a better 
understanding of the interrelationships of the key players and the outcomes of their interventions. 
The ICT ecosystem lenses (Figure 3) build the ability of this study to engage with the dynamics 
of the system and define key parliamentary patterns of interaction 
3.5 Locating parliament in constellation of institutions  
Drawing from the literature in Sections 3.1-3.4 parliament is confirmed as a key actor with a 
significant role to play in the ICT reforms market. Investigating the nature and dynamics of ICT 
sector reform in Africa from a parliamentary perspective can be a complex undertaking without 
the aid of existing frameworks. To assess the extent to which parliaments participate in ICT 
sector development process in Africa this study assumes that no single framework can fully 

















Figure 4: Locating parliament in the constellation of institutions. Source:  Author’s synthesis of 
Jordana and Sancho’s (Table 4), Gillwald (2009) concept of an institutional constellation 
and ICT Ecosystem (Figure 3). 
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The conceptual framework constructed for this thesis is shown in Figure 4. The conceptual 
framework locates parliament in a framework that combines the concept of ICT as a complex 
ecosystem with that of a constellation of institutions. It contextualises the analysis in the political 
and economic circumstance of each country, embracing key elements of the political economy 
tradition as outlined in Sections 3.2 to 3.5. These include the formal and informal historical, 
economic, diverse institutions and power structures, the interests, ideologies, responsibilities, and 
the ongoing processes to examine what shapes political behavior of parliaments. The new state 
theory aids our understanding of how the changing nature of the state is critical to understanding 
current structures and processes. The ICT as a complex ecosystem enables an examination of the 
interrelationships and engagement patterns within the sector, to effectively contextualise the ICT 
ecosystem within the political domain. Figure 4 depicts all the elements of the conceptual 
framework and how they are linked to each other.  
 
To apply the conceptual framework that was constructed for this study (and shown in Figure 4), 
there is further elaboration in several respects to illustrate the structural relationships between the 
different actors, the elements of the institutional constellation and the factors influencing 
institutional outcomes. This study is particularly concerned with the interaction of the above 
elements to explain outcomes within the ICT sector in Kenya and South Africa from a 
parliamentary perspective. The conceptual framework in Figure 4 assists the researcher’s 
understanding of the ICT sector reforms market as a political space with a set of political and 
economic activities underpinned by both formal and informal institutions and regimes, actors 
with diverse interests and constraints that result in power relations which determine policy 
outcomes in the ICT sector.   
 
The conceptual framework extends the analysis of the research to the broader sector context that 
influences the decision-making processes of the state and the economy and more specifically the 
specialised institutional arrangements of the modern state (in the case of this research the 
regulatory system for the telecommunications sector). The broader context allows the research to 
examine critically essential elements such as the processes and structural designs that shape the 
relationships among key players in the ICT ecosystem. The framework assists the researcher to 
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identify and understand the extent to which these sector designs influence the formal and 
informal engagements of parliament from rule-making to organizational practices and behavior.  
 
The conceptual framework in Figure 4 provides a lens for examining empirical evidence on 
parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms in the Kenyan and South African states. Based 
on the constitutional mandates that define the roles, responsibilities, principles, values and the 
relationships that exist, the framework exposes key factors of parliamentary performance, the 
arrangement of institutions to ensure effective engagement, consolidation of power and 
negotiation of conflict, leading to specific outcomes in the ICT sector.  Furthermore, the 
framework provides a basis for understanding the relationships that exist between parliament and 
other state actors, the private sector and civil society. This allows for an analysis of how the 
defined formal legal framework influences or constrains the actions of parliaments in practice 
and ultimately identifying institutional factors that determine the effective in contribution to the 
ICT reform processes. 
 
It is through the lenses of the conceptual framework developed for this study (Figure 4) that 
patterns, trends and contradictions in parliamentary participation and their causes can be 
observed in Kenya and South Africa. To bring in the internal factors influencing parliamentary 
effectiveness into the conceptual framework (Figure 4), the analytical framework constructed for 
this study factors in parliamentary performance dimension as critical to parliamentary 
participation in the sector reforms. The analytical framework adds to the conceptual framework 
appropriate tools for analyzing parliamentary performance, co-relationships amongst key sector 
players and any changes arising from their interactions.  A self- assessment methodology is used 
to examine parliamentary performance dimensions as described in Chapter 2, to identify critical 




This chapter has outlined concepts and theories around the subject and conceptual framework at 
the core of the research contained in this thesis. The key concepts and theories around the subject 
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and conceptual framework explained in this chapter indicate how the play out of law making in 
practice, the  context (social, political economic, historical institutions and power relations), the 
constellation of institutions (institutional diversity, power structures, and distribution of 
responsibilities), interests (political and economic interests, and stakeholders), ideologies, 
arrangements and constellation of rules, as well as internal capacity of institutions guarantee 
effective, meaningful and sustainable participation of parliament in policy making. Fundamental 
to effective parliamentary participation are the internal and external factors that determine sector 
institutional arrangements and design structures.  Clarity on the political, social, economic 
aspects of policy reform, its linkages to the institutions and actors that will enforce it is thus 
necessary to operationalise parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms as an agenda for 
research.   
 
The development of the ICT sector has been in the spotlight in the last three decades as demand 
for affordable and accessible ICT services increased with the growth of knowledge-based 
economy. In most cases this development has been largely dependent on the growth of an ICT 
ecosystem underpinned by the symbiotic interactions within it. The ICT ecosystem recognises 
the interplay between governance and other key elements such as citizenship, knowledge, 
communication, and innovation reflecting the joint responsibilities of the different stakeholders. 
The interplay between the ICT policies and regulations (for example laws relating to ICT, burden 
of government regulation), market dynamism (for example ICT competition, intensity of local 
competition and capacity of innovation) as well as the business climate (for instance procedures 
to start business, efficiency of a legal framework) places parliamentary accountability and 
participation right at the centre of the reforms of the sector. 
 
A conceptual framework that combines the concept of the institutional constellation with that of 
an ICT as a complex system will thus contextualise the analysis in the political and economic 
circumstances of Kenya and South Africa. This is to examine the role parliament plays in the two 
countries by pursuing the orthodox ICT reform model, the interplay among which influences 





METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.0  Introduction 
The validity of research is based on some philosophical assumption that should be understood to 
evaluate the research.  Based on the theoretical underpinnings discussed in Chapter 2 and the 
conceptual framework (Figure 4) developed in Chapter 3, this chapter discusses the paradigm, 
epistemological and ontological approaches and the methodology of the study, describing what 
has influenced the selection of methods of data collection and analysis. This institutional analysis 
is located in the context of an applied policy research and, thus, builds concepts as a means of 
explanation, rather than as a test of the theory.  Constructs are derived from the field through an 
in-depth examination of the phenomenon of interest. An interpretative paradigm is identified as 
the framework of the study, bounded in the belief that there is no single correct route to 
knowledge; theories are judged according to how interesting they are to both the researcher and 
participants (Walsham, 1993).  
Parliamentary participation in ICT sector reform is investigated from a political economy 
perspective that draws on Jordana & Sancho’s (2004) notion of constellation institution as 
further developed by Gillwald (2009).  According to Jordana & Sancho (2004: 297), it is 
worthwhile to study parliamentary participation as a key player since it is the “whole institutional 
arena, not just the new agencies making the difference in policy processes and policy outcomes”. 
Furthermore, the focus on decision-making processes relevant for policy outcomes and the 
influence of institutional settings that combines comprehensive and specialised public bodies 
charged with shaping public policy according to various public mandates, with different and 
often contradictory goals, enables a wider political and contextual analysis of the relevant 
institutions in the policy arena.  
Institutions define interaction patterns and structures, the interests and ideologies that determine 
behavior and the processes through which policy outcomes are achieved. The literature identifies 
parliament as a key public body that can influence key outcomes within the ICT sector. To 
understand the determinants of parliamentary performance in this complex institutional setting 
84 
 
with multiple players, this thesis also draws on the concept of parliamentary performance 
(Johnson, 2005; Parliamentary Centre, 2013) as a critical dimension of parliamentary 
effectiveness in policy making processes.  
Within the context of an institutional constellation located in a national ICT ecosystem, this 
thesis combines the relevant theoretical, conceptual, formal and informal perspectives to 
investigate contextual and institutional factors and examine the relevance of parliament in 
enabling ICT sector reforms. These perspectives develop a motivation for analyzing both 
external and internal factors that give rise to effective parliamentary participation in developing 
an enabling environment for ICT sector development in the two selected countries. Furthermore, 
the thesis analyzes the dynamism of the regulatory, political, historical and economic 
environments, exploring prevalent policy practices, key actor engagement patterns within a 
complex ICT ecosystem to determine underlying determinants of parliamentary participation.  
     
In order to consider the external factors this study examines the following key dimensions :-- the 
context (social, political economic, historical institutions and power relations), the constellation 
of institutions (institutional diversity, power structures, and distribution of responsibilities), 
interests and ideologies (political and economic interests and stakeholders), arrangements and 
constellation of rules to understand the institutional and market performance. The internal 
investigation focuses on five dimensions of parliamentary performance based on the expected 
traditional parliamentary roles of representation, legislation and oversight. The five capacity 
dimensions identified area: the legal mandate; accessibility; bill reviews and hearings; oversight 
committees; and financial and material resources.  
 
4.1 Epistemological and ontological approaches 
The research process has three dimensions: ontology, epistemology and methodology.  
Ontological and epistemological perspectives are concerned with the world view of how reality 
and knowledge are perceived. Epistemology is about what constitutes valid knowledge and how 
we obtain it; ontology is what constitutes reality and how we can understand existence.  A 
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research paradigm is a comprehensive system of interrelated practices and thinking that define 
the nature of enquiry along these three dimensions (TerreBlanche & Durrheim, 1999).  
 
The research literature (for example Yin, 1989; Myers, 1997; Bryman, 2001; Patton, 2002; Guba 
& Lincoln, 2005) identifies major paradigms or world views to knowledge: interpretivism, 
positivism and subjectivism.  Interpretivism views knowledge of reality as a social construct of 
language, shared meanings, tools, documents and is thus inductive (Walsham, 1993). Positivism 
is a major paradigm mainly associated with the quantitative methodology where the research 
process is deductive, as it starts with a hypothesis. The data is subjected to experimentation and 
statistical manipulation to establish the cause-effect relationship between variables.  Positivism is 
not suitable for this study as the study is mainly a qualitative methodology that follows a 
subjectivist epistemology that has no predefined variables. In positivism, the focus is discovering 
and interpreting patterns as the situation unfolds (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Kaplan & 
Maxwell, 1994). Those who have experienced aspects under investigation are selected to 
participate, in positivism (Jackson & Kassam, 1998).  Subjectivists argue that proving the cause-
effect relationship between variables with certainty in social and political phenomena can be 
problematic (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). The subjectivists further argue that the nature of political 
phenomena and the existence of multiple realities, knowledge or truth are relative rather than 
absolute. It can be a product of interpretation of lived experiences as well as construction in the 
minds of individuals.  
 
The subjectivist approach of reality emphasises the importance of understanding the process 
through which institutions fix their engagement models (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). The 
subjectivist approach accepts that organisations generate their reality shaped by experience and 
an ongoing interchange of perceptions, meanings, and motives. Parliament is identified as the 
place where the interests of the public are negotiated and debated (IPU, 2006). It is in parliament 
that MPs generate their realities based on their experiences and interactions with their 
constituencies and other stakeholders, as well as their appreciation of the world around them. It 
is these realities that are of particular importance to this study, as they can help create an 




A subjectivist approach has distinct advantages: it requires researchers to observe, analyze and 
explain actions concerning internal, personal interpretations of their environment. It also 
provides fruitful theoretical and applied subjectivist research which de-emphasises exploitation 
of existing opportunities, and the knowledge construction fundamental to the genesis of creative 
behavior becomes central (Evely et al., 2008). The fact that parliament is concerned with human 
choices and actions and not just mechanically dependent relationships motivates for the 
subjectivist approach.  
 
This research has practical implications in that it contributes not only to the theoretical debate on 
parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms but also creates knowledge that is of practical 
use to practitioners, parliaments and key players within the ICT sector. A political analysis is 
undertaken to contextualise the political circumstances33 of the two countries under study, to 
understand the relevance of parliament in ICT sector reforms, Due to the practical implications 
accompanying such a piece of research, epistemologically the study adopts a political economy 
perspective and is guided by a practical and interpretive paradigm. This approach depends on an 
interpretive and subjective philosophical assumption regarding the nature of knowledge, reality 
and existence.   
 
Interpretivist construes the reality as consisting of people’s subjective experiences of the external 
world, stressing the need to put an analysis in context and supporting the adoption of a subjective 
epistemology. Interpretivism acknowledges the existence of multiple realities from a subjectivist 
perspective as a means to understand meanings assigned by participants for the researcher to 
judge or evaluate, and refine interpretive theories. The researcher and research participants are 
thus viewed as co-creators of knowledge (Yin, 1989; Bryman, 2001; Patton, 2002; Guba 
&Lincoln, 2005).   
 
The institutional approach to a case methodology adopted for this research requires the gathering 
of evidence. The theory is used differently in interpretive case studies. It can be used to guide the 
                                                          
33  Includes the context (social, political economic, historical institutions & power relations); the constellation of institutions 
(institutional diversity, power structures, and distribution of responsibilities); interests- political and economic interests’ & 
stakeholders; ideologies, arrangements. 
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design and collection of data, provide an iterative process for data collection and analysis and to 
be an outcome of the study. This thesis uses theory to provide an iterative data collection and 
analysis process. Iterative observation and interpretation underpin the process by drawing 
inferences from the information and some abstraction or meaning assigned to concepts by people 
(Deetz, 1996).  
 
From an ontological perspective, this study adopts a new institutionalism approach and more 
specifically that of historical institutionalism acknowledging that political economy is a principal 
factor structuring collective behaviour and distinctive outcomes. The research acknowledges that 
multiple realities exist due to people’s diverse knowledge, interpretations and experiences. This 
reality can be explored and meanings discovered and constructed through human interactions 
(conversations) and actions.  
 
This ontology perspective enables an analysis that construes the relationship between institutions 
and behaviour in broad terms, explaining the process by which institutions originate or change 
(Hall & Taylor, 1996). It allows for the examination of the interplay between the ICT processes 
and structures (for example policies and regulations such as laws relating to ICT, burden of 
government regulation), market dynamism (for example ICT competition, intensity of local 
competition and capacity of innovation) as well as the business climate (for instance procedures 
to start business, efficiency of a legal framework). Table 5 displays the characteristics of 
interpretivism, as used in this study, categorised into the adopted approach, the ontology and 





Table 5:  Summary of the Epistemology and Ontology approach. 
 Item Approach Characteristics 
Theoretical 
approach 
Political economy  Analysis of power relations, interests and institutions. 
 Interpretive and practical paradigm. 
 Knowledge is viewed as the product of theory and 
practice. 
 Practical as it is used to understand the process 
through which institutions fix their engagement 
models to advise policy and decision makers on 
appropriate structures and arrangements. 
 Subjective as ccausality favors ‘multiple, dynamic 
interactions’. 
Epistemology Interpretive   It rejects the reduction of all social practices to a 
single political-economic explanation, as there is no 
single correct route to knowledge; constructs are 
discovered and interpreted as the situation unfolds. 
 Knowledge is socially constructed by subjective 
experiences.  
 Understood through interpretation and interaction 





 It assumes the existence of the multiple realities 
different values and perceptions and personal 
interpretations.  
 It stresses structures and institutions rather than 
social change, social processes and relativism. 
 Assumes that reality is constructed subjectively 
through meanings and understandings developed 
socially and experientially. 
 




4.2 Methodological considerations  
The nature of the political phenomena and the existence of multiple realities in parliament 
motivates for a qualitative approach to the investigation based on an interpretivist perspective 
that allows for the co-creation of knowledge by both the researcher and research participants.  To 
enable co-creation of knowledge informed by adequate dialogue between the researchers and 
participants to collaboratively construct meaningful reality (Yin, 1989; Bryman, 2001; Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005), the study utilises questionnaires, interviews, observation and analysis of existing 
texts to develop a comprehensive analysis of parliamentary participation in the ICT sector of 
Kenya and South Africa. 
 
Investigating ICT policy and regulatory reforms can take a variety of designs depending on, 
among others, the line of enquiry and conceptual framework.  The conceptual framework 
developed in Chapter 3 (summarised in Figure 4) enables an analysis of key external and internal 
factors that influence or constrain parliamentary participation in policy making processes. 
 
Multiple data collection methods are used to gather information from primary and secondary 
sources. Primary data is collected through a self-assessment survey of ICT Committees and 
complemented by high-level interviews with key sector players and based on ‘direct 
observations’ of parliamentary processes as part of my work in multilateral agencies building 
African parliamentary capacity.  
 
The self-assessment through the questionnaires confirms the existence, or non-thereof, of critical 
capacity elements required for effective parliamentary participation. The Africa Parliamentary 
Index (API) follows an assessment methodology that enables the evaluation of existence of 
parliamentary capacity by parliament itself as well as by other interested stakeholders such as 
civil society/operators and the regulators. Such a mix of data collecting methods underscores the 
subjectivist nature of the study in that it facilitates the co-creation of knowledge by assuming the 
existence of multiple realities, different values and perceptions and personal interpretations.  
 
Secondary data is collected through an extensive document review and analysis of country 
constitutions, ICT policy documents, ICT Laws and ICT legal frameworks, parliamentary 
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reports, ICT sector reviews.  The intention is to unearth key factors that highlight key decision-
making processes supporting parliamentary participation in the policy making process and the 
integration mechanisms of this decision-making process in the wider parliamentary engagement 
with the main actors.    
 
Participants were purposively sampled to represent, interrogate, juxtapose and construct the 
experience of 15 participants from both countries key actors within the sector reforms process. 
The sample of 15 was perhaps not ideal but adequate considering the use of high-level interviews 
with participants purposefully selected on the basis of availability and experience with 
parliament and access to relevant information. The findings from the self-assessment and the 
high-level interviews were analysed in terms of the governance framework including the 
constitutional provisions that define legal and operational powers for parliament, implementation 
and enforcement arrangements, mechanisms and procedures. Quantitative supply-side data 
related to the ICT objectives of price and access was collected through secondary data from the 
ITU, the World Bank, and Research ICT Africa to evaluate and appreciate progress made in the 
ICT sector effectively, 
 
4.2.1 A comparative case study of parliamentary participation in Kenya and South  
 Africa  
This research uses a comparative case approach to the investigation in that it constructs a 
justification of worldwide trends common to parliament and allows the researcher to analyse the 
intricate trends of that particular society (Ragin,1987). It justifies trends by evaluating and 
contrasting one ideology aligned with others showing two parallel sides of two slightly different 
situations.  
 
According to Routio (2007), comparation is used to explicate or utilise tacit knowledge or tacit 
attitudes.  Furthermore, he asserts that the goal is to examine cases which are similar in some 
respects but differ in others to explore causes for the differences and reveal the general 
underlying structure which generates or allows such a variation. This study explores two cases to 
reveal the systematic structure and invariance that could be generalised as true not only for the 
cases studied but for Africa as a whole. Data are collected primarily by self-assessment surveys, 
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and underpinned by observation and high level interviews to determine trends, similarities and 
differences related to parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms in Kenya and South 
Africa through a horizontal analysis of the political economic issues and the linkages between 
the political-economic framework, the institutional arrangements, and the ICT policy outcomes.  
The case studies are used to provide a detailed understanding of the in country nuances to reveal 
the what, how and why parliamentary participation in ICT sector development has been 
ineffectual. 
 
According to Sarana (1975), such an illustrative comparative analysis can be used to examine 
trends, tensions, and contradictions by exploring units of comparison and types of data that 
reflect a variety of theoretical assumptions and interests. In the case of this research to 
understand what role parliament plays in ICT sector reforms, the units of comparison include the 
dimensions of institutional constellations, political, historical institutions and power, economic 
and political interests and culture, ICT market performance, impact of global governance as well 
as parliamentary mechanisms and practices for oversight, representation and legislation in Kenya 
and South Africa. These units of comparison explain and exemplify political phenomena, 
enabling the development of typologies and analyses of processes found in the different 
parliaments in the two selected countries.  These items are chosen to illustrate the value and are 
not systematically chosen to be statistically representative (Sarana, 1975). Illustrative 
comparisons have been used in historical reconstructions, to support interpretations or general 
assertions. 
 
4.2.2 Research limitations  
A significant limitation to using a comparative analysis is that the data sets (units of analysis) in 
different countries may not use the same categories, or may define categories differently, 
affecting its comparability. Explanations may be unique to a country obviously affecting the 
kinds of generalisations that are possible given the nature of the data processes studied and the 




4.2.3 Primary and secondary sources 
This research made use of used both primary and secondary sources of data and information. The 
main sources of primary data are the self-assessment surveys, observations and high-level 
interviews. Primary data was captured through a self-assessment survey by members of the ICT 
parliamentary committees and complemented by high-level interviews with key sector players 
conducted over several hours on different occasions mostly between 2012 -2015 (see Appendix 
1: Research Framework and Protocol).  
 
Taking into cognizance the uniqueness of parliament as an organisation (normally 1 or 2 houses 
in each country) with very few people comprising them, this study adopts the qualitative 
methodology that purposively samples participants to represent, interrogate, juxtapose and 
construct the experience of parliaments and the various actors within the reforms process. This 
will provide an in-depth understanding of the world as seen through the eyes of the people being 
studied. The findings are triangulated with those from an extensive document analysis. The 
interviews were conducted in person or over Skype, transcribed and digitally stored for coding. 
 
4.2.3.1 Self-assessment through surveys and high-level interviews  
 
Whilst a number of tools exist for assessing parliamentary performance (for example NDI 
standards; SADC Parliamentary Forum Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures; CPA 
benchmarks,; IPU toolkit; Parliamentary Centre34 evaluation frameworks for Budget and Audit), 
the Africa Parliamentary Index (API) is suitable for this study as it allows for the assessment of 
parliament through the committee structure where most of the work by parliament is done. I 
therefore adapt the API and utilise the set of indicators and questions developed and apply to ICT 
parliamentary committees. 
 
Developed by the Parliamentary Centre (2011), through its Africa Parliamentary Strengthening 
Programme (APSP), the API consolidates a set of indicators into a tool that comparatively 
assesses and measures the performance of parliaments (Parliamentary Centre, 2011). The choice 
                                                          
34 See www.parlcentafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=85&lang=en 
(Accessed January 2012). 
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of indicators is based on the governance work conducted by such international institutions as the 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), the World Bank Institute (WBI), the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association (CPA), Inter-Parliamentary Union and experience of the 
Parliamentary Centre in Canada; assessing parliaments against international best practice. These 
indicators are combined into an index to measure cross-country variation in five broad 
functions35.with the identified capacity elements then customised to reflect other empirical 
applications based on the design of the survey. In particular, the application to this study is 
concerned with whether or not certain internal capacity element exists to influence parliamentary 
performance as a key player in the ICT sector.   
 
According to the Parliamentary Centre (2011), the value of API lies in its adaptability as a tool to 
address a number of different issues of parliamentary performance. It presents a standardised, 
simplified system for assessing the performance of parliaments. The questions are framed in 
comparative mode (“How effective, adequate, systematic, etc.) allowing comparing across 
dimensions and countries ((For a full set of questions see Appendix 2: Questionnaire). 
Participants are then invited to provide a value assessment based on a four-point scale based on 
the API Index (Parliamentary Centre, 2011) reflected below:  
4 = High level of capacity in place 
3 = Moderate level of capacity in place 
2 = Basic level of capacity in place 
1 = Clear need for increased capacity 
 
The API follows a self-assessment methodology that allows the evaluation of the performance of 
parliament by both parliament itself and allows for triangulation of content by other interested 
stakeholders to counter any biases. This underscores both the subjectivist and interpretive nature 
of this study in that it facilitates the co-creation of knowledge by assuming the existence of 
multiple realities, different values and perceptions and personal interpretations which the API 
methodology caters for.  
                                                          
35See Parliamentary Centre(2011) . The API focuses on five core areas that are of importance to this study, namely: 
representation, legislation, oversight function, financial oversight and institutional capacity providing a weighted 
capacity ratio defining the level of parliament’s capacity given the priority level individual respondents attach to 





The API provides a measure that gives an idea of what parliament is like (Parliamentary Centre, 
2011). The API approach assesses value judgments of how parliament measures itself against set 
criteria process by allowing different groupings to assess key committee functions and reflecting 
the broadest possible array of perspectives. Respondents are asked to provide recommendations 
and the evidence for such at the end of the assessment.  
 
The API assessment enables a compound assessment of the capacity of parliament against a set 
criterion (for example effectiveness, sustainability and structured participation) in parliamentary 
practice for executing legislative, representation and oversight functions in respect to a certain 
policy area. Such a methodology for data gathering facilitates a practical and interpretive review 
of core parliamentary functions and mechanisms in place, an approach for co-creation of 
knowledge.  
 
4.2.3.2  Sampling of respondents  
To cater for the uniqueness of parliament occurring as one entity per country purposive 
sampling, a common sampling strategy is used to allow for the grouping of participants based on 
preselected criteria relevant to a particular research question and relevancy to the study. Sample 
sizes vary depending on the resources and time available, as well as the study’s objectives and 
are often determined on the basis of theoretical saturation allowing for both data review and 
analysis to be done in conjunction with data collection. 
 
A total of 15 respondents were drawn from the two African countries, Kenya and South Africa.  
Four categories of participants were involved in the study, as follows:  
1.  Chairpersons and or representative MPs from committees responsible for ICTs ,who have 
the responsibility to develop the legislative framework and ensure the right governance is 
in place. They are also charged with ensuring that parliament applies its traditional roles 
of oversight, legislative and representative in the ICT sector policy processes. Insights 
were sought too from the committee clerks and staff who support the committee work. To 
get further insight on the capacity and knowledge levels of parliaments, parliamentary 
development experts working with the two countries were included in the sample.  These 
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experts and staff of parliament also filled an important role as proxies in cases where the 
MPs were not available.  
 
2.  Representatives from the regulatory bodies whose insight was sought into the dynamics of 
the relationship between parliament and the independent agencies.  Their insights 
highlight key issues affecting the independence of regulation which is a key requirement 
for successful reforms. The findings will enable parliament to assess its role and respond 
more meaningfully to the requirements of the sector. 
 
3.  Senior representatives from departments responsible for legal and regulatory affairs 
and/or public relations in the main industry associations and mobile and fixed 
telecommunication companies. They provided insight and opinions into how parliament 
has applied its mandate within the sector, and provided much needed evidence to support 
the formulation of patterns of interaction and engagement models, limitations and 
constrains outside of government, in a fast changing and dynamic sector where policy is 
always playing catch up to innovations. 
 
4.   Lastly, participants from civil society organisations and, in particular, parliamentary 
monitoring organisations and interest groups with focus on developing the ICT sector and 
ensuring affordable access for all. These participants provided their views as the watch 
dogs of parliament, holding it accountable to the interests of the constituencies and the 
broader electorate and, therefore, countered any biases likely to be present as parliament 
evaluates its own performance. 
Participants were selected according to their experience and access to relevant information 
(taking into account the researcher’s resource limitations), and grouped according to their 




4.2.3.3 High level (elite) interviews 
To discover how political institutions operate, how important decisions are made and how 
political power is attained we are likely to focus attention on those individuals (very small group) 
who have access to this level of information- those referred to as political 
elites(Harrison&Sratin,2013).  
 
High level and elite interviews allow for the conducting of intensive individual interviews with a 
small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea (Boyce & Neale, 
2006). Elite, in this case, may be defined as 'a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a 
privileged position in a society' (Richards, 1996) or more flexibly as an interview for 'any 
interviewee who is given special, non-standardized treatment' because they have specialist 
knowledge the researcher is eager to be taught (Dexter, 1970).  
 
As observed by Hochschild (2009), the central purpose of high level or elite interviews is to 
acquire information and context that only that person can provide about some event or process. 
Furthermore elite interviews give substance and meaning to prior analyses of institutions, 
structures, rule-making, or procedural controls.  Elite interviews are therefore an appropriate data 
collection methodology for a study as this one that follows recent historical change, or process-
tracing of policy enactment or implementation, and seeks to understand the role of elites and 
perception in a political process.  
 
Elite interviews allow researchers to engage legislators and others involved in political and 
policy decision-making processes to find out their perspective and/or what went on backstage 
away from the final formal institutional story (Hochschild, 2009). However such individuals 
have very tight schedules and are unlikely to agree to spend a lot of time on the interview. More 
so, because of the political nature of the subject, interviewees who remain in office in particular 
may be reluctant to participate at all or to be transparent on all issues. While the final number of 
interviewers was lower than was intended, other than a few key ones that despite persistent 
efforts could not be secured, the necessary spread of interests and functions was covered to 





As Hochschild (2009) suggests the researcher can carefully triangulate among respondents; 
without revealing any confidences or names of previous subjects, and this can counter any biases 
that may arise from the fact that politicians are part of the institutions. Further, the researcher 
utilised other data collection methods to capture the perspectives such as the self-administered 
questionnaire and through intensive document analysis.   
 
The individuals identified for the elite interviews were figures  in decision making roles such as 
the chairperson of committees, senior government officials, and senior managers in private sector 
was mainly used as a follow up on the basis of a generalised questionnaire. The interviews 
investigated the engagement patterns that influence the decision-making process that support the 
parliamentary intervention in the policy making process. The semi structured interviews had 
open-ended questions to allow interviewees to express themselves within their own framework 
and introduce new perspectives and support the co creation of knowledge by both researcher and 
participants. This could help gain perspectives, views and experiences of parliamentary 
processes and politics. 
 
4.2.3.4 Document review   
Secondary data was collected through an extensive document review process that analyzed data 
from a variety of secondary sources including constitutional, legal, normative and strategic 
documents and reports on ICT and parliaments in Kenya and South Africa that have created 
institutional arrangements, practices, structures and mechanisms that shape parliamentary 
participation in ICT policy making processes. Documents included ICT sector and parliamentary 
reports, supply-side ICT data, print and electronic media, plenary and committee records as well 




Table 6:  Sources of secondary data used in the study 
Dimension /Element Source Type of Data /information 
ICT Market Performance   Comparative ICT Sector Performance 
Review (RIA 2009/2010);  
 ICT Sector Performance Reviews of 
Kenya and South Africa (RIA 
2009/2010) 
 ITU ICT Indicators Database 
 Market structure 
 Sector Priorities  
 ICT indicators  
 
Parliamentary mandates 
political culture, extent of 
political power  
 Constitutions of the Republic of Kenya 
(2010), South Africa(1996)   
 Rules of Procedure for Kenya and 
South Africa  
 Oversight and Accountability Model( 
PSA) 
 Political, institutional framework  
 Constitutional provisions for 
parliamentary power. 
 Characteristics and relationship 
between state institutions. 
 Dispute resolution processes. 
 Decision making process. 
Institutional constellation  
 
 ICT Laws ( Kenya and South Africa)  
 Terms of Reference of Committees 
Responsible for ICTs for Parliaments of 
Kenya and South Africa 
 ICT Strategies / Action Plans /ICT 
Policy guideline of the Ministries 
Responsible for ICTs in Kenya and 
South Africa 
 Degree of institutional 
fragmentation, dispersion 
responsibilities and centralization. 
 Rules in use for regulating the 
sector. 
 ICT sector attributes. 
 Sector arrangements, plans and 
actions. 
 ICT strategies in place. 
Parliamentary  performance ( 
mechanisms and practices)  
 Rules of Procedures of the Parliaments 
of Kenya and South Africa 
 Committee Reports of Committees 
Responsible for ICTs for Parliaments of 
Kenya and South Africa  
 Hansard ( debate records) of the 
Parliaments of Kenya and South Africa 
 Rules in use 
 Sector attributes 
 ICT bill process  
 Level of debate  
International and global 
governance 
 World Economic Forum Report 
 SADC Protocol on Transport  
Global governance processes, frameworks 
and protocols. 





The document analysis focused on presenting the constitutional mandate of parliament by 
reviewing whether the mandates of the parliaments of Kenya and South Africa were clearly 
stated, either in the constitution or in any other document. The outcomes were compared for 
trends and contradictions of the assigned mandates and power structures. Furthermore the 
analysis investigated the structures and processes and mechanisms that parliament used to 
achieve the mandate. Lastly, the analysis investigated compliance to what is widely accepted as 
the role of parliament (representation, oversight and legislation) as reflected in the SADC 
Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) benchmark for democratic parliaments and National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) international standards. An analysis of the ICT reports defined the 
market performance during the period of analysis, identifying key drivers of ICT policy and 
regulatory reforms and the various sector arrangements in play in the reforms arena.  
 
4.2.4 Data Triangulation  
Respondents were selected using a purposive sampling approach to represent, interrogate, 
juxtapose and construct the experience of 15 participants from the two countries representative 
of parliament and the various key actors within the ICT sector reform process. In order to 
corroborate the evidence primary data was collected from three different sources and 
perspectives including parliament, civil society and technical experts and the data in itself were 
triangulated (Figure 5).  
 
4.2.5 Challenges with data collection  
Two main challenges worth pointing out were encountered by the researcher during data 
collection. Firstly, at conceptualisation, the scope of the study covered three countries (Kenya, 
South Africa, and Zimbabwe) and included facilitated focus group discussions to implement the 
assessment. Getting the requisite institutional approval from all the selected parliaments to 
conduct the study proved to be a difficult undertaking. As is general practice with such state 
entities letters of request were sent to the administrative management of parliament to seek 
permission to meet and interview the participants. However, of the three parliaments approached, 
only one positive response - from Zimbabwe - was received almost immediately, with 
permission granted for the researcher to work through the staff/committee clerk. However, upon 
implementation, it became clear that targeted respondents were not available, which was made 
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more difficult by the significant political changes Zimbabwe was undergoing at the time of the 
research (2010-2015).  In the case of Kenya permission was never granted, and South Africa 


















Figure 5: Data triangulation for the study. 
 
 
Secondly, the continued availability of parliamentarians in the countries under study was not 
guaranteed.  All countries had elections during the study period, with resultant changes in the 
administration, membership and chairpersonship of the committees.  Whilst the other key players 
were available, they often expressed lack of knowledge and capacity to respond to parliament 
related issues, an indication of very weak inferences and ambiguous patterns of exchange. 
Furthermore, when eventually a solution was found through utilisation of personal networks and 
relationships the time and effort required to administer the questionnaire and receive a significant 
number of completed responses varied. Some participants took quite a long time to respond, 
Self-assessment completed and 
high level interviews with key 
players within parliament, 
government departments 
- insight into parliamentary 
policies, mechanisms practices 
and capacity, information 
flows, and involvement in ICT 
Governance  
Opinion assessment completed and 
high level interviews with key 
players within the national ICT 
ecosystem i.e., regulators, 
operators and civil society  
Document Analysis (Official documents, 
sector reports, international standards and 
websites) 
-official footprint of parliaments mandate 
and extent of legal powers and 
enforcement mechanisms; Provides 
overview on the extent of ICT sector 
reforms in countries 





often times leading the researcher to consistently follow up and, in a number of cases, sit with 
the respondent / or converse over teleconference and complete the questionnaire. The turnaround 
time for receiving a completed questionnaire varied greatly from 1day to two months. These 
challenges confirmed that indeed parliaments, especially the Kenyan case, are not as open as 
they are expected to be, and are largely as bureaucratic as any state institution. 
 
The two challenges and the location proximity of the researcher ultimately influenced the 
decision to focus on South Africa and Kenya and to include former chairpersons in the sample in 
the case where there had been political changes in representation. I as the researcher had to 
appeal personally to the chairpersons of the committees, with respect to South Africa and Kenya, 
for support based on relationships built during the time I worked within the parliamentary 
circles. Ultimately the researcher had to resort to respondents completing the questionnaire 
without the focus group discussions happening as part of the process. In the case of Kenya, the 
researcher piggy backed on data from a similar research conducted during the same period made 
available by a development organisation working with parliament.  The effect of these challenges 
on the quality of the research was mitigated through triangulation of the data (Figure 5). 
 
4.3 Coding  
The first step in the analysis was to develop codes to enable the selection and narrowing down of 
responses received into consistent clusters of data that enabled an understanding of the concerns 
around each particular mandate.  In order to organise the data, analysis and data collection 
occurred concurrently, with the data being consistently reflected on and analytical questions 
being posed so that data could be “organised categorically” (Cresswell, 2002:). 
 
 The coding of qualitative data added value for the explanatory process of indicating the levels of 
existence of the different capacity elements investigated in this study.  Moreover, the coding of 
the data collected from official documentation, high level interviews and self-assessment survey 
responses were a reflective and reflexive activity. This was essential to ensure the capturing of 
the textual, non-numerical information required to elicit meaning from the data. As Basit 
(2003:152) explains; “What coding does above all, is to allow the researcher to communicate and 




Narrative data collected was analysed using thematic coding. Thematic coding is “interpreting 
the information” and categorising textual extracts with reference to “themes in the context of a 
theory or conceptual framework” (Boyatzis, 1998:11). This form of coding allows one to analyse 
narrative data and to identify emergent themes. Thematic coding was used to combine and 
catalogue recurring patterns identified in the narrative data that were collected through the semi-
structured interviews. The codes were generated from the topics addressed in the self-assessment 
questionnaire which were useful in clustering similar subjects or ideas gathered from different 
respondents.  
 
Once groups of narrative data were created on the basis of themes and the issues mentioned 
above, a more in-depth analysis of the participants’ answers gathered in codes ( See Appendix 3: 
Coding Schedule) made it possible to identify themes that were clearly connected to the issues 
previously identified in the theoretical framework. Transcripts of interviews and questionnaire 
responses were reviewed, listing topics found based on recurring issues. Topics were identified 
based on the research questions and prior literature review and described through the lens of 
conceptual framework that combines the concepts of the ICT as a complex ecosystem with that 
of institutional constellations in which parliament is centrally located.  The emerging thematic 
patterns were used to analyse comparatively the practices that parliament applies to set the 
national policy objectives, oversee implementing agencies and shape policy outcomes in the ICT 
sectors of Kenya and South Africa.  
 
The information collected from both primary and secondary sources centred on four main areas 
of investigation to answer the research questions raised in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4). These areas 
were informed by the theoretical framework and prior literature review and then described 
through the lenses of a conceptual framework that combines the ICT ecosystem and constellation 
of institutions. Parliamentary capacity elements were then indexed through the self -assessment. 
The areas investigated were around the following: 
 
i. The extent to which the two countries (Kenya and SA) have implemented ICT sector 




ii. The surrounding governance context (nature of state, the interplay between state and 
market; interplay between different institutions and interest groups, extent of political 
space; impact of global governance)  and how it has supported or constrained  effective 
participation of parliaments in influencing ICT sector reforms:  
 Political culture: policy dominance, consensus formation and policy coherence, 
 Degree of institutional fragmentation (low-high), 
 Degree of dispersion responsibilities (low-high), 
 Degree of centralization (low-high). 
 
iii. How parliaments have applied their mandates (legislative, representative, oversight and 
budgetary; Table 7) to influence ICT reform processes. 
 
iv. Existing or nonexistence of institutional capacity, political competency, and specialised 
knowledge levels with regard to ICTs hampering its participation in developing an 
enabling environment for ICT sector reforms.  
 
The codes were generated from topics addressed by the self-assessment questionnaire and the 
high level interviews used and grouped into similar subjects or ideas and conversations. The 
assessment used for analysing empirical evidence on capacity provides for a 1-4 coding system 
for responses, with meanings as follows: 
 1 signifies the clear need for increased capacity in parliament,  
 2 means that basic level of capacity is in place,  
 3 means a moderate level of capacity  
 4 means high level of capacity in place.  
For each rating, an explanation was provided to support meaningful selection of choices by 
participants. The information was coded and evaluated to reflect the following issues: 
1. The level of maturity of the ICT sector reforms process in each sampled country, measured 
by the outcomes of policy objectives price, access and quality of service, as well as levels 
of government/parliamentary intervention in the process.  
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2. Degree of involvement of parliament in national and regional ICT ecosystem, measured by 
its accessibility to key stakeholders and parliamentary application/adherence to 
international frameworks. 
3. Extent of influence of parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms, measured by its 
oversight effectiveness and resource availability. 
4. The degree of application of political power by parliament in ICT governance processes 
measured through its legal mandate, and the effectiveness of the bill review and hearing and 
oversight mechanisms and processes. 
   Table 7: Summary of parliament’s mandates. 
 
Parliamentary Mandate  Capacity Element  Key dimensions  
Representation Accessibility i. Parliamentary openness;  
ii. mechanisms for public awareness;  
iii. mechanisms to promote public understanding;  
iv. guidelines to govern  relationship with stakeholders  
Legislation Legal mandate 
 
i. source of parliamentary power to amend legislation  
ii. power to amend bills 
iii. opportunities for citizens to input into legislative 
process 
iv. mechanisms to track impact of legislation 
v. Power to send back legislation for review 
Bill reviews and 
hearings 
 
i. Period of review of any ICT legislation 
ii. Existence of an ICT Committee 
iii. Existence of Public hearings on ICT 
Oversight function  Oversight committees  
 
i. oversight function performed by sector related 
committees  
ii. oversight committees have investigative powers  
iii. oversight of the expenditures of state owned 
enterprises and opportunities for minority/opposition 
to participate 
iv. mechanisms to obtain information Power to follow up 
on recommendations 
v. adequately resourced  
vi.  





The literature review assisted in the identification of important themes for effective 
parliamentary participation in ICT policy making. From the literature reviewed, a conceptual 
framework was developed to provide a lens through which empirical data was analysed. From 
the self-assessment and follow up interviews, qualitative evidence was collected to enable a 
comparative analysis of worldwide trends common to parliament allowing for an analysis of the 
intricate trends in participation of the parliaments of Kenya and South Africa in ICT policy 
making. The result was a detailed identification and description of parliamentary structures, 
mechanisms and processes to understand the practices that have been applied to the ICT policy 
process. The document analysis provided evidence of the parliamentary and legal mandate basis 
for developing the structures, processes, and mechanisms that have influenced the parliamentary 
practices. Primary and secondary qualitative data was used to measure ICT policy and regulatory 
outcomes, in terms of market performance.  
 
In the next chapter the findings of the document and legal analysis of parliamentary mandate 
structures, mechanisms and processes are applied to the ICT policy making process. Legal 
documents were assessed in terms of the Constitutions of Kenya and South Africa and what is 




DOCUMENT ANALYSIS OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES AND 




Building on the research problem set out in Chapter 1, the theoretical and conceptual framework 
in Chapters 2 and 3, and applying the methodology described in Chapter 4, Chapters 5 presents a 
review of constitutional, legal, normative and strategic documents, media statements and reports 
on parliaments and ICT sector in Kenya and South Africa that define the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional environment to shape parliamentary participation.   
 
The formal role of parliament, its functions and procedural guidelines are defined by a country’s 
legal and governance framework. The legal framework, however, exposes the parliamentary 
system to a variety of interpretations reflective of the ambiguity of different relationships 
parliament has with its stakeholders. Furthermore having different colonial, historical and 
constitutional arrangements means that values held by each parliament manifest in a variety of 
ways (SADC- PF, 2010). In some cases, these values are embedded in the constitutional and 
legal frameworks and activities of some parliaments, while in others values remain aspirations 
that require urgent and concrete interventions to bridge aspirations, policy and practice.  
 
What constitutes a formal legal, regulatory and institutional architecture for ICT policy making 
from a parliamentary perspective is what is investigated and outlined in this chapter. This 
includes a focus on the constitutional mandate, the underlying power, authority bases, 
institutional history and capacity and the political culture that structures political participation 
and shapes policy outcomes. This is done taking into account how the continuity and strength of 
a parliament are influenced by a set of external and internal factors that depend on a support 





The chapter then identifies mechanisms and structures that exist in both parliaments to 
implement the architecture outlined. These parliamentary mechanisms and structures, together 
with the parliamentary mandates, are benchmarked for compliance with what is accepted as the 
role of parliament reflected in international standards36. The assessment in Chapter 6 then 
focuses on how parliament has practically applied its constitutional mandate including the 
mechanisms and structures in ICT policy-making processes and the extent of influence of such 
external factors as political culture and institutional constellation within the sector. 
 
To contextualize and apply parliamentary mandate to ICTs, an attempt at understanding ICT 
sector governance is undertaken. Following the developments within the national ICT ecosystem 
of each country under study, parliamentary participation is assessed within the context of 
influencing or constraining factors defined in ICT laws, policies and institutional arrangements 
adopted by Kenya and SA. The chapter thus presents the parliamentary mandate for ICT policy 
making, through a reflection of the extent of legal powers the processes and mechanisms to 
implement the mandates. Chapter 5 provides a foundation for an examination of the 
parliamentary practices adopted and applied to the ICT sector in the next chapter. 
  
 5.1 Legal context 
The constitutional structure of a country shapes the quality of its governance and defines the 
divergent executive organizations and arrangements. The constitutions of both countries have set 
up the fundamental modes of legitimate governmental operations by vesting the constitutional 
authority separately in three arms of government - the executive, parliament and the judiciary. 
Both constitutions provide a rights-based legal framework that defines who the government’s 
officials are, their selection and terms of office, division of authority, processes to be followed, 
and the rights reserved for citizens (Nunow, 2004; Africog,2013 ).  
 
                                                          
36 Commonwealth Parliamentary Association's "Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures";  Inter-Parliamentary 
Union's "Evaluating Parliament: A self-assessment toolkit for parliaments";  National Democratic Institute's 
"Toward the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures"; SADC Parliamentary Forum 




On the basis of the constitution, the political and structural relationships and division of power 
among the state organs set out the principles and values that each parliament serves in the two 
countries under study. It is the institutional constellation37 of these state agencies, the values, and 
arrangements that then influence the effectiveness of the democratic system of governance, 
making the implementation of the constitution dependent on applicable legislation, 
administrative capacity and the power and remits of parliament (Africog Report, 2013). As 
provided in the constitution, South Africa practices a multiparty parliamentary democracy38 in a 
single, sovereign democratic state where the executive is drawn from parliament (PSA, 2004). 
The government is formed in the lower house, and the leader of the majority party in the national 
assembly is the president. The parliament follows the Westminster parliamentary procedures, 
with the rule of the majority at the heart and respect for the minority. Its objective is to facilitate 
deliberation of interests to understand the will of the parliament upon these questions. 
 
 The Kenya 2010 constitution brought with it major changes to the country’s systems and 
structures (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Report, 2012). The general political 
structure changed with the adoption of a bicameral parliament and a two-level devolved system 
of government: national and county.  Kenya is now a pure presidential republic with clearly 
demarcated separation of power between parliament and the executive39 amplifying the 
independent and distinct roles of the three arms of state (Oloo, 2011; Mathooko, 2014).  This 
clear cut separation of power has resulted in increased responsibility for parliament and greater 
need to ensure intergovernmental interaction to enable extensive scrutiny. In implementing its 
mandate, the parliament is transitioning from the Westminster procedures before the 2010 
Constitution to congressional with a bicameral legislature comprising of a national assembly 
                                                          
37 Entire set of political institutions and the interconnected rules that shape public decision-making, including shared 
interpretative structures affecting the patterns of interaction by decision-makers. 
 
38 A political system in which the legislature (parliament) selects the government - a president, or premier, along 
with the cabinet ministers - according to party strength as expressed in elections; by this system, the government 
acquires a dual responsibility: to the people as well as to the parliament.  
 
39 The new government consists of a president and cabinet secretaries (executive), a national assembly representing 
constituencies (with allocated seats for minorities) and a senate representing counties all elected directly by Kenyan 




(NA) and the Senate. The national assembly controls the allocations of revenues to the various 
state organs and has the power to impeach state officials. 
 
The SA’s parliamentary system, on the one hand, creates a more centralized decision-making 
process with an institutionalized policymaking process centered on strong political parties and 
party-aligned interest groups. The system is more decisive with hierarchical administrative 
structures than would normally be found in a presidential system. Whereas the Kenyan 
presidential system is a more resolute system of governance centered more on individual 
politicians and smaller, less established organizational entities. There is greater institutional 
fragmentation that offers greater resistance to change, which requires increased capacity and 
willingness on the part of parliaments to exercise the power in the face of undue executive 
dominance. 
 
The SID Constitution Working Paper Series No 1 (2010) brings to the fore notable differences 
between the two systems as lying in the number of additional veto points brought by delegation 
within the political process. The report confirms that additional veto points increase the number 
of institutions involved in policy formulation, resulting in an even greater degree of 
fragmentation. Delegation to state agencies is a constitutional provision used consistently to 
bring credibility in both countries to formally vetoing against unilateral decision making. 
Delegation can, however, result in less hierarchical power structures when specialized agencies 
with differing degrees of autonomy impact the decision-making process and the principal-agent 
status interchanges depending on the institution.  
 
Kenya is inclined towards a less concentrated dispersion of responsibilities with simultaneous 
actions performed by several institutions and no clear-cut separation of responsibilities between 
competing authorities and sector regulators. This has resulted in overlaps and undefined limits of 
responsibilities amongst key institutions in the sector (ICT Sector Review, 2010). Kenya’s 
transition to a presidential system has introduced new challenges to the system, with delegated 
state agencies vested with rule-making powers and providing the executive an opportunity to 
create laws possibly ignoring the will of parliament, and in addition not systematically reviewed 




It is the institutional capacity requirements of effective parliamentary participation in different 
political systems and cultures that will be further tested by the empirical section of this study. 
Both Kenya and SA are multi-party democracies with a parliament comprised of members who 
influence the decision-making processes based on political party goals irrespective of the 
governance arrangements in place. The major difference between the two lies in the incentives 
for MPs, whether or not they are driven by an individual or party vote.  Within both 
governments, the executive represents government policy, and parliament provides the checks 
and balances through scrutiny, review and oversight of government actions. Institutional 
arrangements in place to facilitate policy and decision making are reflective of the constitutional 
structures in each country.  
 
As determined  in Chapter 2 of this study, the typology of national parliaments, government 
structures, the interplay of political and social factors, political context in which they operate 
predominantly matter when measuring homogeneity levels, preferences, strength and  capacity of 
parliament in the policy making process. Table 8 summarizes the characteristics of the political 
environments within which the parliaments of Kenya and SA operate. The political environments 
define the governance arrangements within which the parliaments of Kenya and SA influence 
policy outcomes in the ICT sector. The next section provides an analytical narrative of the 
constitutional mandate for Kenya and SA, based on the constitutional choices and as determined 
by the legal and political context described above.   
 
5.2 Constitutional mandate  
The origin of the institution of parliament is the constitution. The constitutional mandate sets out 
the roles and functions it performs (Article 93 of Constitution of Kenya; Chapter 4 of 
Constitution of SA). Furthermore, it enables the definition of the values and principles 
parliament as an organization pursues. The structure of political participation is achieved by 
defining parliament’s relationships with other state institutions.  
 
In South Africa, it is the constitution and other laws that limit parliament functions (PSA 
Website, 2015; Chapter 4, 9, Constitution; Strategic Plan, 2014). Similarly, within the Kenyan 
111 
 
context, the parliament is constitutionally mandated by enacting legislation, determining the 
allocation of revenue between the levels of government, overseeing national revenue, 
expenditure, and state organs. The new Kenyan Constitution has fundamentally changed the 
operational framework increasing responsibilities for members significantly (Mathooko, 2014).  
 
Table 8: Political environment in Kenya and SA (2012). 
 
Institutional variable Kenya SA 
Type of political system  Presidential Parliamentary 
Level of representation  National, county(post 2010)  Sub-national, national 
Parliamentary structure  Bicameral (post 2010) Bicameral 
Method of  election  Mixed representation combined 
constituency and proportional 
representation 
Pure List Proportional  
Representation 
Parliament’s size  Between 250 and 500 MPs Between 250 and 500 MPs 
Parliament is Age Over fifty years of democratic 
existence 
21 years  
Administrative structure  Decentralized (post 2010) and less  
hierarchical  
Centralized and  
Hierarchical 
Resource availability  Determined by an independent  
Parliamentary Service  Commission  
 
Colonial tradition Congressional  Westminster 
Formal parliamentary 
Powers 
Constitutionally mandated Constitutionally mandated  
Political will and space  Constitutionally provided for but 
limited by the political culture and 
system  
Constitutionally provided for but 
dominated by political party 
dynamics 
Source: Authors compilation 
 
 Table 9 summarizes the constitutional mandates of the parliaments of Kenya and SA as reflected 
in constitutions (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996). The summary in Table 9 and the preceding discussions on the mandate of the parliaments 
of Kenya and SA emphasize the promotion of inclusive and sustainable participation of citizens 
in governance processes with a human rights based approach that ensures accountability by the 
government for its actions. Both parliaments in implementing the constitutional mandate seek to 
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be open, accessible, transparent and responsive through an electoral system that diffuses 
authority among multiple independent bodies.  






values of the 
country. 
Parliament of SA must:  
 Promote constitutionalism and 
human rights. 
 Be inclusive in the way it’s 
constituted (represent all South 
Africans) and in its practices which 
must respect participatory 
democracy and ensure proportional 
party representation in their 
proceedings (sections 57 and 116). 
 Be accessible, open, responsive and 
participatory (sections 59, 72 and 
118). 
 Be efficient and effective. 
Parliament of Kenya must (Article 10(2)) 
promote:   
 Patriotism, national unity, sharing and 
devolution of power, the rule of law, 
democracy and participation of the 
people;  
 Human dignity, equity, social justice, 
inclusiveness, equality, human rights, 
non-discrimination and protection of 
the marginalized;  
 Good governance, integrity, 
transparency and accountability; and  





 Selection of officials for the 
legislature and elsewhere such as 
the President (section 86), the 
Judicial Service Commission 
(section 178(1) (h)), most of the 
Chapter 9 institutions (State 
Institutions Supporting 
Constitutional Democracy) and the 
Public Service Commission 
(section 196). 
 Making law- (sections 55(1) (ii), 
68(1) (ii) and 114(1) (ii)), (sections 
73(2) and 119. 
 Providing, sustaining and 
overseeing the executive. 
 Linking citizens and the legislature. 
 Promotion of inclusive representation 
(Article 27(8); Articles 97, 98, 100, 
177 and 82). 
 Deliberate on and resolves issues of 
concern to the people. 
 Enacts legislation in accordance. 
 Budgetary oversight40. 
 Exercises oversight over national 
revenue and its expenditure. 
  Approves declarations of war and 
extensions of states of emergency. 
 
Source: Author’s synthesis of PSA (2004),Murray (2010), Migai (2010), Oloo (2010). 
                                                          
40 Determines the allocation of national revenue between the levels of government and appropriates funds for 





Table 9 (continued): Parliamentary constitutional mandates for Kenya and SA. 
Constitutional mandate  SA Kenya 
Structure its 
relationships with other 
state organs in a system 
of governance. 
 Executive is drawn from it. 
 Broad legislative powers. 
 Bears primary responsibility 
for oversight of the national 
executive. 
 Executive is separate.  
 Reviews the conduct in 
office of the President, the 
Deputy President and other 
State officers and initiates 
the process of removing 
them from office. 
 Approves the appointment 
and dismissal of public 
officers (including judicial 
officers).  
 Exercises oversight of State 
organs. 
 
Source: Author’s synthesis of PSA (2004),Murray (2010), Migai (2010), Oloo (2010). 
 
Electoral accountability is a key disjuncture between parliamentarism and presidentialism as 
practiced in SA and Kenya, respectively. SA offers greater accountability at the national level 
(between constituents and their political party) while Kenya accountability is at the local level 
(between constituents and their individual representative). The Kenyan system, because of the 
separation of powers prescribed by the constitution, requires more consensus building to agree 
on any policy direction and as such consensus is mandated by the constitution.  In SA on the 
other hand, the consensus is often and temporarily monopolized by the ruling party, with other 
groups voicing their opposition but having no formal mechanism to affect policy outcomes. 
 
It is the same constitutional mandate underlying the political environment that accounts for some 
of the major differences arising from the political culture, power structures and governance 
processes of the two countries. In the Kenyan case, the clear-cut separation of powers has 
increased checks on an executive that previously enjoyed enormous and unfettered power.  
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However, having an executive drawn from parliament brings with its dynamics particularly since 
political parties influence the level of participation and ability to exercise power required for 
effective governance processes as is the case with SA. The arising arrangements change to a 
great extent the roles and functions each branch of government plays as especially reflected in 
the processes of delegating responsibilities to state agencies.  
 
A significant difference between the Kenyan and South African system lies in the prioritization 
of the constitutional choices or focus. Constitutional choices reflect the notion that a government 
that requires more checks and balances follows a presidential system while that which requires 
power to enact laws quickly follows a parliamentary system. The choices are often underpinned 
by multiple realities based on the cultural, socioeconomic, and historical factors which vary from 
period to period (Oversight Model, 2009). The strategic direction of the parliament of SA shows 
that for a while, post-independence, the focus was on developing, institutions and structures to 
redress the ills, imbalances, and backlogs inherited from years of apartheid rule. This called for 
increased legislation and representation capacity during the post-apartheid era. The constitutional 
choice was relevant taking into account the expressed need to pass a lot of legislation. Lately, 
however, there is a significant shift towards developing the oversight capacity which had been 
lagging for a while (Oversight Model, 2009; PSA, Strategic Plan, 2014).  
 
Kenya on the other hand, post adoption of the new constitution, is in the process of aligning all 
laws to the new constitution.  The logic of the new constitution is to be people centered, with 
important implications for the three arms of government.  This is at the backdrop of a state that 
has been largely dominated by the executive with a judiciary and legislature that has over the 
years been compromised41 (SID Constitution Working Paper No. 1).  
 
Table 10 summarizes the constitutional provisions for the Kenya and South African parliaments. 
The interpretation of the constitutional provisions listed in Table 10 contextualizes the 
parliamentary mandate in both policy making and within the broader political governance, with 
                                                          
41  Africa’s political systems are characterized by powerful central governments with equally powerful executives 





particular emphasis on provisions for legal frameworks, the arising institutional arrangements 
and mechanisms required for policy implementation (described below) 
 
Table 10: Summary of constitutional provisions for parliaments of Kenya and SA. 
Constitutional 
provisions  
South Africa Kenya 
Establishment  Chapter 4 Section 42 establishes National 
Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces. 
Chapter 8 establishes the National Assembly and the 
Senate.  
Legislative Authority Chapter 4 (Sections 43 and 44) vests the 
legislative authority in parliament. 
 Article 93, 44 (1), (2), and (4) vests 
legislative authority in Parliament. 
 Section 19 to 31 of the National Assembly 
and Presidential Elections Act. 
 National Assembly Elections.  
 Election Petition & Rules. 
Legislative power Section 55 (1),(2) - Derives from the 
Standing Orders 
 Article 94(5); Article 109(1); -derives from 




Chapter 4, Section 44. 1(a) (iii) - assign any 
of its legislative powers, except the power to 
amend the Constitution, to any legislative 
body in another sphere of government. 
Not clearly articulated. 
Accountability  Ch. 44 Section 55 2 (a) determines 
accountable of all government to parliament. 
Section 181(5) – Accountability of State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy. 
Article 119 - right to petition parliament. Article 104 
- right to recall an MP and enactment of legislation to 
do so.  
 
Parliamentary Functions  
Legislation  
 
Section 44(2) -parliament can intervene by 
passing legislation 
Section 73(2)- Introducing a Bill in the 
Assembly  is only  by a Cabinet member or a 
Deputy Minister, or a member or committee 
of the National Assembly, money Bills  by 
only the Cabinet member responsible for 
national financial matters  
 Article 109. 
 Article 118 - Bills must be introduced by 
members of Parliament (thus members of 
the executive need to find sponsors for 
legislation they want to put through). 
 Article 119- the executive is to be consulted 
on money Bills but cannot block their 
passage. 











Parliamentary Functions (continued) 
Oversight of state 
organs/ key 
stakeholders 
National Assembly- Sections 42(3) and 
55(2) and National Council of Provinces 
(Section 42(4)).  Further provisions - 
Section 41(2); Section 56; 59;  Section 
66(2), Section 67, Section 69, Section 
70(1), Section 89, Section 92, Section 
93(2), Section 100(2), Section 102, Section 
114(2), Section 115,116(1), 118, Section 
125(4), Section 130(3) & (4); Section 
133(2) & (3); Section 139 (2), Section 
139(3), Section 139 (6), Section 146 (6), 
Section 154, Section 155(6), Section 
155(7), Section 231(2), (3) & (4)  
 National Assembly- Article 95 4(C), 5 (b). 
 Senate- Article 145. 
Representation  Ch. 44  Section 59 -  public 
involvement in the legislative and 
other processes of the Assembly and 
its committees;  
 Section 59(1.b) - parliament conduct 
its business in an open manner, and 
hold its sittings, and those of its 
committees, in public with  reasonable 
measures may be taken  to regulate 
public access  
 participation in the proceedings of the 
Assembly and its committees of 
minority parties represented in the 
Assembly, in a manner consistent with 
democracy; 
 
 Article 10 
 Ch. 7 provisions for a mixed system -
plurality/majority system based on the first 
past the post (FPTP) and proportional 
representation system (Article 98 (b) election 
of 16 women county representatives;  Article 
97 (c) - special interest groups) 
 Articles 94 and 95 provide for - diversity of 
the nation, the will of the people, and 
exercise their sovereignty in parliament. 
 Article 118 imposes a duty on Parliament to 
facilitate public participation and 
involvement in the business of Parliament 
and its committees  
 Article 118(1) provides for conducting 
parliamentary business in an open manner, 
and its sittings and those of its committees 
shall be in public 













No PSC  Article 127(1) 
Processes and 
Procedures  
 Chapter 4 Section 57& 70 
(internal arrangements, 
proceedings and procedures and 
makes rules and orders 
concerning its business. 
 Section 57 - rules and orders 
concerning its business, with due 
regard to representative and 
participatory democracy, 
accountability, transparency and 
public. 
 Financial and administrative 
assistance to each party 
represented in the Assembly. 
 Sections 56(d) and 69(d) of the 
Constitution, requires Parliament 
to accept petitions, 
representations and submissions 
from any interested persons or 
institutions. 
 Article 117(2); Article 124(1) - 
Standing Orders for the orderly 
conduct of its proceedings including 
the proceedings of its committees. 
 Article 126 - Determination of its 
calendar. 
Committees  Terms of reference for are 
derived from Standing Orders. 




 Chapter 4 Section 42 – provides 
for bicameralism consisting of the 
National Assembly and the 
National council of provinces. 
 Chapter 8 provides for bicameralism 
consisting of National assembly and 
the Senate (Articles 109-113).  
Financial and 
Human resources 
Budget is determined by the executive. Article 120 - Parliament’s budget is dealt with 
separately from that of the executive. 




The right of parliament to organize itself, as conferred by the constitution, is the basis for the 
formation of parliamentary groups and committees that then scrutinize legislation and executive 
action providing opportunities for input and feedback into parliamentary processes. The 
institutional designs take into account the principles and values of representativeness, 
participatory democracy, accountability, transparency and public involvement in parliament to 
structure itself to promote and facilitate intergovernmental and other relations through 
appropriate mechanisms and procedures. 
 
Furthermore, defining core legislative and oversight functions gives parliament the ability to 
initiate legislation as well as rights to propose and amend legislation, consult experts, and staff, 
hold public hearings or receive testimony from experts, subpoena or obtain documents. The 
following section outlines key parliamentary mandates that build the legal and institutional 
frameworks, bearing in mind the prerogative (Sections 57 & 70, South African Constitution 
(1996); Articles 117 & 124, Kenya Constitution (2010)) that parliament has for designing its 
internal arrangements, processes and procedure tools and  by-laws, rules and regulations to 
define its conduct. 
 
5.2.1 Legal Mandate  
The source and level of legislative authority are critical elements to defining parliament’s role in 
policy making. Both the constitutions of Kenya and South Africa confer legislative authority to 
its parliaments. Legislative authority gives parliament the power to consider, review and amend 
the constitution and pass laws concerning any matter as necessary to maintain national security, 
economic unity and to establish minimum and essential standards required for the rendering of 
services (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
 
Legislation considered in both countries is mainly in the form of public bills sponsored by either 
government or private members or statutory instruments, but with very few private bills ever 
passed. Acts of parliament are enacted to give ministry and other state agencies powers to make 
regulations or subsidiary legislation and apply the law in greater detail adapting it to fit changing 





In both countries, law-making has its roots in policy and generally speaking, the policy is 
conceptualized by the executive with in-country nuances existing. In South Africa, the policy 
formulation process is usually a two-step process that starts with a Green Paper (discussion), 
which is published for comment before a White Paper (policy) is then compiled. The process of 
drawing up a green or white paper is often a lengthy one and may involve consultations with the 
department responsible for making policy in the area, with the relevant parliamentary 
committee(s), and other experts or stakeholders as well as the general public. 
 
In SA, legislation whether or not it is preceded by a policy paper is drafted by the executive in 
line with the constitutional provision regarding the power to introduce bills. The new constitution 
in Kenya allows only members of parliament to introduce bills in parliament. Since cabinet 
members cannot be members of the national assembly, need to develop intergovernmental 
relationships have grown as cabinet members seek to sponsor bills in parliament. 
 
To effectively implement the constitutional mandate both countries have defined legislative 
processes comprised of elements listed in Table 11. The process places parliament at the center 
as key players and custodians of laws. Parliaments are also the entity charged with approving the 
budget and overseeing the implementation of the programs to implement the adopted policies 
and enacted legislation.  The process is very similar in both countries with three clear cut stages 
as a condition precedent to enactment. The main difference remains in who has the power to 
introduce bills.   
 
The legislative authority of parliament allows parliament to "delegate any of its legislative 
powers, except the power to amend the constitution, to any legislative body in another sphere of 
government (Constitutions of Kenya, 2010 and South Africa, 1996)." Delegation brings to bear 
the constitutional structures and arrangements described above, exposing factors such as ability 
to exercise power, principal-agent relationship with the ministry, effects of party politics, level of 





Parliament’s effective utilization of powers in the ICT sector reforms process can be measured 
by its ability to delegate authority to an independent regulator.  In SA, this is done by the 
Independent Communications Authority of SA (ICASA) through the ICASA Act of 2000, and in 
Kenya through the Communications Authority (CA) in 1999 through the Kenya Information and 
Communication (KICA) Act of 1998. The ICASA Act acknowledges the importance of 
establishing an independent body to regulate broadcasting and electronic communications and 
thus provides a procedure to appoint and manage the regulator.   The KICA Amendment (2013), 
defines an executive led process for appointing the regulator. Table 12 summarizes the key 
elements of the establishment and appointment processes followed in Kenya and SA to establish 
a sector regulator for ICTs.  
 
Appointing a regulator for the ICT sector in both Kenya and SA is a critical process central to the 
effective governance of the sector. Over the years, as part of the reforms trajectory, it has become 
a significant but controversial element of the work of the parliamentary committees responsible 
for ICTs, especially in a parliamentary system like South Africa. Significant differences in the 
appointment processes can be observed in Kenya and South Africa reflecting the nature of the 
prevailing political systems and governance arrangements. The differences mainly lie in how the 
regulator is appointed and members selected, the public consultation approaches, approval 
authority, the appointment of chairperson and members and in the length of terms of office.  
 
In South Africa appointing a regulator is mainly parliament-led process, with all approvals done 
at parliament level before any appointments are made by the minister. Parliament is mandated to 
follow a public process that caters for the public nomination, elaborate interviewing, vetting and 
selection. The short listing of candidates is often a controversial undertaking with no consensus 
reached both committee and party levels, ending with a vote many a time. The parliamentary 
committee often utilizes technical experts to facilitate the process that can take anything from a 
few weeks to- months. The process is clearly an indication of the formal legal system in SA that 
dictates a multiparty public process representing multiple interests. Parliamentary involvement 
extends beyond the appointment process to other essential elements of running the regulator such 
as performance management. Kenya, on the other hand, follows a predominantly executive 
process for both the appointment and the selection of board chairperson and members. 
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Parliamentary engagement is very minimal and occurs outside of the appointment process to 
allow for effective scrutiny of the performance of the agency. 
 
Table 11- Legislation processes and mechanisms in Kenya 
Purpose  Process/ Mechanism  PSA Kenya 
Introduce bill to the house by reading the title only. 
Minister or relevant Committee may move a motion to 




Entire bill is read to the House, marks the beginning of 
the debate when the minister moves the bill. 
2nd Readings X X 
Amended bill is read to the House, and a vote is taken to 
accept or reject the bill 
3rd  Readings X X 
Bill is read one clause at a time, and each clause is 
debated, and questions on it are put. This is the stage 
when amendments to the bill are proposed and questions 
put on each clause. 
Committee of the whole house, 
plenary debates 
X X 
Consider bills and invite inputs from stakeholders, 
amends the bill to include recommendation and reports 
to the House. 
Committees, Committee debates, 
Public input 
X X 
To report on the current position of the bill. Report of Progress X X 
Allows for amending a bill that has been reported to the 
Committee of the whole house. 
Recommital of a bill X X 
Allows for bill withdrawal at any stage without prior 
notice. 
Withdrawal of a bill X X 
Ratify and domesticate international laws. International agreements process X X 





Table 12: Establishment and appointment procedures for regulators in Kenya and SA. 
Element  SA  Kenya 
Purpose of 
Council/CA 
To regulate broadcasting and 
telecommunications electronic communications  
To license and regulate telecommunication, 
radio-communication and postal services in 




Council consists of a chairperson and eight other 
councilors appointed by the  Minister upon the 
approval by the National Assembly, according to 
the following principles, namely— 
a) participation by the public in the 
nomination process; 
b) transparency and openness; and 
c) the publication of a shortlist of 
candidates for appointment, with due 
regard to subsection (3) and section 6 
The Board consists of a chairperson appointed 
by the President, a Principal Secretary 
(broadcast, electronic, print and all other 
types of media), Principal (finance), Principal 
Secretary (internal security) and seven 
persons appointed by the Cabinet Secretary. 
In selecting, shortlisting and appointing the 
chairperson and members of the Board, the 
President/Cabinet Secretary shall—  
a) ensure that the appointees 
reflect the interests of all 
sections of society;  
b) ensure equal _opportunities for 
persons with disabilities and 
other marginalized groups, and  
c) ensure that not more than two-
thirds of the members are of the 
same gender.  
Terms of office Chairperson holds office for a period of five 
years, and other councilors hold office for a 
period of four years 
The chairperson and members of 
the Board shall hold office for a 
period of three years renewable 
once.  
 
Financing of and 
accounting by 
Authority 
The Authority is financed from money 
appropriated by Parliament. 
The Authority among other sources of finance 
receives such moneys as may be provided by 




The minister tables a copy of the annual report in 
Parliament with a  predetermined time after 
received the report 
The minister lays the audit and annual reports 
before parliament within a predefined time 
after it’s submitted to him.  




Table 12 (continued): Establishment and appointment procedures for regulators in Kenya and SA. 
Element  SA  Kenya 
Appointment 





 with assistance from technical experts: invites 
applicants  
 submits a list of suitable candidates, at least, one 
and a half times the number of councilors to be 
appointed to the minister  
 interviews and  evaluation and selection 
 public engagement  
 if not satisfied that the persons recommended for 
appointment by the minister comply with set 
criteria parliament may request the Minister to 
review his or her recommendation 
Minister  
 recommends to parliament whom he or she 
proposes to appoint to serve on the Council from 
the list provided  
 following approval by parliament of the minister’s 
recommendation for appointment, the minister 
must appoint the chairperson or other councilors by 
notice in the Gazette.’’ 
A selection panel42 convened by the President / 
cabinet secretary: 
 determines own procedure with support from 
the cabinet secretary.  
 considers applications, shortlists and publishes 
the names and qualifications of all the 
applicants and those shortlisted by the panel in 
the Gazette and on the official website of the 
Ministry, within seven days from the expiry of 
the deadline of receipt of applications  
 interviews the shortlisted applicants selects 
three persons qualified to be appointed as 
chairperson; and two persons, in relation to each 
vacancy, qualified to be appointed as members 
of the Board, and forwards the names to the 
President / Cabinet Secretary.  
 President / Cabinet Secretary appoints the 
chairperson and the members 




Councillors may resign tendering three months’ written 
notice to the minister. A councilor may be removed from 
office only on- 
 a finding to that effect by parliament; and 
 the adoption by parliament of a resolution 
calling for that councilor’s removal from 
office. 
The President- 
(a) may suspend a councilor from office at any time after 
the start of the proceedings of the parliament for the 
removal of that councilor; 
(b) must remove a councilor from office upon adoption 
by parliament of the resolution calling for that 
councilor’s removal. 
 A person desiring the removal of a member of 
the Board of the Authority may present a 
complaint under oath to the Cabinet Secretary, 
setting out the alleged facts constituting that 
ground.  
 The Cabinet Secretary shall consider the 
complaint and if satisfied that it discloses a 
ground under subsection shall send the 
complaint to the President.  
 On considering a complaint under subsection 
(1) or on receiving a complaint under subsection 
the President may suspend the chairperson or 
member pending the outcome of the complaint 
on recommendation of a tribunal. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
                                                          
42  Shall comprise of persons drawn from the following organisations - (a) Media Council of Kenya; (b) Kenya Private Sector Alliance; (c) Law 
Society of Kenya;   (d) Institute of Engineers of Kenya; (e) Public Relations Society of Kenya; (f) Kenya National Union of Teachers; (g) 
Consumers Federation of Kenya; and   (h) the Ministry responsible for matters relating to media. 
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5.2.2 Representative Mandate  
Parliament manifests diversity of the nation, represents the will of the people, and exercises their 
sovereignty (Constitution of SA, 1996; Constitution of Kenya, 2010). Representation is thus one 
of the most valued functions of parliament (SADC PF- Self Assessment Toolkit, 2012). Access 
and public participation are key elements of representativeness and are measured by parliament’s 
openness to the public, mechanisms in place to promote an understanding of the work of 
parliament, and nature of the relationship between parliament, civil society and other related 
institutions (Parliamentary Centre, 2011). 
 
Embedded in representation is the assumption that parliament represents a diverse society - in 
terms of political plurality, gender, culture, age, and language, among other factors (SADC PF-
Self Assessment Toolkit, 2012). Thus, the extent and level of representation hinges, first and 
foremost, on the country’s electoral system and the authority granted by a constituency to act as 
its representative is through winning a democratic election. The Parliament of Kenya follows a 
mixed system with elements of both constituency-based systems and proportional representation 
(Oloo, 2011). A mixed system combines elements of the plurality/majority system and 
proportional representation system with the rationale to translate a party share of the votes into a 
proportional number of seats in parliament. In Kenya, the connection between constituents and 
the MP is the “glue that binds voters to political institutions” (SADC-PF, 2010: 13). 
 
On the other hand, the SA parliament is based on a purely proportional representation system.  It 
is the plurality/majoritarian system that is used to determine the allocation of parliamentary seats, 
while the proportional representation system is used to compensate for the inequalities that may 
arise from the use of the plurality/ majority system (Oloo, 2011). Here the voters are closely 
attached to political parties as vehicles for representation. 
 
A key measure of representativeness is parliamentary accessibility and openness. Access to the 
institution and its members and information provided to the public is vital for representativeness 
of parliament.  According to a Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) evaluation of the 
openness of parliament South Africa on the basis of four key indicators (see Table 13), the 
parliament has a moderate score satisfying most of the criteria necessary to call it open. 
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However, there are weaknesses still identified in a number of areas.  The same criterion was then 
applied to the Kenyan parliament based on the researcher’s observations and research. 
 
The PMG report findings point to the ability of the South African parliament to promote 
proactively access, transparency and openness through civic education, multiple channel access, 
live streaming of plenary and committee sessions, publishing the plenary schedule for every term 
and implementing such initiatives as taking parliament to the people and establishing 
parliamentary democracy offices. By so doing it excels in easing access to information in a non-
discriminatory basis and enables two-way communication with its stakeholders. However, 
inconsistencies are evident in the way the information is published, with a lack of emphasis on 
recognizing public ownership of information. This affects information reuse by citizens and 
availability of necessary information to the broader citizens for informed decision making. 
 
The case of Kenya brings to the fore yet another key measure of representativeness that of public 
participation. Formally Kenya acknowledges the right of the people to participate in the 
governance of their country (Constitution of Kenya, 2010). The decentralization of government 
to county levels is aimed at creating and encouraging public participation through decision 
making processes and new powers of self-governance (Africog Report, 2013).  Under the 
constitution, public participation is mandatory at both parliament and county assembly levels. 
There is a requirement to facilitate public participation and committee hearings by ensuring 
attendance and safeguarding the public right to attend. Significant challenges hampering public 
participation include the low staffing levels, limited number of committees, lack of time to 
scrutinize proposed legislation due to slow working committees, and poor support from 
government agencies (Africog Report, 2013).  The solution herein lies in not only amending 
standing orders to include general principles of openness in committee hearings and proceedings 
but to provide necessary information, for example through a website that is interactive with 
accessible and reusable information(on the basis of Table 13 findings, this is lacking), and 
addressing the technical and legal43 obstructions to access.  
 
                                                          
43 The National Assembly (Power and Privileges) Act allows information to be withheld on the ground that it is of a 
private nature.  
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Table 13: Kenya and SA parliamentary openness scores based on criteria used by the South African  
   Parliamentary Monitoring Group.  
 
Indicator Criteria Scores 
  3 = meets requirements                      
0 = meets none 
  SA Kenya 
Promoting a culture 
of openness 
Recognizing public ownership of information 1 1 
promoting civic education 3 2 
engaging citizens /civil society  3 1 
enabling effective monitoring 2 1 
disseminating complete information 1 1 
providing timely information 1 1 
ensuring accurate information 2 2 
Making information 
transparent 
pro transparency policies 1 1 
information on roles and responsibilities 3 3 
informing citizens on the legislative agenda 3 3 
records of committee proceedings 1 1 
publishing budget/expenditure information 2 2 
disclosing member assets 3 1 
disclosing information on unethical conduct 3 0 
access to historical information 1 1 
Easing access to 
information 
information availability multiple channels 3 2 
open sessions to public attendance 3 1 
guaranteeing media access 3 1 
live/on demand streaming of proceedings 3 2 
nationwide access to information 2 2 
plain language used 2 2 
multiple languages  2 1 
free access to information   2 2 
Enabling electronic 
communication  
clear privacy policy 2 1 
intuitive and friendly website 2 2 
downloadable and usable information 1 1 
regularly updated and maintained 1 1 
search optimization 1 1 
information linked 2 1 
use of alert services  1 0 
two way communication 1 1 




Parliament as the national forum for the public consideration of issues puts in place processes, 
mechanisms and tools (see Table 14) that facilitate interaction and involvement with key 
stakeholders and gathering feedback from the electorate on its processes. The frequency and 
pattern of interaction (proactive/ reactive or regular/ frequent) depend on the extent of the 
relationship between parliament and its stakeholders. 
 
5.2.3 Oversight mandate  
According to an oversight model developed by the parliament of South Africa, parliamentary 
oversight is about the proactive interaction with executive and administrative organs initiated by 
a parliament to review, monitor, and supervise state agencies, programs, activities, and policy 
implementation (Oversight Model, 2009). Oversight encourages compliance with constitutional 
requirements by the executive and administration to ensure delivery of agreed-to objectives for 
the achievement of government priorities. Essential elements of parliamentary oversight, 
therefore, include the evaluation of the efficacy of public service programmes and the 
appropriateness of financial resource allocations and management, and the relationships between 
these key elements (Oversight Model, 2009).  
 
For these reasons parliamentary accountability is used as a primary control mechanism used by 
regulatory agencies. Its effectiveness is supported by a variety of authorities such as the 
constitution, public law, plenary and committee rules and is an integral part of the system of 
checks and balances between parliament and the executive. Underlying effectiveness are the 




Table 14: Parliament representation processes and mechanisms. 
 
Purpose PSA Kenya 
Inform and educate 
stakeholders about 
the role of parliament  
 Sectoral parliaments 
o People's Assembly,   
o Taking Parliament to the 
People programme,  
o Women's Parliament  
o Youth Parliament 
 Outreach programmes- Radio and 
television programmes and  broadcasts 
 Business and educational publications  
 Website, newsletters, promotional 
material, Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube 
 Business and educational 
publications  
o Website, newsletters, 
promotional material 
 Outreach programmes – public 
broadcasts, access to the public 
gallery 
 Transcripts of proceedings  
 Public relations office 







for interest groups, 
civil society and 




 Public hearings  
 Submissions  
 Representations  
 Petitions44 
  
 Public Petitions 
 Public hearings 45  
 Written submissions 
 Oral presentations  
 Expert opinions  
 Right to observe, give evidence 
and offer views 
Source:  Authors synthesis of the Parliaments of South Africa website, Kenya Parliament website  
 
.  
                                                          
44 A written prayer to the House by a member of the public requesting the House to consider any matter within its 
authority including enacting amending or repealing any legislation. 





The parliaments of Kenya and SA are constitutionally mandated to provide mechanisms to 
ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to 
parliament (Constitution of South Africa (1996), Kenya (2010)). On that basis, the parliaments 
are mandated to maintain oversight of the exercise of national executive authority including the 
implementation of legislation by any organ of state (Constitutions of Kenya and South Africa, 
2010; 1996). This mandate allows parliament to conduct scrutiny effectively and oversee 
government actions. Parliamentary accountability in both countries is too derived from the 
legislative power conferred upon parliament, and is an essential element for effective policy 
making (Oversight Model, 2009). However as discussed in Chapter 2 § 2.1.1 and 2.2.1 the ability 
to hold the executive accountable is influenced by external (constitutional powers, social 
legitimacy, and external actors) and internal (the committee system, party and party groups, and 
the chamber) elements.  
 
Parliament exercises legislative power largely through its committee system and other activities 
and contexts that include authorization, appropriations, investigative, and legislative hearings; 
specialized investigations by select committees; and reviews and studies by parliament support 
agencies and staff. In both countries, parliamentary oversight occurs at both committee, and 
plenary levels with the committees are finding appropriate means to conduct oversight to cover 
all organs of state. A committee either requests a briefing from the organ of state or visits the 
organ of state for fact-finding, depending on the purpose of the oversight. Table 15 summarizes 
the oversight mechanisms in use at the parliaments of Kenya and SA. Furthermore, the tools 





Table 15: Summary of parliament oversight mechanisms in Kenya and SA. 
 
Purpose  Processes 
Mechanism 
SA Kenya 
Committee Level  
 Facilitate detailed scrutiny of legislation and oversee 
government activities and any aspect of the 
department, including its structure, functioning and 
policy 
 Be an intermediary body between interest groups the 
public and external factors and government and an  
entry point for citizens to the work of Parliament 









the split of DOC 





responsible for ICTs 
with split mandate 
for Energy and 
Communications  
 
Provide feedback from the activities of the oversight 




Plenary Level  
Allow for scrutiny of budget by each committee of the 
respective government department over which it 
exercises oversight to determine whether the Department 
has kept its undertakings of the previous year, and spent 
taxpayers’ money appropriately. 
Budget votes X X 
Provide the ability to hold the government to account. 
Question time provides MPs the opportunity to question 
members of the government on matters of service 









Table 15 (continued): Summary of parliament oversight mechanisms in Kenya and SA. 
Purpose  Processes 
Mechanism 
SA Kenya 
Plenary Level continued 
Brings up issues for debate in Parliament by a member of 





Bring important information to the attention of the 
government regarding specific government programmes 
or legislation required to improve service delivery. 
Plenary debates  X X 
Members of Parliament can make statements in the 




 Commission of 
inquiry 
X X 
Provide MPs with an opportunity to conduct individual 
oversight interact with the public and identify any issues 








vacancies in a 
statutory body). 
X X 
Source: Authors Compilation, Oversight model, 2009 
5.2.4 Committee systems  
The most prevalent structure for implementing a parliamentary legal and institutional 
architecture for parliament is through parliamentary committees. Committees are constitutionally 
mandated and are the fundamental structures through which parliamentary participation 
influences or constrains policy making. The parliamentary processes and mechanisms identified 
in the preceding sections occur, for the greater part of their life cycle, within the ambit of 
committees.  The committee is at the epicenter of legislative activities where the interplay of key 






Table 16: Categories of parliamentary oversight tools used in Kenya and South Africa. 
 
Relating to annual, monthly and weekly activities 
 State-of-the-Nation Address 
 Questions (written and oral) 
 President 
 Deputy President 
 Ministers 
 Members’ statements 
 Ministerial statements 
 Debates in the House 
 Matters from constituency work 
 Private member’s bills 
 Individual member’s oversight 
 Committee reports on legislation and oversight 
activities 
 Committee reports on international agreements 
 Departmental strategic plans 
 Departmental current and past annual performance 
plans 
 Annual reports (including annual financial 
statements, statements on programme performance 
and human resource information 
 Performance contracts 
 Departmental compliance with parliamentary 
committee recommendations 
Financial instruments 
 Budget Speech/ Review 
 Estimates of National Expenditure / 
Revenue 
 Division of Revenue Bill 
 Ministers' budget vote speeches 
 Departmental budget votes 
 Treasury Regulations relating to strategic 
planning 
 Reports of the Auditor-General (including 
performance reports) 
 Treasury reports (monthly and quarterly 
reports) 
 Audit Reports  
 Budget Policy Statement  
 Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure 
 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations report 
 Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
 Financial statements (monthly financial 
reports and quarterly performance reports) 
 Statistics reports. 
 Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
 Public Finance Management Reform 
Strategy 
 National Integrated Monitoring Evaluation 
System  
Issues arising from institutions supporting constitutional 
democracy 
Reports on investigated matters of relevance by institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy (ISDs) and other 
statutory institutions supporting democracy for 
consideration by Parliament. 
Established legislation and long-term plans 
 Constitution of the Republic 
 Legislation 
 Government Programme of Action [5-year 
plan] 
Source:  Oversight Model, 2009 
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Kenya and SA, like many parliaments, have reformed their committee systems to enable the 
committees to shadow respective government departments and allow their members to develop 
appropriate expertise accordingly. The mandate, characteristics, composition and type of the 
committee(s) reflect the prevailing arrangement within the ministry and/or government 
departments (PMG, 2015).  
 
 Parliament of South Africa has two dedicate portfolio committees for ICT related issues, one for 
communications and the other for telecommunications and postal services. The two committees 
are reflective of a 2014 presidential proclamation46 that split the Ministry of Communication into 
two departments.  Kenya has established a department committee with a split mandate for 
communication and energy sectors. Depending on the institutional arrangements within a 
particular the sector, committees are the main interface with parliament.  
 
The Kenya Parliament’s website47 lists the functions of departmental committees as follows: 
 Investigate, inquire into, and report on all matters relating to the mandate, management, 
activities, administration, operations and estimates of the assigned ministries and 
departments; 
 Study the programme and policy objectives of ministries and departments and the 
effectiveness of the implementation; 
 Study and review all legislation referred to it; 
 Study, assess and analyse the relative success of the ministries and departments as 
measured by the results obtained as compared with their stated objectives; 
 Investigate and inquire into all matters relating to the assigned ministries and departments 
as they may deem necessary, and as may be referred to them by the House; 
 To vet and report on all appointments where the Constitution or any law requires the 
National Assembly to approve, except those under Standing Order 204 (Committee on 
Appointments); and 
                                                          
46 See Proclamation, No. 47 of 15 July 2014, Available on URL: http://www.gov.za/reconfiguring-ministerial-
portfolios-line-governments-new-mandate ( Accessed  
47 See more information on http://parliament.go.ke/the-national-assembly/committees/mandate-and-
classification/departmental-committtees  (Visited 21 May 2015). 
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 Make reports and recommendations to the House as often as possible, including 
recommendation of proposed legislation. 
 
 The three parliamentary committees: Communications and Telecommunication and Postal 
service( South Africa) and the Energy and Communication(Kenya)  offer a setting that facilitates 
the detailed scrutiny of legislation, oversight of government activities; vehicle for public input, 
feedback and stakeholder interaction with the public and external factors and participation of 
minority groups in parliamentary business (Oversight Model, 2009).  All three committees work 
as intermediary bodies that connect interest groups and government and provide an entry point 
for citizens into the work of parliament. Table 17 summarizes the characteristics of the 
committees responsible for ICT in Kenya and SA.  
 
The activities of committees include consideration of committee reports, an essential and 
necessary component of the ICT policy-making and governance process. Study visits that entail 
physical inspections, conversing with people, assessing the impact of delivery and developing 
reports which contain recommendations for the assembly to consider are also a critical part of the 
work of the three committees. Table 18 highlights the type of information and oversight 
activities that the committees have engaged with over a period of two years, occurring within the 
period of this study. 
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Table 17: Parliament committees responsible for ICTs in Kenya and SA. 
 
Country Number and type of 
Committee  
Oversight responsibility   Composition 
(in 2015) 
Kenya 1 Departmental Committee- 
Energy and Communications 
Ministry of Information  29 MPs  
SA  2 Portfolio Committees  
 
Portfolio Committee on 
Communications  
Department of Communications and  
following statutory entities: 
 South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Limited 
 Telkom SA Limited 
 National Electronic Media 







Department of Telecommunications and 
Postal Services and the following entities 
 Sentech Limited  
 Independent Communications 
Authority of SA (ICASA) 
  SA Post Office Limited 
 Universal Service and Access 
Agency of SA (USAASA ),  
 State Information Technology 
Agency (SITA ), the ZA domain 
















Table 18: Sample oversight activity and work of parliamentary committees in Kenya and SA (2013-
2014). 
 










Public hearings on policy 




X - X 
Written and oral 




X X X 




X X X 
Strategic and Annual 
Performance Plans for 








ministry, agencies  
X X X 
Bill Reviews/ Bill 
amendments/ deliberations 
/ processing 









Ministry/ Public  
X - - 
Tabled  Reports – Study 
and oversight visits, 




X X X 
Calls for Comments Agencies/ 
Ministry/ Public 
X X _X 
Questions and  replies/ 
responses by ministry 
Agencies/ 
Ministry/ Public 
X X X 
Dispute resolution/ 
Inquiries of public officials 
Agencies X X X 






Table 18 (continued): Sample oversight activity and work of parliamentary committees in Kenya and SA 
(2013-2014). 
 










Election of Chairperson Committee  
Members 
X X X 
Expenditure Reports/ 
Budgetary Reviews 
Ministry/ Plenary  X - - 
Briefings- ICT and sector  
developments, political 
developments,  






X X - 
Quarterly performance 




X X X 
Briefing- International 
relations, compliance with 






X X - 
ICT Seminars/ Capacity 
building  
 X X - 
Source:  Authors Compilation 
 
The activities and information listed in Table 18 are an indication of the level of parliamentary 
participation in the ICT sector through the committee system in both parliaments (Kenya, SA) 
during the period under study. The activities cut across the three traditional roles of parliament 
and require a committee composition that reflects multiparty representation, committee 
leadership, industry knowledge and capacity for effective implementation. For the purposes of 
exercising oversight, committees often obtain first-hand knowledge from people engaged in the 
direct implementation of specific programmes and/or who are directly responsible for service 
delivery. To evaluate the work of government from a broader perspective, committees invite 
experts from outside government to provide background knowledge and analysis on relevant 
138 
 
issues. Evidently it is at committee level that parliamentary practices emerging in support of 
implementing the parliamentary mandates can be tested (see Chapter 6).  
 
The fact that parliament of SA records a greater number of legislative outcomes and activities 
than that recorded for Kenya during the period 2013-2014 is indicative of a number of 
possibilities. This could be a clear indication of Kenya’s lack of capacity (Africog, 2013) or a 
case of failing to recognize that parliament is a public institution, and, therefore, its information 
should be in the public domain, but ultimately a case of being less accessible and open. Kenya 
has relatively less capacity to support committee work, as reflected in the split mandate of the 
committee for the energy and communication sectors. The two committees in the SA parliament 
reflect the split of the Communications Department after a presidential declaration in 2014. The 
less number of legislative activities by the telecommunications and postal services committee in 
South Africa reflects its infancy more than capacity.   
 
5.3 Conformance with international standards and benchmarks 
 
Benchmarking parliaments against international and regional standards is increasingly being 
used by various institutions worldwide as a tool to gauge strengths and weaknesses and create 
strategic plans for democratic reform. To remain relevant and healthy parliament’s practices and 
systems must keep pace with those of the society it serves and must be recognized as doing so. 
Most legislative benchmarks and standards focus on the central themes that make parliament 
relevant in the present day such as its representativeness, oversight over the executive, legislative 
capacity, transparency and accessibility, accountability and involvement in international policy.  
 
Critical elements covered by international standards such as the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI) International Standards for Democratic Legislatures, the International Parliamentary 
Union (IPU) Self-Assessment Toolkit, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum Benchmarks for 
Democratic Legislatures include:  
• Elections and status of legislators, 
• Organization of the legislature, 
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• Values of the legislature (institutional independence, procedural fairness, and 
democratic legitimacy/representation ), 
• Right of parliament to organize itself, 
• Core legislative and oversight functions, political parties, party groups and 
caucuses. 
 
A significant element of this study is the conformance to internationally agreed standards of the 
implementation of the parliamentary mandate by the parliaments of Kenya and SA.  The critical 
elements listed above are all contained in SADC benchmarks for legislatures, hence its suitability 
as the standard in this thesis for testing conformance of selected parliaments against what is the 
accepted the role of parliament. Moreover, it is presently the only publication developed by 
African parliaments for African parliaments taking into context the peculiarity of the democratic 
and governance processes in Africa. The assessment focuses on the existence of the standards at 
their barest minimum as defined in the SADC Benchmarks for Democratic Parliaments adopted 
at a regional level in 2010.   
 
The parliaments of Kenya and SA are both, by definition, aligned to the SADC benchmarks and 
encompass the critical elements of the role of parliament as follows: 
 Pass legislation or laws (makes new laws, changes existing legislation and repeals, 
 Scrutinize and oversee executive action (keep oversight of the executive and organs of 
state, 
 Facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other processes, 
 Participate in, promote and oversee co-operative government,  
 Engage and participate in international assistance (participate in regional, continental and 
international bodies). 
 
The above roles are reflected in the mandates of both parliaments, which are as follows:  
• The role of the Kenya National Assembly is to enact legislation, determine the 
allocation of revenue between the levels of government, oversee national revenue, 
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expenditure and state organs and approve declaration of war and extensions of 
states of emergency (Article 94 of the Constitution of Kenya). 
 
• The Parliament of South Africa fulfills its constitutional mandate by passing 
legislation or laws; scrutinising and overseeing executive action (keep oversight 
of the executive and organs); facilitating public participation and involvement in 
the legislative and other processes; participate in, promote and oversee co-
operative government and  engaging and participate in international participation 
(participate in regional, continental and international bodies (Parliament Website 
(SA), 2015)  
 
Table 19 summarizes the minimum level of compliance to the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
Benchmarks for Legislatures as reflected in legal parliamentary documents that define the 
constitutional and institutional architectures of Kenya and SA. Table 19 indicates compliance 
with the barest minimum having considered mechanisms, processes, and structures used in the 
parliaments of Kenya and SA as described in section 5.2.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates, from an empirical perspective, the conversion of these minimum 
requirements into mature practices that consistently support policymaking. At this lowest 
minimum level, it is just about awareness, the maturity of the practices increases exponentially to 
the capacity being built to support the practices. As best practice will dictate, high levels of 
conformance are directly linked to maturity of the parliamentary practices and reflect practices 
that have become repeatable, defined and managed over time.   
 
An understanding of the constitutional mandate and role of parliament, the mechanisms to 
operationalize the mandate checked against the internationally accepted role provides a solid 
foundation for extending an analysis of parliamentary participation in ICT sector development. 
Such an analysis requires an exploration of the nature and extent of political and governance 




Table 19: Summary of compliance of the parliaments of Kenya and SA to SADC benchmarks. 
 
 Theme SADC Benchmark 
Accessibility and openness  
 
Accessible and open to citizens, civil society organizations and the media 
Appropriate access to its proceedings  by the media 
A non-partisan media relations facility 
Promote the public's understanding of its work 
Use of multiple working languages to be supported by simultaneous interpretation of 
debates and translation of records.  
Transparency and Integrity Members and staff maintain high standards of accountability 
Transparency and integrity in the conduct of all personal, public and parliamentary matters. 
Legislation to enforce parliamentary codes of conduct, including rules on conflicts of 
interest and acceptance of gifts for Members and parliamentary staff. 
Legislation requiring legislators and staff to fully and publicly disclose their financial 
assets and business interests. 
Internal mechanisms to prevent, detect and bring to justice Members and staff engaged in 
corrupt practices 
 Electoral system designed to ensure reflection of will of the people expressed through a 
voting process conducted in accordance with continental and regional instruments for 
democratic elections. 
MPs reflect the social diversity of the population with respect to gender, language, 
religion, and ethnicity among other considerations. 
Rules of Procedure Develop and adopt own rules of procedure based on regional best practices. 
Parliamentary legal department reviews all draft laws and standing orders to ensure 
compliance with the constitution. 
Power to adopt and amend its rules of procedure subject to review by the judiciary only in 
cases of a constitutional nature. 
Convening of Sessions 
 
Speaker has power to convene Parliament for ordinary business, provided that the Head of 
State may call extraordinary or special sessions in consultation with the Speaker. 
Parliament meets regularly and for lengths of time sufficient for engagement with their 
responsibilities, including constituency work. 
Parliament develops its own calendar.  












Table 19 (continued): Summary of compliance of the parliaments of Kenya and SA to SADC  
             benchmarks. 
 
 Theme SADC Benchmark 




The agenda of Parliament set by a steering committee (sometimes called the Business 
Committee, Standing Rules and Orders Committee, Committee of Committees, or the 
Bureau) chaired by the Speaker. Where membership of such a committee includes 
members of the executive, such members shall not outnumber backbenchers. 
Parliament has the right to amend the proposed plenary agenda. 
Debate  Parliament establishes and follows transparent procedures for structuring debates and 
determining the order of precedence of motions tabled by Members. 
Parliamentary rules are not changed in the chamber. Waivers or suspension of rules are 
agreed to prior to plenary by the steering committee 
Parliament has equitable time allocations for motions, committee reports, ministerial 
statements, and bills and constituency issues 
Parliament provides meaningful opportunity for legislators to debate bills and consider 
committee reports in open session before adoption or a vote. 




Voting in plenary is public. Parliament makes public any exceptions and gives advance 
notice before a secret vote. 
Parliament establishes and follows fair and transparent procedures for a specified minority 
of Members to demand a recorded method of voting to be used. 
When Parliament uses roll call voting, the public shall be given access to how Members 
voted. 
All Members have the right to vote in the chamber 
Presiding Officers 
 
Members have the right to elect their own Presiding Officers 
The Presiding Officer is impartial in the conduct of his or her duties. 
There are equitable gender representations in the election of Presiding Officers. 
The Presiding Officer is elected by secret ballot. 
The removal of a Presiding Officer from office follows due process established by 
Parliament's own rule of procedure. Removal from the position of presiding officer does 
not imply removal from Parliament, as a former presiding officer may become an ordinary 
member 
The executive has no power to remove Presiding Officers 





Table 19 (continued): Summary of compliance of the parliaments of Kenya and SA to SADC  
             benchmarks. 
 
 Theme SADC Benchmark 
Committee System Parliament has permanent and temporary committees 
Membership of committees reflects the Parliament's political party composition and gender 
parity and seeks to include all parties and independent MPs. 
Selection of Members of committees is responsibility of a committee presided by the 
Speaker with leaders of parliamentary parties and/or party groups or party whips as 
members 
With limited exceptions, membership to committees is for the entire term of the 
Parliament. 
Chairpersons and Vice Chairpersons of committees are elected by committee members and 
reflect gender equality. 
Parliamentary committee meetings and hearings, except those of the business/standing 
orders committee are open to the public. Parliament may, however, establish transparent 
procedures for determining in-camera committee meetings and hearings 
Parliament notifies the public in advance of committee meetings or hearings. 
 Powers of Committees 
 
All legislation is referred to an appropriate parliamentary committee for review before 
plenary debate. This includes bills and other forms of legislation such as regulations 
Parliamentary committees have the power to call for public consultations on legislation 
and any matter under consideration. 
Parliamentary committees have the power to propose amendments to legislation. 
Parliamentary committees have the right to consult and/or hire experts if the required 
expertise is not available in Parliament 
Parliamentary committees have the power of summons to examine persons, papers and 
records from the executive and quasi-executive bodies 
Parliament determines and enforces penalties for non-compliance with its powers and 
those of its committees. 
Source:  Authors’ synthesis of SADC-PF (2010) 
  
5.4 ICT Institutional Analysis   
Governing the ICT sector requires a combination of processes, structures and institutional 
arrangements that can determine with certainty actions within the sphere of policy, law and 
regulation, given the powers conferred upon them. Parliament is a key partner in defining 
frameworks that influence or constrain the establishment of a comprehensive legal and 
governance structure and is resilient to emerging challenges. For effectiveness, an ICT 
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governance structure should be created through legislation to support with ease the translation of 
policy goals into results. 
 
5.4.1 ICT sector governance   
ICT sector governance in Kenya and SA utilizes both legislation and regulation as tools at the 
disposal of the government. The pace with which leading ICT countries (such as Canada, 
Ireland, Malaysia, and Singapore) have reformed laws in support of commercial and government 
activity in the digital environment by adopting laws on e-commerce provides opportunities for 
learning. First and foremost they have recognized institutional approaches that emphasize 
established governance structure as key to providing coordinated support to the sector. 
Furthermore, government’s ICT sector initiatives are placed under high-level political leadership 
to secure intergovernmental co-ordination to synergize policies and programs driven by various 
government departments and agencies. In such cases, business and academia take a central role 
in advising the government on appropriate policies, and the civil sector is drawn in as a co-
partner in government initiatives to attract investment (especially foreign investment) in the ICT 
sector.  
 
In particular Kenya’s multi- operator ICT industry is a “culmination of a series of policy, legal 
and regulatory interventions” (Murungi, 2011: 41) underpinned by developments and 
transitions48 occurring mainly during the period 1997- 2008.  Murungi (2011) highlights three 
fundamental pillars of an ICT regulatory framework and within the Kenyan context establishes 
as critical to developing the ICT industry the policy, administrative and legal frameworks that 
define the institutional arrangements, the goals and targets of the sector, and how key 
stakeholders interact.   
 
Murungi (2011) describes how the ICT policy and national development frameworks supported 
the transition from a state controlled market to a liberalised and competitive market and provided 
incentives for participation and investment in the telecommunication sector. Furthermore, the 
administrative framework underpinned by five key institutions (see Table 22) structured an 




enabling environment that clearly identified key sector players and the decision-making 
processes for the sector. 
 
The above elements provide for a proper comparison between the two countries under study. The 
institutional arrangements prevalent within the broader ICT governance context define a 
supportive legal framework that brings parliament closer to the sector to ensure government 
accountability.  The governance framework is highly dependent on the effectiveness of 
parliamentary structures mechanisms, and tools to ensure the public interest is maintained, 
captured and fed into the policies. The mechanisms, structures and tools described in the 
preceding sections, depending on the model of power, enable parliament to act independently to 
provide avenues for debate and analysis of ICT policy.  The next section investigates the existing 
laws regulating the ICT sector of Kenya and SA to probe the ICT institutional arrangements and 
contextualize parliamentary participation.  
 
 
5.4.2 ICT laws regulating the ICT sector in Kenya and SA 
As mentioned in Section 5.4.1 developments in the ICT sector are influenced by the broader 
political governance49 space and the national and international legal frameworks prevailing 
within the sector.  At the national level, the primary Act of parliament regulating the electronic 
communications industry in SA is the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005 (“the ECA”).  
Kenya has clearly undergone rapid change in the sector since the establishment of sector reforms 
by an Act of parliament (Kenya Information and Communications Act 1998). The two 
overarching legal frameworks have defined the sector institutional arrangements as well as the 
key interactions required to achieve sector outcomes. Table 20 summarizes the legislation that 
impacts upon the ICT sector for Kenya and SA.  
 
                                                          
49 Dr Makau in her Examiners Report of this thesis notes the impact of developments within the political economy 
post the terror attacks in Kenya. The focus of parliament turned towards national security and counterterrorism 
rather than investment conditions. This led to amendments to the Security Act that affect ICT sector reforms 
(curtailing consumer identity protection) as well as forays into cyber security as reflected in the Kenya Cyber 
Security Report 2015.  
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By being the custodians of laws, the parliaments of Kenya and SA are key institutions and major 
players in creating and implementing ICT-related legislation as summarized in Table 20. Both 
parliaments play significant roles in passing laws at various points in the reforms trajectory, 
including enabling key and much needed public participation based on constitutional mandates 
that allow them to intervene in any matter. Furthermore, they continuously exercise oversight of 
government actions through a system of dedicated committees50.  The historical and current roles 
of the parliaments in the sector reforms are summarized in Table 21.   
 
5.4.3 Institutional Constellation  
The implementation of ICT legal frameworks identified in section 5.4.2 determines institutional 
arrangements that have significant implications for parliamentary participation in both Kenya 
and SA. Key institutions influencing ICT policy formulation and implementation in Kenya and 
SA are compared in Table 22.  
 
Figure 6 presents a constellation of institutions created by the Electronic Communications Act of 
2005 in SA, showing a high degree of dispersion of responsibility that extends beyond the sector. 
The Kenya Communications Act of 1998 has created an even higher degree of dispersion of 
responsibilities within the sector with ICT responsibilities distributed in different agencies with 
little coordination, if any, and often resulting in duplication. This has introduced huge overlaps 
amongst key players51. To top it all the regulator CA, does not have a formal relationship with 
the Monopolies and Prices Commission; as a result, there is no mechanism to regulate 
competition in the industry. 
 
5.4.4 International and regional ICT Frameworks 
Given the importance accorded to international frameworks in support of cohesion and 
integration, most countries have defined procedures and processes for acceding to international 
                                                          
50 For SA there are two dedicated committees:  Parliamentary Committee of Communications and the Parliamentary 
Committee for Telecommunications and Postal Services. Kenya has one committee: Committee on Energy and 
Communications. 
51 Overlaps exist between the national communications secretariat and Kenya ICT board with respect to advisory 
services to government on ICT issues. More overlaps found in the implementation of key E-government 
applications by the Kenya ICT Board and e-government directorate with no clear coordination. Yet more 
overlaps exist in the implementation of universal access projects by the ICT Board with no clear coordination 
with CCK which has the universal access mandate. 
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/regional laws and treaties. Parliament plays a critical role in domesticating and ratification of 
regional and international laws and treaties.  The process followed depends on the constitutional 
provisions and institutional arrangements defined for such an engagement. While tensions may 
arise from the national development and international aspirations, it remains a useful mechanism 
for check and balances.  
 
SA proactively participates in the international arena for ICTs through an executive-led process 
that starts with the executive preparing and promoting a national and/or local position. The 
naional position is signed at the executive level with input from ministry departments, cabinet 
committee and legal opinion from the Justice Department before submitting to parliament 
through the parliamentary committee for approval.   
 
The parliament has option to participate in global issues independently through a number of 
ways. The Speaker, who is the leader of the national assembly, represents the institution during 
the signing of international treaties, conventions and declarations.  Furthermore, the Speaker 
hosts international delegations to the SA Parliament and represents parliament in the multilateral 
and bilateral relations (Parliament Website, 2015). As a consequence the current Speaker, Hon. 
Baleka Mbete (Fifth Parliament), is a member of various bodies including the Pan African 
Parliament (PAP), International Board for Information and Communication Technology, 
Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF), Inter-





Table 20: ICT legislation governing the ICT sector in Kenya and SA. 
 
Impact / Expected Outcome Legislation 
 Kenya SA 
Sets out the broad legal and regulatory 
framework for the ICT sector  
 Kenya Communications Act (1998) 
 Science, Technology and Innovation Act 
28( 2012) 
 Kenya Information and Communications 
(Amendment) Act, 2013 
Electronic Communications Act 
36 (2005) 
Establishes the sector regulator, its 
powers and sanctions  
Section 3 Kenya Communications Act (1998) ICASA  Amendment Act 13 
(2006) 
Sets out a lawful intercept regime and 
details the obligations of electronic 
communications service providers in 
co-operating with law enforcement 
authorities and storage of traffic data 
Section 27A of the Kenya Information and 
Communications Act (Amended in 2013). 
Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision 
of Communication-related 
Information Act 70 (RICA) 
(2002) 
enable and facilitate electronic 
communications and transactions in the 
public interest 
- Electronic Communications and 
Transactions (ECT) Act 25 
(2002) 
Legislates against anti-competitive 
practices such as collusion and cartels 
 Competition Act 
 Monopolies and Prices Commission 
Competition Act 89(1998)  
Obliges electronic communications 
service providers to assist where a 
person alleges harassment using 
electronic communications 
Section 29 of Kenya Information and 
Communications Act, 1998 
Protection from Harassment Act 
17(2011) 
Regulate the use and management of 
personal information within the digital 
environment 
Kenya Information and Communications 
(Amendment) Act, 2013 
Protection of Personal 
Information Bill (2009) 
Disputes resolution  Section 102 of the  Kenya Information and 
Communications (Amendment) Act, 2013 
establishes a Communications and 
Multimedia  Appeals Tribunal 
Section 17 ICASA  Amendment 
Act 13 (2006) 






Table 21: ICT legislation passed to support sector reforms in Kenya and SA. 
 
Reforms Stage Role of Parliament   Legislation and Year 
   Kenya SA  
Establishment of 
the regulator:  
Establishment of national 
regulatory authorities 
(NRAs) to complement 
liberalization and 
competition. 
Section 3 of Kenya Information 
Communications Act (1998), 
Amendment(2013) provides for 
separation of roles and 
establishment of  different legal 
entities including the 
Communications Authority of 
Kenya (CA) as the  regulator  
Passed the ICASA ACT 
(2006) to define the role 
and arrangements for 
independent regulation 
Liberalization:  Oversee the liberalization 
and competition in the ICT 
market and ensure that there 
are mechanisms to 
safeguard consumer welfare. 
 Provisions in the KCA(1998) 
for the introduction of 
competition in certain market 
segments- Section 23, 2( a)-(e)  
 Enacted the Statistics Act 
(2006) 
 Airwaves  and Vsat services 
Liberalized 
Competition Act (1998) 
Privatization:  Facilitate funding issues and 
incentivize investment in 
high-speed broadband and 
the dynamics of 
convergence including 
issues of universal access; 
infrastructure investment. 
 KCA( 1998) provisions for the 
disbanding Kenya Post 
&Telecommunications 
Company reducing and 
eventually eliminating 
government operational role in 
the Telecommunication Sector 
 Privatizations Act, 2004 was 
passed to privatize prudently 
public enterprises with Telkom 
Kenya was privatized in 2007 
De Villiers Report 
(1987) 
Telecom White Paper, 
Telecom Act (1996), 
Telkom license (1997) 







Table 22: Key ICT sector institutions in Kenya and SA. 
 
(a) Kenya 
Institution  Role 
Ministry of Information and 
Communications 
In charge of national ICT policy formulation and implementation, 
coordination (and oversight) of the entire ICT sector policy guidelines 
National Communications 
Secretariat 
Advisory policy role the Government of Kenya, through the Ministry of 
Information and Communications.  
Communications Authority of 
Kenya 
Statutory agency, whose purpose is to license and regulate 
telecommunications, radio communications and postal services 
Appeals Tribunal Arbitrating disputes between the parties under the Act. Members 
appointed by and are responsible to the ministry  
Directorate of E-government Oversees the implementation of e-government strategy and assists the 
government to deliver more effectively services to citizens.  An E-
government strategy proposes that each ministry should have its ICT 
department 
Government Information 
Technology Services (GITS) 
Provides computer services to government ministries and  departments 
and some parastatal organisations ensure ICT standards within 
government organisations 
Kenya ICT Board (created by a 
Presidential Order in 2007) 
Advisory role to the government on all relevant matters pertaining to the 
development, co-ordination and  promotion of information and 
communications technology industries in the country 
Parliamentary Committee on 
Energy, Communications and 
Public Works 
Oversees the actions of the Ministry of Information and Communications, 
dealing with any arising political issues on behalf of the Ministry and 
most importantly sponsors legislative framework for the sector in 
parliament before the bills become an Act of Parliament 
Monopolies and Prices 
Commission 
Determines matters that may affect competition in the 
telecommunications business (excludes monopolies established by an Act 
of parliament control). Consequently, the MPC had little effect on 
telecoms sector exclusivity.  








Table 22 (continued): Key ICT sector institutions in Kenya and SA. 
 
(b) South Africa 
Institution  Role 
Ministry of Information and 
Communications  - Department of 
Communications/ Department of 
Telecommunication and Postal 
services  
In charge of national ICT policy formulation (issues both policy and 
policy directions) 
Competition authorities   ICASA is generally regarded as having ex ante regulatory powers, 
i.e. it acts so as to prevent future anti-competitive conduct.  
 Ex post regulation – responding to specific complaints or instances of 
anti-competitive conduct – is the province of the Competition 
Commission and Competition Tribunal under the Competition Act.  
 ICASA and the Competition Commission act under a Memorandum 
of Agreement 
State-owned Companies Charged with intervening in the provision of electronic communications 
facilities where government is of the view that there is market failure. 
Broadband Infraco provides national long-distance and international 
cable services at prices based on a cost-plus basis. Sentech is the national 
signal distributor and has been earmarked for the development of a 
national wireless backbone. 
National Consumer Commission Enforces consumer rights under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
Hearings are conducted by the Consumer Tribunal. 
Universal Service and Access 
Agency of SA  
Established under the ECA to promote the goals of universal access and 
universal service in the under-serviced areas of SA. 
Portfolio Committees Exercises oversight over the ministry, the regulator and other 
government agencies. It has powers to conduct inquiries and 
subpoena documents 




Figure 6:  Institutional framework for SA telecommunication sector. Source: Gillwald (2009). 
 
Before the 2010 constitution was adopted, Kenya was a “dualist state, requiring implementing 
legislation before any ratified treaty could have the force of law nationally” (Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights Report, 2012:3). Kenya 2010 Constitution transformed the 
country from a dualist to a monist state by providing that all treaties ratified by Kenya would 
form part of the law of Kenya. As the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Report 
(2012:4) reflects “the need for implementing legislation and international treaties can now be 
invoked before the courts, tribunals and administrative authorities in the Republic. However, 
Article 2(5) and 2(6) of the Constitution has to be given full effect and clarity through legislation. 
This is more so since Article 21(4) of the constitution requires the state to enact and implement 
legislation to fulfill its international obligations”.  
 
The procedure for international engagement and ratification of international instruments in 
Kenya, has been formalized through the Treaty-Making and Ratification Act of 2012. The Act 
fulfills the constitutional requirements of Article 2(6) and provides a procedure that includes 
parliament in the making and ratification of treaties. Accordingly the Executive is responsible for 
initiating the treaty-making process, negotiating and ratifying treaties and may delegate this 
responsibility to a state agency.  The treaty is then considered by parliament, with public 
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consultation expected through the committee system.  
 
Parliament may approve the ratification of a treaty with or without reservations to specific 
provisions of the treaty. In the case where parliament refuses to ratify a treaty, the executive may 
resubmit. Parliament is obliged by both this act and the constitution to sanction the ratification of 
a treaty that is in the best interest of Kenyans. Currently, parliament does not sanction but can 
only approve and/or refuse to ratify if provisions are contrary to Constitution.  
 
In future it is envisaged that parliament will have the power to sanction and fulfill this 
requirement, the Kenyan Parliament will be involved in sanctioning the treaties before they are 
domesticated.  A multi-agency committee to monitor and oversee implementation of the 
international treaties is being established to review all conventions, treaties and agreements that 
have been signed since independence and advise the government on the ones to maintain and 
those to drop. The role or inclusion of parliament in this committee is not yet clear. Furthermore, 
this move has been criticized by opponents as it is perceived to target specifically the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which has been under heavy criticism for its refusal to 
withdraw all the cases against Kenyans at The Hague (The East Africa, January 10, 2015).  
 
The above procedures and processes are applied to the ICT sector. However, poor 
implementation, conflicting laws and general lack of understanding of the implication of the 
international framework are likely to pose challenges in realizing benefits. Table 23 presents the 
main ICT legal frameworks that Kenya and SA have signed.  The effectiveness of the laid 
processes is reflected in the year of signing and the status of ratification and domestication.  
 
5.4.5 Sector Outcomes  
The national and regional ICT processes described above are implemented to achieve certain 
policy outcomes (universal access, low prices and quality of services for example) within the 
sector.  Both Kenya and SA have recorded positive outcomes from implementing sector reforms 
since the 1990s. A number of global and national ICT indicators evidence this progress 
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confirming the two countries as the ICT giants of sub-Saharan Africa, and leaders in their right 
within their regional economic communities52.  
 
Table 23: Main ICT international and regional frameworks that Kenya and SA are party to. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Table 24: Status of ICT sector reforms in Kenya and SA. 
Element Kenya SA 
Regulator Converged Converged 
Liberalization and Competition Limited competition 
introduced 
All except electronic network services 
liberalized. 
Licensing Regimes (type, year) Technological Neutral Horizontal  
Privatization (incumbent / 
government ownership) 
Telkom Kenya (49%) Partially privatized (Telkom 49%) 
Source:  Authors synthesis of RIA (2010), CA (2012), ICASA. 
                                                          
52 SADC and EAC. 
Country International/Regional Frameworks Year  
South 
Africa 
WTO- Basic Telecommunication Agreement, 1994  (GATS Fourth Protocol, 1996)  1995 
SADC Protocol on transport, communications and meteorology 1997 
Telecommunication policies for SADC  1998 
SADC ICT Declaration  2001 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2003 
Support for harmonization of the ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa 2009 
COMESA ICT policy 2003 
COMESA Regional Information and Communications Technologies Support 
Programme 
2002-2007 
Kenya  Basic Telecommunication Agreement, 1994  (GATS Fourth Protocol, 1996)  1995 
Regional e-government framework  2006 
Framework for cyber laws  2008 
Guidelines on Interconnection and access for telecommunications networks and 
services within the East African Community 
2008 
COMESA ICT policy 2003 






At the national level, the prioritization of performance objectives for the ICT sector is an 
important process in the determination of institutional arrangements including the roles and 
responsibilities of key players in the ICT ecosystem. ICT Indicators such as market structure, 
pricing, access are critical measurements in understanding the performance objectives for the 
sector. Table 24 shows the status of ICT sector reforms and the resultant market structures for 
Kenya and SA53.  
 
ICT sector outcomes in Kenya and SA can be analyzed through three international measures 
namely the World Economic Forum (WEF) Networked Readiness Index (NRI)54, WEF Global 
Competitiveness Index55 and the ITU ICT Development Index (IDI)56. These indicators measure 
how each country is performing in developing its ICT sector and providing policy makers with 
insights into country performance, strategies and policy direction. The ITU ICT Development 
Index (IDI) ranks 157 countries’ performances regarding ICT infrastructure and uptake. Table 25 
shows the performance levels of Kenya and SA as demonstrated by the international indicators.   
 
SA has steadily maintained its rankings, with slight fluctuations of growth. IDI rankings showing 
ICT infrastructure (access), use and skills, has moved upwards from 90 to 84 in 3 years (2012-
2014).  Meanwhile, the IDI rankings for Kenya have remained consistent at rank 124 with scores 
ranging from 2.62- 2.79 for the period 2012-2013. Kenya shows signs of stagnant growth, 
stabilizing prices following high degree of competition and liberalization in the sector. 
According to the GCI rankings which measure institutions, policies and strategies underpinning 
competitiveness SA and Kenya rank 56 and 96 in the global scenario, respectively. Within the 
sub-Saharan African region, SA ranks 2nd behind Mauritius with Kenya coming in 5th. This is a 
                                                          
53 These are of particular interest to the study as they are proxies that can to confirm critical parliamentary touch 
points and government interventions. 
54 Measures access and usage, effectiveness of the political and regulatory environment and the economic and social 
impact of ICTs providing policy and decision makers with an ability to evaluate the impact of ICT at a global level 
and to benchmark ICT readiness and use in different countries. 
55 Measures factors underpinning national competitiveness as a set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of a country to provide insight and stimulate discussion about the best 
strategies and policies to help countries overcome obstacles to competitiveness. 
56  Ranks the performances of 157 countries’ in terms of ICT infrastructure and uptake and explains differences 
among countries and within regions with regards to ICT development. The IDI explains differences among 
countries and within regions with regards to ICT development. 
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clear indication of the huge differences between developed and developing countries, with a 
widening gap between the highest and lowest ranked.  
 
Another measure used to compare performance in African countries is the Research ICT Africa’s 
index57 on prepaid mobile voice which shows the pricing trends (see Table 27& Figure 7 for the 
pricing trend for Kenya and SA over 5 years). SA ranking of 7th on this index is characterized by 
an oligopoly mobile phone market with a relatively high level of access to and use of mobile 
phones. In this market, MTN and Vodacom are the two dominant operators, and often match 
their prices which are relatively high compared to other African countries. On the other hand, 
Cell C and 8ta have been reducing their retail prices.  Kenya ranking 2nd behind Sudan also has 
an oligopoly market where Safaricom is the dominant player.  
 
The trend shows a decrease in prepaid pricing in the last five years with drastic reductions 
recorded during certain periods. Kenya recorded low prices in 2013 Quarter 4 and 2014 Quarter 
1 and 2.  SA has drastically reduced its prices from close to USD20 to the current rate of 
USD4.79. Drastic reductions for SA were recorded from Q3 of 2013. These reductions reflect 
the prioritization levels and the prominence given to the cost of communication and access to the 
government agenda at different intervals. Table 27 and Figure 7 show the pricing trends over a 
period of five years in Kenya and SA. 
 
These above outcomes measure how well the institutional and governance arrangements and 
structures are performing within a broader political transformation context. They represent a 
significant level of commitment from regulatory states that are in a constant influx of 
prioritisation and implementation with complex political contexts. Rapid changes in the ICT 
industry have however necessitated a review of the 2006 sector policy (Kenya) and the ECA 
(SA) inspired by the need to bring them in tandem with the new changes in the industry as well 
as the constitutional dispensation in the case of Kenya. For Kenya, the new constitution binds the 
state to review all laws that are inconsistent with it to ensure fundamental rights under the new 
constitution are taken into account.  
                                                          









Global ICT indices 










Kenya 124;124;  2.62;2.79;  60;96 3.93 92 3.71 
SA  90;89; 84 4.42;4.19;3.95 53,56 4.37 70 3.98 
Source:  ITU, database for 2012, 2013, 2 014 
 





Cheapest product % cheaper 
than 
dominant  
Dominant operator Cheapest in Country 
USD Rank USD Rank  
Kenya 4.3 4 1.48 2 66% 
SA 12.06 19 5.2 7 57% 
Source: ITU database 
 
 
Table 27: Mobile call pricing trends per quarter (Q) in Kenya and SA 2010-2014. 
 
Country Period 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 
Kenya  3.47 3.36 2.79 2.59 2.91 3.25 3.25 3.25 1.69 3.16 2.90 2.82 1.48 1.47 1.46 
SA 19.79 19.53 20.13 16.98 14.93 15.56 13.10 12.86 12.21 11.53 10.89 5.28 5.20 4.85 4.97 
 





Figure 7: Pricing trend prepaid mobile calls, 2010-2014. Source: Research ICT Africa (2014). 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The legal framework for the ICT sector clearly identifies a significant role for parliament in 
ensuring government accountability through implementing its oversight, representative and 
legislative mandates. A country’s constitution gives parliament power to organize and structure 
participation through its three traditional roles of representation, legislation and oversight. Kenya 
and SA have both defined these roles within the limits of their constitutions. The role is further 
defined by the epistemic community based on internationally agreed standards of how parliament 
should be organized. Based on the constitutional mandate key components of a parliamentary 
legal and institutional architecture applicable to ICT policy making (see Figure 8) are identified. 
The architecture is based on a formal system that defines the limits of power; the functions and 
roles; the mechanisms, structures and processes that determine the practices and the relationships 









Figure 8:  Parliamentary legal and institutional architecture Source: Authors compilation 
 
A defined legal and institutional architecture structures parliamentary participation, positioning it 
as a significant political institution in the promulgation and manifestation of the principles and 
values of the constitution.  The political systems and culture determined by the constitution 
outline the rights and relationships that parliament has at its disposal for the implementation of 
its mandate. Kenya pursues a presidential system with a clearly demarcated separation of power 
between the executive and parliament. This separation of power influences the extent of 
parliamentary powers and authority and the ability in holding the executive to account for its 
actions. The arrangement is different in SA where the executive is drawn from parliament, 
results in a system of governance impacted by the dynamics of a political party system and 
ultimately executive dominance that undermines democratic participation. Comparably, this 
results in differing approaches and levels of institutional development, with aspirations to ensure 
inclusive participation, maintain public interest as central to public policy and decision-making 
processes while preserving a significant degree of accountability. 
 
From the above evidence, both parliaments play an important role in ICT policy formulation and 
implementation with a constitutional responsibility for policy adoption. As a consequence 
parliaments should consult and engage sector players, on the main ICT policy issues to develop 
ICT laws and implement processes, represent the eensures the diverse and competing for public 
interest remains a dominant driver for policy. Furthermore to cater for a lack of capacity and 
utilise powers conferred parliament assigns and approve regulatory tasks, oversees government 
action.  
The interplay between the legal framework and multiple interests represented reflects the play 

















ministry as well as with delegated agencies, the regulator and the citizenry. The degree and 
extent of the delegation are heavily influenced by the governance context which determines the 
level and separation of power and nature of relationships among state institutions.  Subsequently, 
this influences the power relations that define participation levels in policy making. The 
attributes of political systems and the political culture influence decision making processes, 
institutional arrangements and constellations impacting on the effectualness of parliamentary 
participation in the policymaking processes across sectors and industries including the ICT 
sector. 
 
The ICT sectors of Kenya and SA have made nominal progress over the years in achieving 
policy objectives of access and price as set in national and international ICT legal frameworks. 
Both countries have set up overarching legal and institutional frameworks through the Kenya 
Information and Communications Act, Amendment (2013) and the Electronic Communications 
Act (2006), respectively. Both pieces of legislation provide policy directions, define sector 
priorities and outline key institutions and governance arrangements giving parliament 
considerable structural support, from an institutional arrangements perspective, to sustain 
participation.  
 
The link between the broader governance arrangement and those of the ICT sector is not 
ambiguous.  In South Africa and Kenya, the overarching legislation has defined a legal 
environment that reflects an institutional constellation at the broader level of governance. The 
legal environment clearly indicates the link with broader governance environment which 
influences sector outcomes. There is significant institutional diversity and high degree of 
dispersion of responsibilities among institutions within the ICT sector in both of the countries 
under study. While such levels of institutional diversity and dispersion of responsibilities can 
reflect a system of checks and balances in both countries, it has resulted in greater degrees of 
institutional fragmentation. The main difference being that the Kenya Information and 
Communications Act (Amendment, 2013) provides a decentralized arrangement built on the 
separation of powers, with less hierarchical power structures that have resulted in huge overlaps 
and no clear coordination within the sector. The Electronic Communications Act of 2005, South 
Africa while pro-competition and pro-convergence, has a high degree of dispersed 
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responsibilities extending even to institutions outside the sector. Policy decisions are allocated to 
different institutions but with a centralized, hierarchical power structure maintained.  
 
Significant legal and technical capacity is required if parliament is to implement effectively its 
mandate within a fragmented sector, with an executive that is likely to be dominant or is drawn 
from it. This capacity resides in a committee system that has dedicated responsibility for the ICT 
sector. These committees have increasingly become the key interface with the sector and are 
regarded as key players within the ICT constellation of institutions. The effectiveness of the 
committees is likely to be influenced and constrained by the arrangements within the sector, such 
as the degree of fragmentation, levels of dispersion of responsibilities and the capacity to control 
policy decisions.  
 
In conclusion despite both Kenyan and SA parliaments having a constitutional mandate, and 
putting in place structures, mechanisms and processes to support their role, they are probably 
ineffective in ICT policy-making. The document review in this chapter clearly shows that there 
is considerable structural support from an ICT institutional arrangements perspective to sustain 
parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms. There is continued lack of a supportive legal 
environment as highlighted in a myriad of literature in the ICT sector. This could be a clear 
indication that, in practice, parliament has not possibly implemented or has encountered 
challenges that affect its ability to implement its role as required.  It perhaps also indicates a lack 
of agency capacity and competency and other problems affecting implementation within 
parliament, but also market forces that have been left to define who participates; raising the 
question of sector inclusiveness.  
 
To understand the effectiveness of parliamentary participation in Kenya and SA, Chapter 6 
investigates the parliamentary practices as applied to the ICT policy making process by the 
committees responsible for ICTs. Chapter 6 extends this review by presenting findings from the 
qualitative findings of self-assessments and interviews conducted with key stakeholders and in 
the ICT sector. The results of the analysis are written up in Chapter 7 in a rich analytical 
narrative that is responsive to the main empirical questions and which builds a comparative 




PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES FOR ICT POLICY MAKING IN KENYA 
AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Key components of a legal and institutional architecture, the mechanisms, structures, processes 
and tools that parliament utilizes to participate in ICT sector reforms are outlined in Chapter 5. In 
order to set the national policy objectives, oversee implementing agencies and shape policy 
outcomes there are three key elements critical to this architecture, namely: (1) legislative 
authority and power anchored in a constitutional mandate, (2) the committee system as a pillar 
for parliamentary processes, and (3) a system of governance that allows parliament to apply 
practices and influence sector outcomes.  
 
This chapter reports on the qualitative findings from a horizontal self-assessment complemented 
by deep cutting high level interviews with key stakeholders in national ICT ecosystem of Kenya 
and South Africa.  Such an  investigation is meant to explore the key parliamentary practices 
applied to the ICT sector through the committee system, While the self-assessment provides 
horizontal views and perceptions of a wide range of factors, the high-level interviews provide a 
deep cut into understanding the realities.   
 
This chapter aims at establishing whether the defined parliamentary legal and institutional 
architecture (including the outputs of national structures, processes, frameworks) have resulted in 
committee practices that facilitate or constrain the participation of parliament in ICT sector 
reforms process. This is in the context of a sector that continually presents policy makers with 
unique and difficult challenges. One such complexity is the rapid development of technologies 
that require policymakers to constantly play “catch up” as new legislative and regulatory 
challenges arise. For understandable reasons, the development of legislation for the ICT sector 




This analysis is done in the context of parliaments undergoing institutional reforms to increase its 
relevance, responsiveness and accountability. A major outcome of the reforms has been the 
establishment of committee systems as a key interface for parliamentary participation in ICT 
policy-making and governance processes. It is in these committees where most of the legislative 
work for the sector is done. The focus of the analysis in this chapter is thus to unearth the 
practices adopted to influence/constrain parliamentary participation in ICT sector development. 
The emerging themes and patterns, together with the findings of the document analysis in 
Chapter 5, will be used to present a cross-country comparative analysis of parliamentary 
participation in ICT sector in Chapter 7.  
 
The self-assessment was conducted with purposefully sampled key stakeholders focused on the 
following four dimensions measuring the key mandates of parliament as main areas of 
investigation: 
1. Degree of representation, measured by the openness and accessibility of parliament to key 
stakeholders within national ICT ecosystem. 
2. Degree of application of parliamentary power in ICT governance, measured through 
effectiveness of legal mandate reflected in the bill review and hearing processes. 
3. Extent of influence of parliament in ICT sector reforms, measured by its oversight 
effectiveness and levels of parliamentary accountability and scrutiny.  
4. Level of institutional effectiveness, measured by availability or resources such as budget, 
support staff, logistics and support for constituency development. 
 
6.1 Sampling 
Purposefully sampled respondents were selected from key stakeholders in the ICT reforms 
process and ICT ecosystem from both Kenya and SA, as follows:  
1. Parliament: Chairs/ Members and staff of the Parliamentary Committee responsible for 
ICTs in Kenya (Committee on Energy and Communication)  and South Africa (Portfolio 
Committee on Communications, and; Portfolio Committee on Telecommunications and 
Postal Services). Due to the continued unavailability of key respondents from the Kenyan 
Parliament, the researcher utilized raw data from a similar survey conducted during the 
same period to capture parliamentary practices. 
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2. Regulator: Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) and Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa (ICASA).  
3. Mobile Operators (private sector) and industry associations: Vodacom, Neotel Cell-C, 
Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA). Due to continued unavailability of 
potential respondents with knowledge of parliament and limitations of researcher’s 
resources MTN and 8ta and mobile operators from Kenya are excluded from the 
sampling frame.   
4. Experts from government departments:  South Africa - Former employee of the 
Competitions Authority; Kenya - former Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of 
Information and Communications. 
5. Civil society (parliamentary monitoring organisations & interest groups):  South Africa - 
Parliament Monitoring Group (PMG); Kenya - Mzalendo, Kictanet.  
 
6.2 Key Findings 
The following themes and patterns recurring in the coding process identified key parliamentary 
committee practices discussed in this chapter.  
 
 Whilst parliament is widely acknowledged as a significant player in policy formulation 
and implementation for the ICT sector, respondents were dismayed at the ineffectualness 
in the conduct of this role. An essential role identified by respondents is that of 
structuring the principal-agent relationships, which influences the level of participation 
by both the principal and the agent defining the political environment that supports the 
growth of the ICT ecosystem. Respondents identified both internal and external factors 
that hinder the effectiveness of participation, such as executive dominance that weakens 
parliamentary oversight; principal-agent relationships that result in contradictions and 
inherent conflict; insufficient parliamentary capacity and technical knowledge in the ICT 
sector that cause confusion and delays; and an inadequate internal design for achieving 





 Interviewees described the South African parliament as having high levels of democratic 
participation with requirements and support structures set in an administrative justice 
framework. On paper, the processes looked tedious and protracted with all the checks and 
balances in place to ensure compliance as required. However, the reality reflects ruling 
party dominance in ensuring preferred outcomes for such parliamentary processes as 
legislation and appointment of the regulator. These processes become relatively seamless 
when the executive interferes with parliamentary decision making processes, and party 
preferences are filtered through ruling party dominated committees and whipping 
practiced to ensure favorable outcomes. Responses to questionnaires indicate the Kenyan 
parliament as having a higher capacity for oversight in comparison to its representation 
and legislation functions which are relatively weak. The strength of this oversight is 
influenced by presence of investigative powers (rated 4) enshrined in law, to request and 
receive updates on actions taken by the Executive. This is supported by sufficient powers 
to oversee the expenditures of state-owned enterprises. 
 
 Respondents further describe ICT parliamentary committees as the workhorse of 
parliament providing the critical link between key stakeholders and government actions 
and policy implementation. These committees, according to respondents, ensure effective 
scrutiny and accountability of government actions as well as providing opportunities for 
public engagement with the reforms process. However, respondents lamented the 
inability of parliament to exercise its powers in holding the government to account and 
the insufficient capacity limiting the utilization of existing mechanisms, tools and 
processes that build consistent practices to facilitate sector outcomes. Split mandates and 
institutional arrangements within the broader governance limit participation and 
independence from the executive and sometimes the industry compromise the oversight 
role of parliament.  
 
 Parliament is indicated as a useful source of information on government priorities and 
provides investors in the sector with the credibility and certainty required for decision 
making. Respondents further identified emerging alternatives for reliable sources of 
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parliamentary information are emerging from parliament monitoring organizations58. 
However the quality of this information still relies on the accessibility, openness of 
parliament and effectiveness of stakeholder engagements and consultations. This is 
viewed as a critical element for solving the information asymmetry that influences 
principal-agency relationships particularly that of the ministry and parliament.   
 
 Respondents highlighted parliamentary engagement models as becoming an effective and 
institutionalized way of ensuring increased participation and consultations for parliament 
to remain representative. These engagement models facilitate structured collection, 
aggregation and expression of interests, concerns, opinions and preferences of the citizen, 
offering an important link to government agendas and ultimately hold the government to 
account for its actions. Both formal and informal consultations with stakeholders in the 
sector have become key and fundamental to decision and policy making.   
 
 Respondents further indicate that parliament is more than a neutral, legal structure. 
Rather it serves as a significant power broker, agenda setter, veto player, conflict resolver 
that reflects the competing interests at play. The effectiveness of these roles and leverage 
within the sector is however determined by its source of power. While this is primarily 
derived from the constitution, how parliament is perceived by other stakeholders is 
critical to its exercise of power. Constitutional hurdles often confronted, limit 
parliamentary scrutiny and approval, resulting in minuscule leverage exercised by 
parliament on input made into proposals. In light of such challenges, sector governance 
arrangements need to reinforce and uphold the parliamentary mandates that support 
improved parliamentary performance. 
 
                                                          
58 Parliamentary monitoring organisations are citizen-based groups that monitor or assess the functioning of 
parliaments or their individual members, often seeking to facilitate and promote public knowledge of and 
participation in parliamentary processes in order to strengthen parliamentary accountability, citizen engagement and 
access to information. 
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6.2.1 Respondents’ views on the role of parliament in ICT sector development  
To assess key sector players’ understanding of the role of parliament in the ICT sector, 
respondents were asked to assess if parliament provides the required framework to support their 
mandate and how this could be improved.  
 
All 15 respondents concurred that parliament had a critical role to play in the ICT sector. 
Patterns emerged related to the conceptual framework, with an overarching view that parliament 
plays a significant role in facilitating reforms while its ineffectualness was raised as a major 
concern. Although viewed differently, this role is mainly centered on facilitating the adoption of 
policies formulated by the ministry and contributing to shaping the desired outcomes by 
providing avenues for input into the legislative processes, while overseeing government and 
agents’ actions through parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Effectiveness becomes a 
factor of its constitutional mandate and its ability to exercise power which in turn determines the 
type and nature of relationships among key players, the prevailing power structures59 and the 
extent of parliamentary authority. Mechanisms, structures and tools are then developed to 
support implementation.  
 
Diverse parties agreed on the significance of a constitutionally mandated role of parliament, yet 
there was wide felt dismayed at the ineffectualness in the conduct of the role as defined in the 
constitution, citing the influence of external factors on the broader governance process.  A key 
player representing a mobile operator in South Africa defined the role of parliament as: 
“…custom-based, significant, and critical for both policy shaping and as the 
custodian of the legal framework.  Parliament plays an important role in shaping 
policy outcomes. A good example of parliament playing its role in the recent 
years is around the whole the debate on the cost to communicate raised on the 
floor by Hon Patricia De Lille in 2009. This resulted in further debates, public 
hearings, and key stakeholder consultations that led to the issue of mobile 
                                                          
59 Institutional degree of capacity to control final policy decisions which can either be centralized or hierarchical. Hierarchical 
power structures concentrate authority within a ‘principal’ institution enjoying democratic legitimacy (such as the legislature). 
Less hierarchical power structures provided different institutions have some degree of autonomy and the centralization of power 




termination rates becoming a key regulatory instrument to address market 
failures in South Africa” (Cohen, personal interview in March 2015). 
 
This respondent further acknowledged the significance of parliament in the law making process 
in South Africa: 
“Parliament tests proposals to law, holding rigorous debates both in committee 
and plenary levels inviting participation of key stakeholders including industry. 
However, the impact of legislation is not sufficiently conducted often resulting in 
unintended outcomes.” (Cohen, personal interview in March 2015)  
 
On a similar note from a Kenyan context a respondent who has provided significant leadership 
and input in developing the sector as the former permanent secretary in the Ministry of 
Information and Communication viewed this role as happening mostly through the committee 
system: 
“In Kenya we have a Parliamentary Committee on Energy and Information and 
Communications, whose role includes 1) overseeing the Ministry of Information 
and Communications, 2) dealing with political issues on behalf of the Ministry, 
and most importantly 3) sponsoring the legislative framework for the sector in 
Parliament before the Bills become an Act of Parliament” (Ndemo, questionnaire 
response in 2014). 
 
A respondent from the private sector in South Africa further noted that:  
“The separation of powers amongst state institutions depicts an ICT policy 
making the process that has clear cut responsibilities with policy formulation 
being the purview of the Ministry of Communication while policy adoption sits 
with parliament, policy implementation with the regulatory and policy monitoring 
is done by the justice and courts. This is meant to facilitate policy coherence, 





Furthermore, respondent Barandse confirmed the existence of a policy process in South Africa 
which as depicted in Figure 9, which lists parliament as a significant player with a principal-
agent relationship with the ministry that influences the quality of legislative output. The 
respondent stated that the legislative output is:  
“…highly dependent on how the policy formulation process is structured. There is 
a principal-agent relationship between parliament and the ministry, between 
parliament and the regulator that results in contradictions and inherent conflict 
especially on reaching consensus regarding sector priorities.  Moreover, 
interestingly agents often behave opportunistically” (Barandse, personal 
interview in February 2015). 
 
 
Figure 9:  Policy process in South Africa. Source: Authors compilation   
 
Furthermore, respondent Barandse confirmed that in the case of South Africa,  
“Most, if not all, ICT policy is formulated by the Ministry of Communication with 
the Minister and Director General leading the consultation process as required” 











A respondent from the private sector in South Africa acknowledged that the role of parliament is 
“often underemphasized with checks and balances that are more pronounced due to opposition 
party politics” (Cohen, personal interview in March 2015). Furthermore, the respondent 
highlighted critical behavioral aspects of parliamentary relationships that often result in 
unintended outcomes: 
“The diversity of interests from members leads the committee to generate gains 
from exchange and cooperation opportunities. Trade-offs become an important 
element of the exchange mechanisms and is often adopted by parties with 
sometimes unintended consequences that can backfire.  A good example is the 
way the Communications Committee handled the debate to reduce the number of 
ICASA Councilors in the ACT [during the fourth parliament]. ICASA 
representatives have based their submission on what is a commonly accepted 
behavior of the ruling party (ANC) which often takes an opposing view to that of 
opposition parties. However, in this particular case because of trade-offs engaged 
in between the ruling and opposition parties, the outcomes did not match the 
original intention of the regulator” (personal interview in2015).  
 
It is the ineffectualness of parliament in implementing its role within the sector that was 
consistently raised by most respondents, pointing to the need for increased institutional and 
technical capacity in the various areas that the committee has responsibility for. One such area of 
ineffectualness that was raised was that parliament is often reactive, as noted by a respondent 
from a parliamentary monitoring organization in South Africa that: 
“Parliament needs to take a greater leadership role and not leave it up to the 
Department [of Communication] to bring the parties together and advance the 
growth of the ICT sector. There are on-going concerns that the ICT sector 
remains fragmented and fractious. The ICT policy green paper60 published by the 
Ministry [of ICT] in January 2014 for comments is viewed as providing the 
solution to address these concerns. Parliament has been briefed on the policy and 
                                                          
60 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/37261_gon44.pdf (Accessed  May 2015,) 
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has held several meetings with industry stakeholders61” (Alli, questionnaire 
response in March 2015). 
 
A similar observation was shared by two other respondents from both countries, who viewed 
parliament as “reactionary rather than proactive in providing a coherent framework” (Weeks, 
questionnaire responses in2013; Rad questionnaire responses in 2012).  Furthermore, a 
respondent from the private sector [South Africa] had observed an: 
“…often lack of tangible outcomes from the entire work parliament does which 
may benefit from a parliamentary operating model developed along the lines of a 
disciplined programme management to a level of ISO certification. This could 
reinvent parliament to be more outcome-based with the desired levels of 
accountability and responsibilities that follow due time frames, stakeholder 
engagement and allows for benefits realization” (Cohen, personal interview in 
March 2015). 
 
A respondent from the Internet Service Providers' Association62 [South Africa] agreed with the 
above perceptions, but further highlighted the lack of technical capacity as hampering effective 
participation.  
“Parliament has contributed significantly to the required framework, particularly 
through the work done by the Portfolio Committee for Communications leading 
up to the passing of the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005. While I am 
aware that members of this Committee have undergone training before, there is a 
critical need for on-going education in some of the technical and regulatory 
aspects of what is a complex field. It is understandable that levels of 
comprehension of some of the important issues is lacking, particularly when a 
new committee is constituted, but this must be addressed to ensure that debate is 
appropriately informed” (Cull, questionnaire respondent in July 2014). 
 
 
                                                          
61 https://pmg.org.za/committee/117/   
62 The Internet services association  
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Capacity Element  Key dimensions  
Representation Participatory 
Accessibility 
v. Parliamentary openness;  
vi. mechanism for public awareness;  
vii. mechanisms to promote public understanding;  
viii. guidelines to govern parliament relationship with 
stakeholders  
Legislation Legal mandate 
 
vi. source of parliamentary power to introduce,  
amend and veto legislation  
vii. existence of power to amend bills 
viii. opportunities for citizens to input into legislative 
process 
ix. mechanisms to track impact of legislation 
x. Power to send back legislation for review 
Bill reviews and 
hearings 
 
iv. Period of review of any ICT legislation 
v. Existence of an ICT Committee 
vi. Existence of Public hearings on ICT 
Oversight function  Oversight 
committees  
 
vii. oversight function performed by sector related  
committees and other special committees  
viii. oversight committees have Investigative powers  
ix. oversight of the expenditures of state owned 
enterprises 
x. mechanisms to obtain information from the 
Executive for effective  oversight 
xi. Power to follow up on recommendations 
xii. adequately resourced to undertake their activities 
xiii. opportunities for minority/opposition parties to 
engage in effective oversight of government 
expenditures 
Source: Authors synthesis of Parliamentary Centre (2009) 
In order to categorize the overarching concerns raised in understanding the role of parliament in 
developing the ICT sector, the findings are clustered according to the three core parliamentary 
mandates (see Table 28) identified in Chapter 5 in respect to ICT policy making.  The capacity 
requirements in relation to parliament fulfilling the mandate for each key dimension are 
173 
 
identified. The committee system provides a structure through which all three mandates manifest 
and opportunities for structured interaction with the sector are provided.  It is, therefore, prudent 
that the investigation is done through the committees responsible for ICTs in the parliaments of 
Kenya and South Africa, with the opinions of the other stakeholders captured either through the 
assessment or the high level interviews.   
 
The difficulty of accessing the Kenyan Parliament is reflected in how the author was not being 
granted access to participants. The author pursued several other avenues to get responses for the 
questionnaires, but this failed.  The researcher then resorted to using raw data, specifically for the 
parliament category, from a similar assessment carried out during the same period by the 
Parliamentary Centre (Africa Programmes) in 2012, which went a considerable way in filling 
that gap.  This data was then triangulated in the analysis with data captured in questionnaires 
conducted with other categories of participants in Kenya to guard against biases and for validity.  
 
6.2.2 Mandate 1: Representation and participation - parliamentary openness and 
accessibility  
Public participation is intrinsic to democratic governance and hence theories of democracy have 
in turn led to theories of public participation that presuppose popular authorization and 
representative accountability.  As discussed in Chapter 2 § 2.2.1.1 the discussion on 
representation in this thesis focuses on the elements relating to public participation. It is 
important at this juncture to emphasize two notions of the democratic theory in political 
governance literature that underpin this study. Varied forms of governance have been advocated, 
with “representative democracy" on the one hand having elected representatives acting in the 
interest of the people and on the other hand "participatory democracy” providing a more direct, 
arguably popular or progressive form of democratization through collective decision-making 
where citizens have power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of 
policy implementation (Aragonès & Sánchez-Pagés, 2009). This thesis investigates the levels of 
participatory democracy in the parliaments of Kenya and South Africa on the assumption that 
representative democracy conducted through fair election systems results in governance 




Participatory democracy provides opportunities to overcome the shortcomings of representative 
democracy by combining elements that facilitate direct participation by citizens in making policy 
proposals, which the elected may subsequently decide to implement. This makes parliament a 
central institution for democratic participation representing the various interest groups and, 
providing space and opportunity for citizens to express their interests. These issues of local and 
national importance are debated, with view of translating the issues into policies. The 
effectiveness of the representational role of the MPs and, for that matter, parliament depends to a 
large extent on the quality of constituent’s interactions with MPs. 
 
6.2.2.1 Representation  
In order to assess the representation capacity of parliament, respondents were asked questions 
that determined existence and level of openness and accessibility as key factors to define 
stakeholder participation and consultation in parliamentary processes.  To define key practices 
for participation, the assessment looks at the level of parliamentary openness that allows 
stakeholders such as citizens, the media and key players within the sector to participate in 
parliamentary process. Secondly, the assessment identifies the mechanisms in place for 
promoting public awareness and knowledge on the work of the parliament and the role of MPs in 
ICT policy making process as a key element for effective participation. Lastly, the assessment 
identifies key structural elements such as guidelines and policies that govern parliament’s 
relationship with its stakeholders to ensure consistent representation.  Table 29 summarizes the 
ratings of accessibility of parliament as assessed by key respondents from the ICT ecosystem of 
Kenya and South Africa. 
 
The chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Telecommunications and Post, 
Hon Kubayi63, in a self-assessment of parliament, rated the Parliament of South Africa as having 
high level capacity in place for representation as “parliament is accessible to citizens and the 
media guided by a framework and communication strategy”. The high level capacity and 
supporting mechanisms for representation in South Africa to support public participation is 
confirmed by the document analysis in Chapter 5.  Furthermore, a representative from the 
                                                          
63 Chair of the Portfolio Committee for Telecommunication and Postal Services(5th Parliament) 
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internet service providers association confirmed the utilization of these mechanisms as the 
parliament does promote the understanding of the role of parliament in ICT policy making 
through stakeholder engagements.  
“There have been some engagements with the public through committee oversight 
visits and engagements around the cost to communicate programme” (Cull, 
questionnaire response in July 2014). 
 
Table 29: Respondent assessment of accessibility of parliament in Kenya and SA. 
 
1- Clear need for increased capacity   2-  Basic level of capacity in place  3-Moderate Level of Capacity  4-  




















































































































































































Committee 1 4 4 2 4 3 4 3 - 




4  - 
Regulator 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 
PMO 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 4 














2  - 
ISPA_ Operators - 3 - 3 
 
3  - 
Average rating 3 3.5 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 
Source: Authors Compilation 
 
Respondent Alli, from civil society further confirmed the existence of high representation levels, 
pointing out the fact that the parliament has focused a lot of effort in developing the 
representation capacity in the post-apartheid era.  
“The Parliament of South Africa has focused a lot of effort during its first two 
parliaments post-apartheid on developing its representation and legislation 
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capacity...This has resulted in the development of a public participation model with direct 
input from the public through an online process recently.” (Alli, Skype Interview in 
March 2015). 
However, Alli further notes that the focus of the public participation model could be improved if 
parliament had sufficient time and capacity for broader participation.  
“Whilst PSA takes public participation seriously as directed by the rules and procedures 
with committee’s proactively advertising submission requests and call for comments for 
legislation, department budget and any matter they may want to solicit input, there is 
never sufficient time depending on the impact of the issue on the legislative agenda. 
Ultimately it’s the views of the regular participants (people and organizations) that track 
parliament whose submissions are heard, hardly ever getting the voice of ordinary 
people.” (Alli, Skype Interview in March 2015). 
 
The South African Parliament was confirmed by all groups of key players in the sector as 
accessible and open. In practice, this means that parliament has in place a framework and 
strategy with guidelines in the rules and procedures to facilitate engagement between parliament 
and its stakeholders. The framework provides a structured process and entry points for 
stakeholders to input into the work of parliament. To facilitate engagement PSA promotes its 
work through a variety of media and outreach programmes64 to enhance the public’s 
understanding of the work of parliament and, in particular, the MPs role in policy-making.  
 
The assessment by respondents of the Kenyan Parliament’s accessibility and openness indicates 
existence of mechanisms that could potentially make parliament accessible to its stakeholders 
including at committee level. These are as prescribed by standing orders and speakers’ rules. 
Mechanisms include live broadcasting of proceedings on national television, and a parliamentary 
                                                          
64 Parliament of South Africa utilises a variety of channels to reach out to its stakeholders that 
includes the website, radio and television programmes, broadcasts , publications, newsletters, 
promotional material and social media - Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. See Chapter 5 § 5.5.5 




website providing access to verbatim records and the schedule of parliamentary business. 
Moreover, parliament has a fully equipped media centre with Internet, enabling journalist to file 
stories, and parliamentarians to have media conferences and briefing irrespective of political 
affiliation.  Respondents felt that it was not sufficient to have these mechanisms in place and yet 
ignore the mandate to enforce these to achieve participation. Respondents from civil society and 
government felt the representation mandate was often ignored.  The assessment clearly indicated 
basic to moderate capacity, with mechanisms that were either non-existence or existed but were 
not well structured and not followed. Two respondents with diverse interests confirmed the 
above concession:  
“Kenya Parliament has a clear constitutional requirement on media freedom and citizen 
participation but ignores it when it comes to serving their own interest like salary 
increases” (Ndemo, questionnaire response in 2014).  
In addition, a representative from a parliamentary monitoring organisation (PMO) assessed that:  
“Parliament is only partially opened to citizens and the media. This is usually in 
response to pressure from organized groups. No communication strategy or framework 
exist to structure and guide this. It is difficult to access parliament and getting 
information requires going through someone” (Rad, questionnaire response in 2012). 
 
A key determinant of openness and accessibility is the promotion of the public’s understanding 
of the work parliament does. Parliament of South Africa has instituted mechanisms that define 
engagement models and create patterns of interaction to link diverse stakeholders with the 
governance processes. One of the models confirmed by key stakeholders from civil society and 
private sector in South Africa is the utilization of a parliamentary liaison office model65 to 
engage and consult with the committees and the rest of parliament. A representative from a 
parliamentary monitoring group in South Africa explained:  
“Dedicated parliamentary liaison officers are appointed by the organizations and 
companies to sit in debates and committee meetings collecting information and 
writing reports for their organizations. Whilst this model is not institutionalized it 
works.”(Alli, Skype Interview in March 2015). 
                                                          
65 The officer sits in the committees to record proceedings and reports regularly to the organisation. 
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Neotel, a fixed line operator in SA, follows this model by virtue of inheritance but rather prefers 
a reactive approach in terms of consulting with parliament. They have adopted an “engage when 
engaged” approach, only responding to calls for submissions and attending hearings.  In an 
interview with them it was highlighted that other players in the market have found different 
approaches with: 
“bigger corporates and dominant players in the market playing the stakeholder 
system by establishing informal and useful relationships with select members of 
the Committee and having direct access to the ANC66 study group on the sector ... 
However it is debatable if this access has translated into outcomes for the 
company” (Cohen, personal interview in March 2015).   
Furthermore, Cohen (2015) qualified their reactive approach and views as: 
“…Improper for operators to engage parliament on a particular issue outside of 
the formalized arrangements. Parliament should too guard against [providing] 
preferential access to certain operators.  Neotel rather prefers to engage directly 
with the regulator should there be any arising issues or to petition the responsible 
ministry” (Cohen, Personal interview in March 2015).   
Whilst the assessment of South Africa confirms presence of key elements for participatory 
representation by key stakeholders, indicative of high capacity in place, the Kenyan case was a 
complete contrast with the self-assessment by parliament indicating a clear need for increased 
capacity, as the existing mechanisms67 are unstructured and fail to promote the required public 
understanding by civil society and other key stakeholders within the national ICT ecosystem. 
The parliament had not institutionalized any public education programmes to guide and foster 
relationships with stakeholders. No clear parliamentary engagement model, especially with 
private sector and civil society, has thus emerged within the ICT sector of Kenya.  
 
An assessment by a representative from a parliamentary monitoring organization indicated that 
mechanisms in place were:   
                                                          
66  African National Congress (ANC ) is the ruling party in South Africa. 




“…Very basic as it is upon the citizens to request and pressure parliament in order to 
participate. Furthermore, there is need to sensitize MPs to acknowledge this and 
introduce structured forms of engagement” (Rad, questionnaire response in 2012).  
Respondents have indicated parliament as a key source of information on government priorities 
for the sector. As indicated through the interviews in South Africa attending parliamentary 
sessions by representatives of private sector had become the norm rather than the exception as 
stakeholders found value in accessing parliamentary information on the sector. A representative 
from the private sector remarked that parliament was a critical link to important developments in 
the sector: 
“There is information that ICASA [the sector regulator] never issues except at 
parliamentary sessions and operators have found it beneficial to attend sessions 
where regulator is making submissions. In actual fact, the regulator has no 
obligation68 to provide information to stakeholders and often times operators find 
useful information when the regulator presents to parliament” (Barendse, 
personal interview, in February 2015). 
 
Respondent Cull [civil society, South Africa] stated that the internet service providers 
association was “happy with level of communication received from parliament and have too 
subscribed to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) to receive regular information”. It is 
the currency and reliability of the information that then plays an important part for decision 
making within the administrative justice framework, as highlighted by one operator that: 
“Parliament has become an important source of current information for the 
sector. From a regulatory perspective currency of information and access to 
decision makers underpin administrative justice” (Cohen, personal interview in 
March 2015). 
Whilst stakeholders can participate through committees, alternative sources of parliamentary 
information are emerging, and one such is the Parliamentary Monitoring Organizations 
                                                          
68 By nature, the regulator is accountable to parliament and is required by law to report its activities to parliament 
directly or through the minister. However, there is no obligation on the regulator to share or consult with other key 




(PMOs)69. Globally PMOs seek to facilitate and promote public knowledge of and participation 
in parliamentary processes, collect and catalogue information as part of their tracking. A 
representative of PMG stressed on the reliability of the information they collect remarking that:  
“…although it may not be an official record of parliament there is high level of 
acceptance of PMG by parliament to an extent where MPs tend to ask where 
PMG is absent in meetings” (Alli, Skype Interview in March 2015). 
The reliability of PMG is further confirmed by the nature and numbers from both South Africa 
and beyond that use it as source of information on local developments and governance of the ICT 
sector.  
“As a result, Parliament Monitoring Group70 (PMG) has become a trusted source 
of current information within South Africa and globally for even members of 
parliament themselves, private sector, legal firms, local and international NGOs, 
universities/courts, foreign embassies and ordinary South Africans and has been 
online since 1998.”(Alli, Skype Interview in March 2015). 
Civil society in Kenya rated the openness of parliament to citizens and media very poorly. 
‘Parliament is a mysterious entity whose operations are not fully understood by 
citizens. It, additionally, looks at citizens as bothers and/or interruptions and it 
does not recognize that information they produce is for the public. It is upon the 
citizens to request and pressure parliament in order to participate” (Rad, 
questionnaire response in 2012; Munyua, personal interview in 2012).   
According to a respondent from the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, the parliament is only 
partially opened to citizens and the media, and this is usually in response to pressure from 
organized groups. There is no communication strategy or framework to structure and guide the 
relationships. An interviewee from civil society confirmed that:  
“Getting a response or information from parliament requires extensive lobbying 
and pressure and using personal contacts. It is up to civil society to use own 
initiative to pressure for engagement” (Munyua, Personal Interview in 2012). 
                                                          
69 Parliamentary Monitoring Group and Mzalendo are the main PMOs in South Africa and Kenya, respectively, and 
have filled the information gap becoming trusted sources of parliamentary information for a variety of 
stakeholders. 
70 PMG was established to fulfil a basic need to understand what happens in the committees of parliament [engine of 




Furthermore, the lack of access affects its representativeness as “It is difficult to access 
parliament and getting information requires going through someone” (Rad, questionnaire 
response in 2012). 
 
In cases where engagement models have been established, it is the quality of the consultations 
that are key determinants for both the development and uptake of the public participation, 
engagement models and the mechanisms described above.  
“In doing their governance role parliament engages at different levels with different 
stakeholders. With the ministry it evolves around submissions, questions, approvals and 
appointments; and with civil society and industry through public hearings” (Barendse, 
personal interview in February 2015). 
Barandse in an interview further defines parliamentary consultations: 
“… with interested stakeholders as either formal or informal depending on the issue at 
hand. Formal consultations are prescribed by legal frameworks whereas informal 
consultation is ad-hoc and based on emerging needs of either party” (Barendse, 
personal interview, February in 2015).  
Responses reflect that both the private and civil society sectors engage at formal and informal 
levels with parliament. A variety of reasons drive consultations ranging from lobbying, 
information dissemination, protecting investment interests, to ensuring certainty and credibility.  
Whilst parliament seeks conformance with constitutional requirements to ensure engagement 
with a wide variety of stakeholders as part of the policy making process; the process is often 
viewed by the private sector as motivated by the needs of the political leadership to get leverage 
especially from informal consultations:   
“The reasons for informal consultation are very much dependent on the capabilities of 
the Chair of the Committee to deal with ICT issues, and these consultations provide the 
Chair with the information and knowledge that can be utilized in the formal 
consultations as well as during committee sessions. There is, however, cases of 
opportunistic intentions by some Chair of the Committee (both incumbent and 
previous) especially close to election [times]. Chairs have called for public hearings 
specifically to get coverage and in those cases it has often been during election 
campaign times” (Barendse, personal interview in February 2015). 
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Furthermore, Barandse views private sector engagement as being driven by self-interest and the 
need to protect investments from disruptions that may arise from policy changes that are driven 
by politicians, but also to ensure no misrepresentations of their intentions. The private sector also 
seeks to provide industry related information to the committees to solve lack of ICT capacity and 
information asymmetry that has resulted from reliance by the committees on information from 
the ministry and the regulators.  
“Operators are aware of the limitations that parliament has in terms of capacity to 
handle technical issues such as those of ICT…It is really to close the gap of 
information arising from lack of skills by parliament and solve the information 
asymmetry problem” (Barendse, personal interview in February 2015). 
Furthermore whilst the outcomes of both informal and formal engagements are then concluded 
transparently within the public space, it is the nature and type of committee leadership as 
reflected in the chairperson that influences the levels of engagement. As observed by 
representatives from the private sector that:  
“Whilst some chairpersons are very active and passionate and seek knowledge through 
engaging industry, others are vulnerable and may not actively facilitate engagements 
outside of the formal engagements prescribed. Hon. Kubayi is regarded as very open to 
engagement, knowledgeable about issues and as a result during any conflicts in the 
sector were resolved transparently” (Barendse, personal interview, Februaryin 2015).  
A similar reason was provided by another interviewee from the private sector:  
“The type of committee chairperson has influenced the level of parliamentary 
participation over the years as different chairs take different approaches guided by 
their background knowledge and involvement with the sector. Hon. Kubayi’s leadership 
[of the Telecommunications and Post Committee] has provided more flexibility and 
more engagement with the committees.   The Minister too at that time was very 
interventionist. More central leadership is provided under Hon Joyce Clementine 
Moloi-Moropa [current chair of the Communications Portfolio Committee] – who, 
coming from industry, understands the role of the private sector. One former 
chairperson was very constituency focused and would often raise questions of 
connectivity at that level.  Under Hon. Vadi the committee unified around the issue of 
reducing the cost to communicate” (Cohen, personal interview in March 2015).   
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Respondent Cohen, from the private sector observed that the organization of the parliamentary 
calendar was still unstructured to achieve effectiveness. According to Cohen if calendar is 
structured, it could be possible for parliament to have consistent quarterly engagement with key 
institutions and ensure they receive written reports and conduct more hearings.  
“The agenda should not be filled with reviewing of reports only; there is need to 
clarify resolution rate of problems.  There is no follow up time frame. There is 
generally a lot of talk and engagement but no actual deliverables within 
timeframes - this could improve the oversight model” (Cohen, personal interview 
in March 2015).    
 
6.2.3 Mandate 2: Legislation - Legal mandate and bill review and hearings processes 
Law making is a responsibility performed by parliament either by making new laws, or repealing 
existing laws and amending others.  To effectively carry out law making requires knowledge and 
expertise in a wide range of technical areas. Both the assessments and interviews interrogated the 
legal mandate with particular emphasis on the source of authority of legislative power, the origin 
of the law making role of parliament, the source of parliamentary power to amend legislation and 
bills, the opportunities available for citizens to input into legislative process, mechanisms to 
track impact of legislation and the power to send back legislation for review. The ratings of the 
legal mandate of parliament as assessed by key respondents from the ICT sector of Kenya and 
South Africa are summarized in Table 30. 
 
Key determinant of parliamentary participation identified by respondents as critical to the 
legislation process is the effectiveness of the legal mandate assigned to parliament. The 
indicators investigated factors for effective legislation including the power to amend bills, 
adequate opportunities71 for citizens to input into the legislative process, mechanisms to track 
legislation and power to send back legislation for review by the executive.   
 
                                                          
71 Mechanisms used by citzens include- Public hearings, Submissions, Representations , Petitions,  Expert opinions 




Self-assessment by the parliament of South Africa rated the capacity in place for all indicators 
associated with the legal mandate as high. Mechanisms are in place to provide the public with 
opportunities to provide input into the legislation process such as bills. The opportunities are 
contained in the rules of procedure and made public.  
 
The self-assessment by parliament of Kenya indicates that they were faring well in some but not 
all aspects. The legal mandate derived from the 2010 constitution, supported by various acts of 
parliament, subsidiary legislation and the standing orders, gives parliament unlimited powers to 
amend bills without seeking the consent of the executive reflective of a distinct separation of 
powers between the two arms of government.   
 
Table 30:  Respondent assessment of legal mandate of parliament in Kenya and SA. 
 
1- Clear need for increased capacity   2-  Basic level of capacity in place  3-Moderate Level of Capacity  4-  High Level 



















































































































































Committee1 3 4 4 4 3 4 2 4  4 




4  4 
Regulator 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 3 
PMO 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 
Expert_ Govt 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 3 
Operator1 
 




3  4 
Operator2 
 




3   
Operators - ISPA - 4  3 - 4 
 
4  - 
Average Rating 3.5 4 3.5 3 3.5  2.5 3.5 3 3.5 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
According to available data from Kenyan parliament, whilst the 2010 constitution requires public 
consultations by parliamentary committees on any issues of public interest there are still limited 
publicised opportunities for public participation. Parliament consequently introduced public 
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hearings in 2011, but due to capacity constraints, it is currently only implemented for the budget 
process. Whilst acknowledging these weaknesses parliament further highlighted time limitations, 
inadequate staff and coverage of public consultations, insufficient facilities and limited public 
knowledge on the opportunities for participating as affecting implementation of legal mandate.  
 
In the Kenyan case a respondent (named Rad) from the Parliamentary Monitoring Organisation 
(questionnaire response in 2012) acknowledged that whilst the constitution specifically provided 
for public input into the legislative process, there was nothing compelling parliament to take into 
consideration this involvement.  This was supported by a former government representative who 
explained that: 
“There are several steps from the Ministry to the Constitutional Review 
Commission to stakeholders to Parliament.  But even with these provisions 
parliament has some leverage to make amendments” (Ndemo, questionnaire 
response in 2014). 
Respondent Rad’s suggestion that acknowledgement of input and consideration by stakeholders 
be documented and tabled at plenary has since been adopted. Public hearings have been 
introduced, and it is expected that parliamentary committees will table inputs for consideration 
by plenary.  However, as determined in this section, there is limited capacity to cover public 
consultations. In concurrence a responded from the ministry reflected that: 
“In most cases the Parliamentary Committee is supportive but sometimes it does 
not understand the urgency of some legislation that in most cases delay and cause 
confusion in the sector. For example, the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill has 
been in and out of Parliament for the past 10 years, yet the sector needs 
guidelines as big data becomes more important. If Parliament were to appreciate 
the impact of such law, it would help, but politics usually takes centre stage where 
you cannot divorce politicians from doing what they know best. They tend to fear 
that FOI will expose their interest, and hence it becomes difficult to move such a 
law” (Ndemo, questionnaire response in 2014). 
Furthermore, respondent Ndemo viewed the process as flawed since: 
“Once a law is passed, parliament in most cases does not follow [up] to see the 
impact not unless the civil society organizations (CSOs) bring up the matter.  In 
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this case, Parliament summons the Ministry to explain if there is need for review 
of the law.” 
Using the example of the Kenya Communications Amendment Bill (2008), respondent Ndemo 
confirmed the need for a mechanism to track impact of legislation. Whilst it was realized at the 
time of passing the bill that further amendments were required almost immediately the current 
process utilizing the miscellaneous amendment process takes a long time. It took a lengthy 
period to get the amendments done.  
 
An important determinant of parliamentary performance as revealed by the respondents is the 
ability of parliament to track legislation. Both the institution of parliaments and even the key 
stakeholders in the sector concur on the inadequate of capacity to track legislation. The ability to 
track legislation requires that mechanisms in place are supported by sufficient resources to 
capture evidence on the impact of ICT legislation. The current situation was that some 
mechanisms existed, but these were inadequate with parliament failing to facilitate smooth rule 
functioning and strengthening.  The lack of capacity is further confirmed by another respondent, 
a former representative of a government department, who observed that:  
“…more regular review of legislation through impact assessment and 
engagement with stakeholders and bodies responsible for implementation is 
required. Capacity building among MPs needs to be improved. This should also 
extend to the support function which should include a strong professional core 
properly qualified to do research and work on policy and legislation and provide 
support to MPs and committee members” (Weeks, questionnaire response in 
2013). 
 
Parliament of South Africa indicated adequate mechanisms to track legislations that have been 
enacted with access to resources to provide evidence on the impact of ICT legislation. The rules 
and procedure operationalises the constitutional provisions empowering parliament to send back 
legislation to the executive for review, and this provision is often exercised.   
 
With regards to sending bills back to the executive for review, the Kenyan representative from 
government (named Ndemo) assessed parliament as having moderate capacity in place as the 
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rules and procedure, and/or other laws empower the parliament to send back legislation to the 
Executive for review. However, in reality, this provision is usually not exercised as,  
“Even with glaring anomalies, Parliament never sends back bills.  They prefer 
reviewing it themselves without giving stakeholder a chance to contribute if the 
Bill has to be revised unless the Bill comes up when the Parliament is prorogued 
for elections” (Ndemo, questionnaire response in 2014) 
Moreover, as respondent Ndemo further highlighted, 
“…the executive has veto powers within two weeks and if no veto within the stipulated 
period, the law is presumed as passed” (Ndemo, questionnaire response in 2014). 
 
Another capacity element identified by the respondents as influencing effectiveness 
parliamentary participation is its source of legitimacy72 for legislative activities.  Political 
legitimacy is about the validity of decisions made on laws, policies by the candidates for political 
office. As described in Chapter 1§ 1.0 legitimation alludes to the recognition and acceptance, by 
key stakeholders within the sector, of the right of parliament to act in some manner, placing an 
obligation on stakeholders to abide by the action (Copeland & Patterson, 1998). The seriousness 
of the perceptions is reflected by how industry responds to parliamentary intervention, as 
highlighted by an interviewee from South Africa that:  
“Parliament has power and authority to influence ICT sector development, and as 
such is taken seriously by operators. In most cases when parliament calls for 
submissions, operators respond positively and at the highest possible level of 
management, with often times CEOs themselves going in person to attend” 
(Barandse, personal interview in 2015).  
Furthermore, the interviewee indicated that this has become the norm rather than the excerption 
amid fears of being labeled “undermining parliament” if firms do not respond to call for 
submissions with top level representation.   
 
                                                          
72 juridical legitimacy - appreciate the legal basis of the system; symbolic legitimacy- feel emotionally attached to 




A critical stakeholder in determining legitimacy and authority of parliament especially in the 
case of SA is identified by respondents as the president of the country.  One respondent observes 
that in South Africa: 
“During the term of President Mandela parliament wielded power and made 
decisions to the point where Telkom invested in a Parliament Liaison Office in 
Cape Town. A senior manager was placed in this office to engage constantly and 
regularly with parliament. However in President Mbeki era this model did not 
yield results as power was shifted and resulted in the closing of the office, as 
private sector realized that decisions were now being made elsewhere.”  
Yet another critical source of parliamentary legitimacy is the private investors especially within 
the mobile industry as explained by a representative from the private sector.  
“Due to the high cost high risk and high returns nature of network industries investors 
are constantly looking out for certainty that their investments are protected.  Parliament 
gives certainty and guarantee for foreign direct investments by maintaining a trusted 
legal framework” (Barandse, personal interview in 2015). 
Additionally: 
“Regulation holds value for network infrastructure industries. Parliament can hold or 
destroy value by changing policy or a phrase within a policy. Foreign investors use 
parliament as a signal/ yardstick to check validity of investment decisions” (Barandse, 
personal interview in 2015). 
Furthermore, interdependencies amongst key players in the sector affect the interplay of power 
influencing consensus building within this space as:  
“Consensus is highly contentious and often results in unintended outcomes. There is a 
high interference by political parties in the decision making process which ultimately 
influences the direction of strategy around critical issues in the sector. Case in point is 
the digital migration, end of termination rates, etc.” (Barandse, personal interview in 
2015). 
A critical and important factor influencing the exercise of parliamentary power in the sector is its 
ability to delegate to the regulator. Parliament is often perceived as ‘highly disorganized’ and 
technically not equipped to deal with ICT issues and thus delegates certain tasks of policy 
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adoption to the regulator (ICASA and CA) as determined by the ICT laws in each country, i.e. 
ECA (SA) and KICA (Kenya).  
 “Parliament by nature delegated authority to the regulator to act on their behalf and as 
such may or may not have direct influence on the impact of regulation.  As such any 
involvement of parliament outside of this delegation may be deemed as undermining the 
power to delegate” (Barandse, personal interview in 2015).  
The relationship between the regulator and parliament is very much that of principal-agent.  This 
principal-agent relationship if not managed effectively can influence to a great extent, the ability 
of parliament to implement its mandate. A challenge, however, is often the ministry by passing 
parliament and issuing policy directives to the regulator even though it is within their mandate. 
These relationships especially as observed in South Africa determine outcomes and affects 
consensus making.  
“By nature ICASA can make contestations on parliament decisions but because of the 
principal- agent relationship they ultimately seek guidance from parliament. Parliament 
too depends on the minister, who may be influenced by party politics to take a certain 
policy direction” (Barandse, personal interview in2015). 
However according to respondent Cohen from the personal experience of having been appointed 
as an ICASA councilor in 2008, the parliamentary based appointment and oversight process used 
is a “competitive, professional engagement with sufficient structures in place”.  
 
A good measure of legislation capacity is also the ability of parliament to review bills and 
provide opportunities for input into the bill process through hearings.  The questions in this 
category assessed the capacity of parliament to conduct legislative scrutiny for ICT policy 
making through committees and debates. Three indicators were assessed: 1) the adequacy of the 
period of review for ICT legislation, 2) existence of a dedicated ICT committee with a mandate 
to review ICT policy issues, and 3) if the ICT Committee and other committees hold public 
hearings on ICT policies in which evidence from the executive and the public are taken. Table 31 
summarizes the results of this assessment. 
 
The responses in Table 31 reveal no major contradictions but a clear indication of insufficient 
time set aside for the review of bills in both countries. In Kenya, the parliament indicated that the 
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two months period provided is insufficient and that there is a great need to review relevant laws 
to extend it to four months. The representative of the Kenya government (named Ndemo) 
concurred with this but further explained that the current bill review process takes a long time 
especially when the changes are significant while smaller changes take the miscellaneous 
amendment route, which in itself takes a while.  The same lack of capacity is lamented in South 
Africa as:  
“Parliament does not have adequate capacity to conduct impact assessments on 
effects of legislation, decisions and budgetary consideration on agencies ability to 
implement” (Cohen, personal interview in March 2015). 
  
 
Table 31: Respondent assessment of bill review and hearings in Kenya and SA. 
 





























































































Committee1 2 - 4 4 3 4 
Committee 2  4  4  4 
Regulator 3 - 4 3 4 4 
PMO - 4 4 4 4 4 
Expert_ Government - - 3 4 4 4 
Operator1  -  4  3 
Operator2  4  4  4 
Operators -ISPA  4  4  4 
Average Rating 1 4 3.5 4 3.5 4 
Source: Authors compilation 
 
The bill review process, according to a representative from the parliamentary monitoring 
organization is South Africa, is lengthy because it’s within a contested policy space: 
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“ the ICT sector is a contested space and the legislative process has become 
lengthy with complex and contentious bills taking more than 3 months”(Alli, 
Skype Interview in March 2015). 
 
With regards to the existence of oversight committees, the self-assessment rated the South 
African Parliament as having a high capacity in place, having two committees with a sole 
mandate to review ICT policy issues.  In Kenya, on the other hand, there was a committee with a 
split mandate for the ICT and energy sectors which are both in infrastructure industries but 
requiring different technical knowledge to manage. Given the insufficient capacity experienced 
in the Kenyan parliament having a departmental committee that focused on two policy areas was 
common. The difference in capacity levels between the committee structures of Kenya and South 
Africa becomes very evident, as South Africa in 2014 introduced two dedicated committees 
focusing on the ICT policy area following a presidential proclamation (See Chapter 5§ 5.2.3) that 
split the department of communications in line new mandate. The existence of two committees in 
SA could, however, increase the degree of dispersion of responsibilities in the sector.  
 
In order to provide opportunity for input into the legislative process parliament, through the 
committee systems, often utilizes public hearings but these only happen within parliament only. 
According to respondent Cull, there was a need to solicit the views of more ordinary citizens so 
the committee should hold hearings in provinces across the country. 
 
Furthermore, respondent Cull highlighted that when the ICT Committees and other committees 
hold public hearings on ICT policies in which evidence from the executive and the public was 
taken, there was often insufficient opportunities to have further engagement on the responses of 
the government department.  A more structured process where more detailed motivations and 
reasons were advanced for decisions taken was, therefore, required. 
 
6.2.4 Mandate 3: Oversight  
The committee system is a key parliamentary structure for oversight. It is where parliamentarians 
develop expertise and conduct thorough examination of proposed legislation, executive actions, 
policies and expenditure. Oversight is the mechanism used by parliament to maintain a balance 
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of power among the three arms of government and to assert citizens’ interest against executive 
decisions.  The focus of the questions in this category sought to assess  parliament’s ability to 
review, monitor and supervise government and public agencies’ actions on the implementation 
of policy and legislation to ensure public policy reflects and meets the citizen’s needs.  
 
The questions that were asked were directly related to the level of oversight performed by sector 
related committees on government actions as well as the expenditures of state owned enterprises. 
Key factors influencing the oversight capability include the level of investigative powers, the 
power to follow up on recommendations and the mechanisms used by parliament to obtain 
information from the executive. This should be supported by access to adequate resources to 
undertake oversight activities. An important element of oversight is providing opportunities for 
minority/opposition parties to engage in effective oversight of government actions and 
expenditures. Thus, the study assesses the existence and effectiveness of oversight committees, 
their powers and resources available to them through seven key elements as listed in Table 32.  
 
Respondent Cohen notes that in a parliamentary democracy it is expected that parliamentarians 
as elected leadership hold the public interest at heart and would be able to intervene in areas of 
importance to find out why outcomes have not been achieved.  This provides insight into the 
effort both parliaments have directed into developing oversight capacity which is rated as 
moderate to high. The increased entrenchment of the separation of powers has resulted in defined 
roles and responsibilities within the broader governance system. In South Africa, the oversight 
function of parliament is performed by sector related committees73 and other special committees 
and often exercised both at committee and plenary levels.  In Kenya, in addition to the 
Communications Committee, there is a Public Accounts Committee and Public Investment 
Committee that have other mandates.  
 
                                                          
73 In SA, the Portfolio Committee on Communication conducts oversight of government agencies including ICASA, 
MDDA and the Department of Communication; Portfolio Committee on Telecommunication and Postal Services 
provides oversight on . In Kenya the committee on energy and communication oversees the  ministry and 
through the ministry the actions of government agencies such as CAK, e-government directorate    
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Respondents provided differing insights into the capacity of the parliament of SA to conduct 
oversight. Whilst some viewed the capacity as improving tremendously in recent years others felt 
there is room for improvement especially with regards to investigative powers:  
“There is huge room for improvement in investigating implementation issues and 
improving the institutional memory of parliament… the same issues occurs year 
after year, and my view is that the committee in general fails to hold the executive 
and portfolio organizations accountable” (Cull, questionnaire response in 2014). 
Respondent Ndemo regarded Kenya as having high capacity in the exercise of investigative 
powers by oversight committees. This is supported with clarity of rules as the ministry 
undergoes, at least, an investigative session with different committees annually. Furthermore 
sufficient mechanisms exist for the committee to obtain information from the executive to 
exercise its oversight function in a meaningful way. These mechanisms have proven time and 
again to work perfectly and are prescribed in the Public Finance Management Act with 
adherence taken seriously. 
“Oversight committees have adequate powers in law to request and receive 
response on actions taken by the executive on the committees/parliaments 
recommendations- The Committee can summon anybody and can ask for any 
information”(Ndemo, questionnaire response in 2014). 
 
Regarding the capacity to follow up on recommendations respondent Alli suggested that 
committees in South Africa should be more diligent and insist on more follow-ups when they 
scrutinize government departments.  Mechanisms for the oversight committee to obtain 
information from the executive are available through department and agencies reporting which is 
done periodically: quarterly, annually and whenever asked. Furthermore, the respondent 
observed that:  
“Mechanisms to obtain information from the executive include letters between the 
Chair of the committees and the executive Heads, PLOs who attend meetings; 
written questions and even the Deputy President as leader of Government 
business interventions when there are disputes” (questionnaire response in 2015). 
In the case of Kenya, the Parliamentary Monitoring Organization, Mzalendo describes oversight 
committees as having adequate powers in law to request and receive response on actions taken 
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by the executive on the Committees/Parliaments recommendations - Committees are empowered 
by the act to receive these responses. This is supported by adequate resources to undertake 
activities as the committees have a separate budget to cover its operations. 
 
Table 32: Respondent assessment of oversight committees in Kenya and SA. 
 






































































































































































































Committee1 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 - 
Committee 2 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 4 0 
Regulator 4 4 4 - 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 
PMO 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 1 
Expert_ Govt. - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 4 
Operator1 4  3  4  -  4  4  3  
Operator2 4  4  4  3  4  4  3  
Operators -ISPA -  4  3  4  3  3  -  
Average Rating 
4 4 4 3.
5 
4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
The opportunities for minority or opposition to make meaningful input into the legislative 
activities of parliament were regarded differently as respondent Allie viewed committee 
meetings in the parliament of South Africa as a “platforms for robust exchanges and dialogue”. 
Respondent Allie felt the opposition voices get drowned during plenary. Respondent Cull, 
however, confirmed that: 
“Oversight committees are dominated by the ruling party with very limited 
opportunities for minority/ opposition parties to engage or have in oversight of 
government expenditure.  This has been a trend over the past 10 years with the 
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committee moving from being relatively collegial to one in which there is little 
real debate” (questionnaire response in 2014). 
Budgetary oversight is considered a key mechanisms used by parliament to hold the government 
accountable for its actions. Respondent Cohen provided insight into the process:  
“Parliament approves the budget votes for the different ministries.  Subsequent to 
the presentation of the Budget by the Minister of Finance, each parliamentary 
committee discusses the different budget votes and has hearings with the relevant 
government department. In this process, the Communication Committee approves 
the budget votes for the different agencies implementing ICT related 
programmes” (personal interview in March 2015).  
The respondent further remarked that:  
“However upon implementation parliament often takes decisions that have a 
budgetary effect and may impact implementation capacity of agencies. This raises 
the question of how costing is done and exposes the lack of adequate impact 
assessments by parliament” (personal interview in March 2015).  
 
The implementation of the oversight model by the parliament of SA has deepened oversight 
visits under the current chairperson as the committee continually seeks reasons why policy 
outcomes are not being achieved. The model could be a useful best practice guide that other 
parliaments can learn from. Oversight should be conducted irrespective of party politics and 
allow for oversight of all government departments as mandated by the constitution. However a 
balance is required, and parliament should not behave as self-appointed cowboys. 
 
6.2.5 Financial and material resources  
In order to effectively conduct its mandates parliament requires access to financial and material 
resources. The parliamentary system is not equipped for technical requirements as mostly their 
roles are limited to setting the overarching policy and governance through approval of budgets, 
appointment of statutory staff, overseeing of policy implementation.  As determined throughout 
this chapter, in implementing their role parliament engages at different levels with different 
stakeholders from ministry through submissions, questions, approvals and appointments to the 




The availability and independence of resources is identified as a significant factor for 
parliamentary effectiveness by key stakeholders within the ICT sector.  A parliament with 
resources, capacity and the will to exercise its responsibilities will create the vibrancy required to 
support democracy. Parliaments should exert the constitutional powers they possess and do away 
with the practice where parliaments in some instances are viewed as sub-branches of the 
executive. Parliament requires independence to define the resources it requires for effective 
implementation of its mandate.  
 
Table 33 identifies five critical factors a parliament requires to ensure adequate resourcing. 
These include powers of parliament to determine its own budget, resources for constituency 
development, mechanisms for receiving technical assistance and research and support staff as 
well as logistics to support the work of MPs. Most respondents scored parliamentary committees 
as supportive but often lacking the knowledge and capacity to deal with the urgency of some 
pieces of legislation, resulting in delays and confusion in the sector. The respondent assessments 
of parliament financial and material resources are shown in Table 33. 
 
Parliament of SA assessed itself as having clear need for capacity in terms of determining its own 
budget as currently the budget for parliament is determined by the Minister of Finance. The case 
in Kenya is different as parliament is empowered by the constitution to make its own budget and 
submit to national assembly for approval through its parliamentary service commission, and this 
resulted in a rating of 4. The Kenyan Parliament is financially independent; it prepares its annual 
budget, and the executive cannot vary it. 
“Parliament determines its budget for the year and the executive cannot vary it. It 
is stipulated in the Public Financial Management Act” (Ndemo, questionnaire 
response in 2014). 
In terms of logistics, both the Kenyan and SA parliaments have sufficient office space, but this 






Table 33: Respondent assessment of financial and material resources in Kenya and SA. 
 














































































































































































Committee1 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 1 4 4 
Committee 2  -  4  -  4  4 
Regulator - 4 4 3 4 - 3 3 4 3 
PMO 1 1 - 2 4 3 1 3 3 4 
Expert_ Govt. 1 - - 3 4 - 1 - 3 3 
Operator1  3  4  -  4  3 
Operator2  3  3  4  4  4 
Operators -ISPA  2  -  -  -  - 
Average Rating 1 2 2 3.5 4 1 2 2 4 3.5 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
 “Parliament hires outside venues if the meeting programme is packed. The 
legislature is planning on increasing its size. All committees should have a 
designated meeting room” (Alli, questionnaire response).  
And for Kenya:  
“A more centralised office space for staff as they are currently operating from five 
different locations making it strenuous for MPs to seek assistance” (MP Kenya, 
questionnaire response) 
Assessment of Kenya indicated adequate logistics; including office space to enable it perform its 
functions with all members having office space and for committee work. On the issue of 
resources for MPs and constituency development activities, the self-assessment for SA rated it at 
clear need for capacity. In South Africa, MPs have no constituency development fund that is used 
for development projects in the constituencies. Civil society highlighted the need for: 
“Greater transparency around MP expenses and how MPs spend their time 
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during constituency periods.”  
In Kenya, the situation is different as: 
“MPs have a constituency development fund supported by an ACT that creates the 
CDF Fund. CDF is used for development projects in the constituency and is 
managed jointly by the MP through CDF Board. They, however, have to 
independently appoint management committees and are audited by the Controller 
of Revenue” (Ndemo, questionnaire response in 2014).  
 
With regards having a structured system for receiving technical and advisory assistance from 
external sources, Kenya Parliament standing orders provide for this, and the clerk coordinates the 
technical departments in this regard.  The ministry perspective is that currently:  
“The parliament does not have a structured system for receiving technical and 
advisory assistance from external sources. This role is undertaken by Treasury 
which then reports to the Public Accounts Committee and parliament requires an 
office to independently verify treasury reports” (Ndemo questionnaire response, 
2014). 
In terms of research capacity, Parliament of South Africa was generally considered to have 
research and support staff, but these were inadequate and lacked requisite tools to enable them to 
provide MPs with information in real time. Basing also on the often poor quality of questions 
asked in parliamentary hearings there was an assumption that the support was not adequate. To 
mitigate this parliaments sometimes outsourced some of the work when need arose. According to 
the civil society representatives in South Africa:  
“This capacity has improved over the years but ideally; each MP should have 
their own staff” (Alli, questionnaire response in 2015).  
The parliament of Kenya has inadequate staffing. Yet adequate capacity supported by personnel 
with the right skills set is paramount to parliament discharge of its functions. Parliament is not 
equipped to deal with the technical, economic and financial objectives of the ICT sector. The 
parliamentary system is not equipped for technical requirements, their roles is setting the 





6.3 Summary of findings 









Table 34 Summary of research findings from respondent interviews. 
 
 
Area of investigation Themes Summary of findings 
Role of parliament in ICT sector reforms Support policy adoption and the shaping of 
outcomes 
Custom based, significant and critical in policy shaping and as a custodian and 
sponsor of the legal framework  
Dealing with political issues on behalf of government  ministries  
Parliamentary ineffectualness  Structuring of policy-making framework  and principal – agent relationships 
influences or constrains parliamentary participation, as the clear cut definition 
of roles and responsibilities highly depends on the extent of separation of 
powers between the executive and parliament  
Institutional and technical capacity and knowledge to deal with ICT issues, 
especially at committee level, is required, the lack of which results in 
confusion and delays in implementing legislative activities.  
A proactive approach to providing a coherent framework that utilises a 
disciplined methodology could solve the problem of intangible outcomes and 
reinvent parliament for accountability  





Institutionalised engagement models and patterns of interaction result in 
predictable outcomes 
Patterns of interaction are ambiguous, weak or strong, and change as the 
sector matures, and the role of each stakeholder becomes better defined with 
frameworks set up to identify responsibilities that meet sector requirements. 
ICT committees provide the link between government and citizens and other 




Table 34 (continued) Summary of research findings from respondent interviews. 
Area of investigation Themes Summary of findings 
 Parliament a source of information  
 
Parliament is a critical source of information on government priorities 
providing credibility and certainty for investors in the ICT sector  
Effectiveness of representation is influenced by access to information. PMOs 
have become an important alternative and reliable information source of 
information on parliamentary proceedings.   
Parliamentary consultations  
 
Formal and informal consultations with stakeholders is key for decision and 
policy making  
Degree of application of political power 







ICT legislative capacity is weakened by the complexity and contentious nature 
of the sector 
Principal-agent relationships result in contradictions and inherent conflict 
especially with regards to consensus on sector priorities 
Ability to track legislation Impact assessments on effects of legislation, decisions and budgetary 










Table 34 (continued) Summary of research findings from respondent interviews. 
Area of investigation Themes Summary of findings 
 Parliamentary legitimacy Stakeholder perception of parliament influences or constrains the exercise of 
power by parliament in the sector. Building this reputation depends on the 
effectiveness of mechanisms in place to support parliamentary processes.  
Stakeholder perceptions on parliamentary power and authority influence level 
of response by key players to interventions with seriousness measured by 
executive level management engagement.  
Interdependencies among key sector  players in the sector affects the interplay  
of power influencing consensus building  
Parliament is used as an important yardstick in guaranteeing certainty to 
investors that their investments are protected through a trusted legal 
framework  
Executive dominance weakens parliament ability to legislate as political party 
politics undermines the importance of separation of powers and the 
independency required for parliament to be effective.  
Legislative Delegation Effectiveness of delegation heavily relies on the structuring of the principal-
agent relationships.  
Period for reviewing bills  Insufficient time to review legislation coupled with inadequate capacity to 






Table 34 (continued) Summary of research findings from respondent interviews. 
Area of investigation Themes Summary of findings 
Extent of influence of  parliament in ICT sector 
reforms  
 
Balance of power among state institutions  
 
Oversight is the mechanism used by parliament to maintain a balance of power among 
the three arms of government and to assert citizens interest against executive decisions.   
Institutionalized investigative sessions/oversight visits provide useful mechanisms for 
effective oversight of government departments.  
Ruling party dominance limits input from opposition and minority parties 
compromising the representativeness and levels of debate  
Development of expertise and thorough 
examination of proposed legislation and executive 
actions  
Committees provide a structure through which s all three traditional roles of parliament 
manifest and opportunities for structured interaction with the sector are provided. 
Committees are a key structure for oversight as they allow parliamentarians to develop 
expertise and conduct thorough examination of proposed legislation, executive actions, 
policies and expenditure. 
Power to exercise oversight Investigative powers, power to follow up on recommendations and opportunities for 
minority/opposition parties to engage in effective oversight of government actions and 
expenditures are key elements for conducting oversight.  
Access to executive information for effective 
oversight 
Power to request and receive executive information on actions is essential for effective 
oversight but can be limited by parliament capacity to utilize mechanisms effectively 
as well as other factors such as the principal-agent dynamics.  
Level of institutional effectiveness  
 
Independence of parliament to determine own 
activities  
A parliament with resources, capacity and the will to exercise its responsibilities will 
create the vibrancy required to support democracy. 
Adequate resources to undertake activities as committees have a separate budget to 








This chapter reviews the evidence presented in previous chapters in light of the current practice 
of law and the state of play by parliament in the ICT sector through the lens of institutional 
constellation framework used throughout. Drawing on the emerging themes and patterns from 
the findings in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 provides a cross-country comparison of the role of 
parliament in the ICT policy making processes of Kenya and South Africa by analyzing the 
trends, tensions, and contradictions in parliamentary participation.  Chapter 7 is an institutional 
analysis using the concept of an institutional constellation and other arising sub-concepts such as 
state, power relations, representation, and interests to understand the different outcomes in each 
country. 
 
The concept of an institutional constellation locates parliament and the state within the ICT 
ecosystem, providing the framework for the comparative analysis.  It enables an examination of 
the political environment in each country, the diversity, responsibilities and power structures 
associated with decision-making processes and, more specifically, the parliamentary mechanisms 
and practices that determine outcomes for the ICT sector in Kenya and South Africa.  
 
The document review in Chapter 5 revealed the formal legal basis for parliamentary engagement 
in the sector. The constitution mandates parliament to develop structures, processes, and 
mechanisms that result in parliamentary practices that are applicable and prevalent in the ICT 
policy-making arena, as identified in Chapter 6. The analysis identifies the different factors that 
influence parliamentary participation in the development of this particularly critical 
infrastructure industry in these two leading African countries regarding ICT development. The 
findings that emerge from the comparative analysis of the role of parliament in policy-making 




As indicated in Chapters 1- 3, this thesis is theoretically informed by the overarching role of the 
state in policy and regulation. It is widely accepted that states should provide public goods, 
regulate the market, enforce contracts, balance the economy, maintain order, and negotiate 
disputes. While state involvement in ICT sector development is, therefore, a given, it is the 
nature and degree of that relationship that concerns this study. As argued by Gillwald (2009) the 
success or failure of the reform and developmental strategies of states is influenced by the nature 
and quality of state involvement. There are thus internal and external factors affecting the quality 
and level of state involvement, importantly its decisiveness. The conceptual framework in Figure 
10, through which the two countries have been analyzed, will assist in this final review of the 
evidence from a comparative perspective. 
 
 
Figure 10:  Locating parliament in a constellation of institutions. Source: Authors compilation 
 
7.1 Political environment: A legal basis for the role of parliament in ICT sector  
 
The political climate determines the level of government intervention in the ICT sector and, 
consequently, parliamentary participation. It is this political environment that defines the 
formal/legal/constitutional roles and functions of parliament within the institutional 
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arrangements of the state and the practice of parliament within a particular government. Formally 
parliament, through multiparty committees, is responsible for appointments to statutory bodies 
and their oversight. However, different administrations use the state instruments such as 
parliament in different ways even within the same party, with some being hands off (no 
accountability), and others hands on (interference) - forcing through decision making by majority 
or consensus in the national interest. 
 
Consequently, the constitution determines the roles and responsibilities, principles and values 
and the relationships pursued by key state institutions and key players in support of ICT sector 
reforms.  Chapter 5 emphasized the importance of a legal and institutional architecture that 
allows parliament to (1) hold government to account for effective scrutiny and oversight, (2) 
conduct transparent debate that leads to enactment of laws, and (3) ensure effective 
representation of citizens and other party’s interests in dealing with the government. It is by 
implementing such a legal and institutional architecture that parliament can structure 
mechanisms that promulgate and manifest the principles and values of the constitution.   
 
Parliament as the legislative arm of the state can contribute significantly to government 
decisiveness with significant implications for policy change and implementation.  Depending on 
the makeup of parliament and the dominance of parties and the interests represented, it can 
constrain ICT development by vetoing legislation, weak oversight of agencies and supporting 
politically based appointments that reflect party ties or patronage instead of the technical 
expertise required by the sector. Establishing optimal levels of parliamentary involvement in the 
ICT sector is addressed in this thesis by considering the institutional theory, specifically 
historical institutionalism in relation to the empirical evidence on its role in the ICT sector in 
Kenya and South Africa. A conscious decision to pursue certain developmental strategies by the 







7.1.1. Extent of state involvement in ICT sector reforms  
Both Kenya and South Africa profess to be “developmental states”, but it is not clear what 
distinguished them as such other than their claims to be so. While both governments strongly 
believe it is this form that can deliver economic growth and development, state intervention in 
the ICT sector at present is very much defined by a regulatory state perspective that has 
accompanied the global reform process.  Regulatory states govern the economy through 
regulatory agencies empowered to enforce standards of behavior to protect the consumers against 
market failure. As Gillwald (2009) argues, in the case of South Africa, the development state has 
been more a rhetoric of the African National Congress than practice and was only ever actively 
deployed post the 2004 election with the introduction of the economic policy ASGISA in 2005.  
 
Problems associated with the state’s inability to respond to market failure and indecisiveness in 
Kenya and South Africa are addressed through constitutional design by structuring the 
participation of the state institutions and their agents.  The constitution defines the roles and 
responsibilities, principles and values and the relationships among state institutions that separate 
executive and legislative power as well as the legislative enactment from interpretation and 
between different levels of government.  In this way the constitution determines the formal rules 
of the political system, mandating parliament’s role and leverage within the system. This 
following quotation by an interviewee Africa (named Barandse) in South makes clear the 
relationship between the political environment and policy processes.   
 
“…separation of powers amongst state institutions depicts an ICT policy making the process that 
has clear cut responsibilities for policy formulation being the purview of the ministry of 
communication while policy adoption sits in parliament and the justice and courts do policy 
implementation with the regulatory and policy monitoring. This is meant to facilitate policy 
coherence, consensus building, and effective coordination” (Barandse 2015, personal 
interview).”  
 
A comparable regulatory model was presented in Chapter 5. The model has been adopted in both 
countries with the establishment of a regulator, partial liberalization, and privatization. The 
regulatory model has influenced the adoption of a legal framework that separates roles within the 
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sector, with the government being responsible for policy making, NRAs for the implementation 
of the policy and operators, including ideally in terms of the reform model, privatized 
incumbents to roll out services.  
 
The establishment of NRAs through an act of parliament has facilitated the growth of the sector, 
developing an enabling environment for regulating the market and ensuring sector performance 
through the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) and the Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa (ICASA). In theory, the Acts guarantee the required independence of 
regulation from state and private interests and ensure the enactment of timely legal provisions 
that are in line with national strategies and global trends for reforming the sector. It is in practice 
that the ineffectualness of the reform model and its failure to consider the institutional 
endowments (institutional capacity, individual competency, political culture and ethos, exercise 
of autonomy of statutory institutions, accountability, and transparency) of each country can be 
observed. 
 
7.1.2.   Political power structures  
An analysis of the empirical evidence in both Kenya and South Africa indicates the legal basis 
for a parliamentary role in policy making, stemming from a country’s constitution. The findings 
confirm that legislative authority and power are vested in parliament through a constitution.  It is 
this authority that gives parliament power to intervene and veto in any matter as necessary to 
maintain national security, economic unity and to establish minimum and essential standards 
required for rendering of services.  It is through the law-making role that parliament’s 
constitutional powers manifest to make new laws, repeal and amend existing laws. Whilst the 
parliament of SA reflects the required capacity to perform its law-making role as supported by a 
legal mandate derived from the constitution and the arising administrative justice law, in Kenya 
the requirement of the constitution to provide for the consideration of public representations in 
committee work is compromised by the insufficient capacity of parliament to utilize mechanisms 
in place.  
 
Empirical findings further suggest that the legitimacy with which parliament is perceived by its 
stakeholders is an important source of parliamentary power and authority. This perception can be 
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symbolic, based on either the acceptability or fairness of formal procedures guiding engagement 
or the effectiveness of legislative performance. These symbolic perceptions are defined to a large 
extent by the structural and institutional arrangements in place, determined by the overlying legal 
and constitutional system of each country.  The level of effectualness of parliament in both 
countries has, to a certain extent, influenced stakeholder perception on the fulfillment of its role 
within the sector.  
 
Mobile phone operators in South Africa perceive the power of parliament as symbolic, as 
indicated by an interviewee. The interviewee stated that responding to parliament’s calls for 
engagement has become the norm rather than the exception amid fears of being labeled as 
“undermining parliament” if a firm does not respond to calls for submissions and more so at with 
top level representation.   
 
“Parliament has power and authority to influence ICT sector development, and as such is taken 
seriously by operators. In most cases when parliament calls for submissions, operators respond 
positively and at the highest possible level of management, with often CEOs themselves going to 
attend”(Barandse, personal interview, 2015).  
 
The perception in Kenya is to a large extent influenced by the parliament’s inability to 
institutionalize engagement models with the different stakeholders. The general perception 
indicates that mechanisms in place are: 
“very basic as it is upon the citizens to request and pressure parliament to 
participate. Furthermore, there is need to sensitize MPs to acknowledge this and 
introduce structured forms of engagement” (Rad, questionnaire response, 2012). 
 
7.1.3. Participation and representation  
Party systems and the underlying electoral system have been shown to have a significantant 
bearing on state’s decisiveness. A proportional representation system such as the one practiced in 
South Africa makes the parliament representative of popular wishes, in contrast to a plurality 
rule which favors single party control. Structural conflict of interests arises from political parties’ 
interference in committee work. Requirements for appointing members to committees impacts 
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the ability of parliament to act in the broader interests of the sector, or even the economy as a 
whole, without impacting negatively on party interests.  
 
South Africa has de jure separation of powers yet de facto parliamentary decision-making is 
dominated by the executive through a party system with single control and a decisive 
government, with high levels of stability. Kenya, on the other hand, has a distinct separation of 
power in practice in conformity with its presidential system, in which the executive sits outside 
of parliament.  
 
The separation of power increases the number of veto points in the political system, further 
fragmenting the ICT sector as more institutions are introduced to the decision-making chain.  
Fragmentation within the sector (shown in Table 35) has not served the sector well rather; it has 
either offered a safety net for centralized decision making or as is the case here, has diffused 
power from specialized or dedicated agencies, so they are unable to take decisions 
autonomously. The veto power assigned to parliament in the ICT policy making process has 
created serious regulatory bottlenecks, with critical sector development policies being delayed in 
parliament for months and even years.  It then takes the interested bodies to lobby the 
committees around decisions in accordance with the public processes required by law.   
 
Table 35: Institutional fragmentation in the ICT Sector of Kenya and South Africa. 
 
Key dimensions Definition Kenya South Africa 
Institutional diversity Number of institutions 
involved 
High Institutional 
fragmentation   
High Institutional 
fragmentation   
Distribution of 
responsibility 
Allocation of  policy 
decisions to different 
institutions 
High dispersion of 
responsibilities 
High dispersion of 
responsibilities 
Power structure Institutional capacity to 
control policy decisions 
Decentralized  Hierarchical and 
centralized 
Source: Authors Compilation based on Jordana & Sancho Matrix (2004) 
 
An important element central to the findings of this study becomes the fact that government, 
through parliament, structures political participation in the sector through a variety of 
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mechanisms (discussed in Section 7.2) as well as its committee systems. The decision-making 
processes in the broader governance environment, such as delegation mechanisms and veto 
powers, then articulate the power structures both formally and informally. Legislative rules in 
parliament decentralize decision-making to multi-party parliamentary committees offering an 
opportunity to deal with the specialized and technical requirements of policy and law in this 
dynamic sector, away from the party and government leaders. The practice, however, has to 
contend with other institutional factors that include structuring the principal-agent relationships 
and mechanisms for vetoing policy decisions discussed in Section 7.2. 
 
7.1.4. ICT sector arrangements  
The political structure influences arrangements within the ICT sector in both Kenya and South 
Africa to a large extent. In both countries nominally there has been progress towards reaching 
national policy objectives of increasing affordable access to a wide range of ICTs. Global 
indicators measuring how each country is performing in developing its ICT sector confirms this, 
placing the two countries among the top performing African countries. The pace at which this is 
being achieved, and how well these countries compare relative to similarly developed 
economies, is the real measure of their success. While Kenya has moved up in global ranking 
from 126 in 2009 to 124 in 2014 in the ITU IDI, South Africa has steadily descended in global 
rankings over the last five years to 90 in 2014 from an 87 in 2009. 
 
Chapter 5 presented evidence that both countries have ICT sector institutional arrangements 
characterized by high fragmentation with high dispersion of responsibilities (see also Table 35). 
The major disjuncture is in the way power is structured. South Africa has a hierarchical structure 
with the delegation to agencies playing a major role in the decision-making processes. Kenya has 
a decentralized power structure through a federated government with decisions made at both the 
national and county level. Ultimately sector arrangements reflect the governance arrangements.  
Appointment of councilors (South Africa) and board members (Kenya) to the regulatory body is 
more on the basis of political allegiance (as it is in many jurisdictions) but in both these cases, 
though arguably more so in South Africa, this trumps critical technical expertise that is a 
requirement in law. This has produced conflict and ineptitude, as appointees are accountable 
within a system of patronage rather than within a transparent and accountable legal system 
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designed to ensure the institutions operate in the public interest. 
 
7.1.5. An underutilized formal system  
It is evident from the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 that parliament is widely acknowledged as a 
significant player in ICT policy formulation and implementation, based on responses 
(interviewees: Barandse and Cohen in 2015; questionnaire respondents: Cull and Ndemo in 
2014). While a formal legal system exists to shape and define political and power structures, it is 
underutilized and ineffective in influencing parliamentary effectualness to a large extent. The 
effectiveness of parliament is influenced by how principal-agent relationships identified in 
Chapter 6 (among other political, legal, social and institutional factors) are structured to 
influence outcomes. Both countries present evidence of parliament effectiveness being hindered 
by inadequate internal designs for inclusive participation that limits parliament ability to 
facilitate core legislative activities. This is worsened by an executive and political party 
dominance that weakens parliamentary oversight and  principal-agent relationships that result in 
contradictions and inherent conflict. An insufficient parliamentary capacity and technical 
knowledge in the ICT sector causes confusion and delays. An electoral system with 
constitutionally stipulated powers at stake (either directly or indirectly) to influence MPs 
incentives.  
 
Empirical findings further indicate that a significant factor for poor outcomes lies in the 
ineffective utilization of the mechanisms that exist. For example, both Kenya and SA 
parliaments’ oversight committees have investigative powers over implementation issues 
including budgetary matters. These investigative powers are enshrined in the rules of procedure 
or other laws but are seldom enforced.  An example to expound this is the case of South Africa 
where parliament calls the department to explain the failure to expend budget, or ICASA is 
wrapped over knuckles for non-performance, and yet there is no evidence of conformance to any 
recommendations agreed. It is clear that parliament has separate powers but does not use 
mechanisms at its disposal effectively (Kenya) and/or can be exploited by the government 
through political party systems to achieve preferred outcomes that are not necessarily in the 
public interest (South Africa). 
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7.2. Parliamentary practices and policy outcomes 
In implementing its mandates, a number of parliamentary practices are identified that influence 
the effectiveness of parliamentary participation and, consequently, the policy outcomes and 
developments in the ICT sector. These are discussed in the subsections that follow. 
  
7.2.1. Structuring principal-agent relationships  
Parliament, through its committee system, is a significant political institution in the structuring of 
principal-agent relationships in the ICT sectors of both parliaments utilising a set sequence of 
delegation. The principal–agent relationships, while anchored in a public interest perspective, 
determine the ultimate form of ICT policy. It is through legislative delegation that the question of 
parliament’s responsiveness to broad public interests and its administrative capacity to 
implement decisions and ensure sustainable implementation of policy changes is raised. The 
effectiveness of the delegation heavily relies on how the principal-agent relationships are 
structured. This was confirmed by a South African respondent (named Cohen) in 2015, who 
observed that: 
 
“..in a parliamentary democracy it is expected that parliamentarians as elected 
leadership hold the public interest at heart and would be able to intervene in areas of 
importance to find out why outcomes have not been achieved”.   
 
Chapters 5 and 6 confirm three distinct levels of delegation prevalent in both Kenya and South 
Africa. The first level of principal-agent relationship occurs when citizens delegate decision-
making to members of parliament, specifically through a constitutional mandate that gives the 
citizens power to replace members of parliament through representation mechanisms and an 
electoral process. This level of delegation gives parliament the power to act and interact on 
behalf of citizens in the ICT sector, with the expectation by citizens (as the principal) that elected 
members (the agent) will represent their best interests at the national level. 
 
The arising principal-agent relationships at this level are very much influenced by the incentives 
that accrue to individual MPs, which are determined by rules regulating electoral competition. 
These incentives influence the MPs’ actions as they often act in accordance with their master’s 
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preferences. Moreover, MPs’ capabilities are determined by electoral success and the 
constitutional powers of government positions at stake.  
 
In the South African case democratic participation and requirements are set out in an 
administrative justice framework. A good example is how the processes for legislation and 
appointing a regulator in South African looked both tedious and protracted on paper, with all the 
checks and balances in place to ensure compliance as required. However, the reality reflects 
political party and executive dominance, which undermine the multi-party and participatory 
structure of parliamentary processes to achieve party preferences and control outcomes. Such 
processes become relatively seamless when the executive interferes with parliamentary decision-
making processes. Party preferences are filtered through ruling party dominated committees with 
whipping practiced to ensure favorable outcomes. This limits input from the opposition and 
minority parties, thereby compromising representativeness and levels of debate. This confirms 
that by and large the parliament of South Africa can be categorised as emerging.  
 
In Kenya’s case, while there is heavy influenced by the combination of distinct separation of 
powers and a constituency-based electoral system that could provide a legal basis for greater 
parliamentary accountability, the highly fragmented sector arrangements compounded by a lack 
of internal capacity to utilize parliamentary instruments and mechanisms constrain parliament’s 
participation. 
 
Both the Kenya and SA parliaments have put in place mechanisms to promote representation that 
ensure a sustainable relationship where the agent (parliament) acts in the best interests of the 
principal (citizens). These include:  
•    Informing and educating stakeholders about what parliament does, 
•    Soliciting and receiving input into parliamentary proceedings and programs, 
•    Providing mechanisms for interest groups, civil society, and individuals to give input on 
government policy and legislation. 
Chapter 5 presents representation mechanisms and processes utilized by both parliaments with 




The empirical evidence reveals three essential practices as pertinent to support effective 
representation in ICT policy and decision making in Kenya and South Africa. These include 
parliamentary openness and accessibility- reflecting the establishment of engagement models and 
patterns of interaction; the usefulness of parliament as a source of information; and the 
importance of parliamentary consultation in decision and policy making, as described below.  
 
Institutionalizing engagement models supports effective representation by parliament as it 
provides MPs with continuous opportunities to interact with constituencies to understand and 
capture interests, views, and perspectives. Parliament uses various processes and tools such as 
questions, motions, resolutions to bring these issues to the attention of implementing institutions 
for redress. The openness of the committee system fully embraces the models and patterns 
providing opportunities for parliament to consult and get feedback from citizens and 
stakeholders. The quality and effectiveness of these interactions depends on the level of 
understanding of interested parties of the role of MPs in the ICT policy process.   
 
The South African engagement model, together with the quality and nature of submissions made, 
creates patterns of interaction amongst key players within the ICT sector giving rise to a model 
as depicted in Figure 11. Findings in Chapter 6 indicated multiple interactions that over time 
result in predictable outcomes with incentives linked to specific contextual factors.  
 
Patterns of interaction with each key stakeholder arise out of both organized and ad hoc 
engagements as summarized in Table 36. The patterns of interaction can either be ambiguous, 
weak or strong. They normally change as the sector matures and the role of each stakeholder 
becomes better defined with frameworks set up to identify responsibilities that meet sector 
requirements. These patterns are determined by the range of strategies which can either be of a 
broad or limited nature as the sector learns from past actions. Similarly, the patterns arise out of 
situations that can either be tightly constrained or less constrained as decisions are made within 
the context of the ICT ecosystem or with other external stakeholders that are required for 
effective implementation of the sector reforms.  
 
It is when engagement models are institutionalized and patterns of interaction established that 
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cooperative and symbiotic relationships with citizens and recipients of policy outcomes result in 
predictable outcomes. The effectiveness of the engagement models is thus influenced by 
parliament’s levels of accessibility and openness. Ultimately parliament becomes a critical 
source of information on government priorities and provides credibility and certainty for 
investors in the sector. This has to a large extent influenced the use of Parliamentary Monitoring 
Organizations (PMOs) as an alternative and reliable source of information on parliamentary 
proceedings.   
 
The parliament of SA proactively promotes access, transparency and openness to its processes 
through civic education, multiple channel access, live streaming of plenary and committee 
sessions, publishing the plenary schedule for every term and implementing such initiatives as 
taking parliament to the people and establishing parliamentary democracy offices. In Kenya 
public participation is hampered by low staffing levels, a limited number of committees, lack of 
time to scrutinize proposed legislation due to slow working committees, and poor support from 
government agencies. Openness is inconsistent with the information published, lacking emphasis 
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Table 36: Patterns of interaction between parliament and stakeholders in Kenya and SA. 
 
Source: Author’s Compilation. 
 
The differences in electoral systems in Kenya and South Africa account for the significant 
disjuncture in the structure of political participation within the ICT sector.  Different electoral 
systems influence the incentives for MPs with either a party or candidate vote determining 
actions. The Kenyan electoral system is candidate-centered and cultivates personal votes; voters 
directly decide which of the party candidates will represent them in parliament. As a result 
candidates in Kenya have substantial incentives to compete against one another, promoting intra-
party competition and influencing involvement levels. The South African system, on the other 
hand, is party-centered; voters have no ability to affect which of the party candidates, actually 
represent them in parliament, subsequently cultivating party votes with a very little incentive for 
candidates to compete amongst themselves.  
 
The Kenyan system provides an example of how constitution based systems provide 
opportunities for politicians to seek focused policy benefits for their constituencies. MPs seek re-
election by cultivating personal votes as an optimal strategy through providing private services to 
voters or through providing particularistic services and favors to special interests groups in return 
for campaign support. Given the institutional designs prevalent in South Africa, individual MPs 
Parliament Regulatory bodies Civil Society Operators/private sector 
Parliament of Kenya Strong inferences and 
specific predictions about 
likely patterns of behavior 
(guided by law). 





Weak patterns of 
exchange (unstructured 
engagement). 
Parliament of South 
Africa 
Strong inferences and 
specific predictions about 
likely patterns of behavior 
(guided by law). 
Ambiguous inferences 
about patterns of 
interaction (formal 
structures and 
mechanisms in place 
but often conflicting 
priorities). 
Strong inferences about 





cannot claim credit for policy changes since there are more MPs involved. At best they celebrate 
party successes and use these to gain personal votes but also claim credit for public work projects 
located in their constituencies and for benefits they have helped deliver. The respondents 
Barandse, Cohen and Ndemo (whose views are used in Chapter 6), having worked with 
parliament from both a private and public sector perspective, observed that MPs do cultivate 
personal votes through building relationships with dominant players in the sector, who would 
then support their initiatives at constituency level.    
 
The second level of delegation is found within the internal organization of the executive and 
parliament through the adoption of sector arrangements that create a centralized or decentralized 
authority.  Ministerial positions, committee and agenda control mechanisms that structure the 
composition of parliament, are reflected as essential elements at this level of delegation as they 
influence the power relations between the executive and parliament. In the South African case, 
for example, the executive, through the president, often uses parliament as the legitimation arm 
of government, making it subordinated and a mere rubber stamp of the executive decisions. This 
is understandable given that separation of power is undermined by the dominance of the ruling 
party, and by de-facto, it doesn’t exist and yet by de-jure it does. In both Kenya and South 
Africa, however, participation is structured through a ministerial model in the sector, with 
principal-agent relationships determined by constitutional regulations, sector institutional 
arrangements as set up through the ICT related acts (ECA and KICA), ministerial positions, the 
power to control committees and plenary agenda.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, two institutional arrangements are prevalent within the ICT sector 
worldwide. There is, on the one hand, a supra-ministerial model which gives formal authority of 
the ICT development processes to the president or prime minister of a country and, on the other 
hand, a ministerial approach that favors distributing policy functions to several ministries, with a 
centralized role of a higher level authority being absent or weak. The institutional arrangement 
adopted is meant to provide clarity of roles, the objectives and independence of the regulator, 
participation models within the regulatory process by interested parties, and transparency of 




Both South Africa and Kenya implement an integrated ICT model with specific ministries given 
full authority over, and responsibility for, most ICT policy functions. Furthermore, policy 
functions are distributed across departments, agents and committees but are coordinated by a 
dedicated ministry that manages the sector. It is the ministry that is then shadowed by the 
parliamentary committees holding it accountable through various mechanisms such as question 
time, legislative hearings, specialized investigations, reviews and studies by parliament, briefings 
from the ministry or department/agent visits for fact-finding.  These mechanisms support 
parliament to maintain a balance of power and to assert citizens interest against executive 
decisions through institutionalized investigative sessions/oversight visits.  
 
However, tipping of this power to the ministry makes parliament “reactionary rather than 
proactive in providing a coherent framework, as it fails to take on the leadership required to 
coordinate interest groups, leaving it to the ministry with its own preferences resulting in the 
sector remaining fragmented and fractious”, according to questionnaire responses by respondents 
Rad (in 2012), Weeks (in 2013), and Alli (in 2015). Committees, however, allow 
parliamentarians to develop expertise and conduct a thorough examination of proposed 
legislation, executive actions, policies, and expenditure. 
 
From a parliamentary perspective, the principal-agent relationship at this level is a reversal of the 
arrangements at the first level, converting parliament from being an agent to principal. Often, the 
agency relationships in this space result in contradictions and inherent conflict especially with 
regards to a consensus on sector priorities, with agents, often behaving opportunistically 
(personal interview with respondent Barandse, February 2015). Parliamentary participation 
becomes a product of the extent of separation of powers between the executive and parliament.   
 
A critical element of parliament’s effectiveness in structuring political participation is the 
availability of power and capacity to request and receive executive information on actions. This 
can be significantly limited by parliament capacity to utilize representation mechanisms 
effectively as well as other factors arising from the principal-agent dynamics. The case of South 
Africa presents clear examples of this, where two dedicated committees review and receive 
briefings from the relevant departments and agencies and, through these mechanisms, the 
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committee questions and contributes to the sector priorities. The consensus is then achieved 
through debates and trade-offs that become a critical element of committee and plenary work. 
 
Delegation to various agents, specifically to the regulator by parliament through administrative 
procedures and laws, presents yet another level in the sequence. A delegation of responsibilities 
to the national regulatory agency (NRA) is a governance practice prevalent in both Kenya and 
SA. The major difference lies in the appointment process of members to the regulator, in South 
Africa using a parliament-led process and Kenya subscribing to an executive-led process, all 
reflective of the political governance environment in each country. Global best practice and 
international law have established that a parliament-led process is best for the appointment of the 
regulator to protect the system against political interference. The above-stated difference, 
therefore, accounts for the outcomes and associated impact on regulatory independence.  
 
In both country contexts, the principal seeks to create conditions using procedural and 
democratic means, but results are ensured by appointing the ‘right’ agents, granting sufficient 
veto powers and requirements of notice/timing which the principal can then use to their 
advantage. The principal directs the actions of the agent to ensure preferred outcomes, but if the 
administrative or legal processes require accountability or consultation (public participation) the 
degree to which the principal can guarantee their preferred outcomes above possibly, conflicting 
public preference is limited.   
 
7.2.2. Vetoing the ICT policy and decision-making process  
 
State indecisiveness and policy stability are identified right at the onset of this study as key 
governance problems, which parliament by design contributes to. As observed by Tsebelis 
(2002) parliament is part of a constellation of veto players that influence policy stability. 
Knowing the preferences of veto players, the position of the status quo and the identity of the 
agenda setter enables predictable policy outcomes (Tsebelis (2002). However, with the 
legislative authority vested in a single institution and with numerous competing factions 





Increasing the number of veto points within a political system is a necessary condition for state 
indecisiveness and policy stability. In Kenya, the presidential system adopted post-2010 
introduced distinct separation of powers between the executive and the legislature through a 
devolved government and a bicameral parliament. Constitutional division of legislative powers 
between two houses (in both Kenya and SA) divides up this authority among the various actors 
in the national and subnational legislative process, introducing different decision-making rules 
and veto player configurations to support any policy changes. While establishing the checks and 
balances is meant to reduce the ability of a single faction to take advantage of state to achieve 
their preferences, parliament facilitates diversity of opinion and interest through the legislative 
process (Chapter 5).  
 
Both Kenya and SA have ensured that there is a separation of purpose among the various veto 
powers through establishing dedicated sector committees in parliament and positioning them as 
key players in ICT sector governance. In particular, the rotational appointment of parliamentary 
committee chairpersons represents a diversity of parliament holding positions of power to ensure 
no particular purpose holds supreme. Furthermore parliamentary practices implemented through 
the committee system have introduced diverse political actors with diverse interests into the ICT 
ecosystem distributing further the power structures. The diversity enforces the use of tradeoffs by 
politicians in the polity to act decisively and ensure all interests are captured. The following 
quote from one of the respondents captures the essence of how interests are dealt with at 
parliamentary level. 
 
“The diversity of interests from members leads the committee to generate gains 
from exchange and cooperation opportunities. Trade-offs become an important element 
of the exchange mechanisms and is often adopted by parties with sometimes unintended 
consequences that can backfire (personal interview, Cohen, South Africa, 2015)”.  
 
Increasing veto points increase transaction costs of negotiating with more people and having 
more deals to be struck before consensus is reached. Case in point is the appointment process 
followed by South Africa to appoint councilors on ICASA, the regulator. While the process is, 
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by de-facto, open and transparent a lot of trade-offs are negotiated and often with unintended 
outcomes, as South African respondent Cohen described:   
“… ICASA, in their submission, based their proposal on what is a commonly accepted trait that 
the ruling par, in this particular case because of trade-offs engaged in between the ruling and 
opposition parties the outcomes did not match the original intention of the regulator” (Cohen 
2015, personal interview).  
 
Political interference hampers progress as decisions are not based on market forces and policy 
outcomes but more inclined to serve the wishes of the dominant political group. Political parties 
and groupings within parliament are an additional veto point that introduces yet another diverse 
viewpoint as the opposition seeks to ensure its preferences are taken into account. This often 
leads to a plenary vote – and ultimate whipping and party political wrangling.  As a result, Acts 
enacted by parliament (CCK in Kenya and ICASA in SA) to create an enabling environment for 
the regulator to regulate the market and ensure sector performance, are often undermined by an 
appointment process that is not based on merit and interest, but party preferences.  Furthermore, 
if the area of specialty does not match party interests not, much attention is given to that 
committee in the party agenda.  
 
While successful policy implementation accommodates different actors’ policy preferences; the 
impact of political interference and conflicting goals of veto players is a divided government. 
The consequence of a divided government is unilateralism, with both the executive and 
parliament attempting to implement policy without the other’s cooperation resulting in policy 
logrolling and gridlocks. This is the case in Kenya where an executive-led process has resulted in 
legislative activities occurring within the ambit of the regulator, CCK, and in South Africa policy 
gridlock (disagreements on policy direction among parties in a committee) as can be observed as 
part of the parliamentary-led processes.  
 
Over and above being a politically motivated veto point parliament still has to battle with its 
legitimacy that ultimately influences its acceptance as a significant player in the sector. 
Stakeholder perception of parliament influences or constrains its exercise of power in the sector. 
Building this reputation depends on the capacity and effectiveness of mechanisms in place to 
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support decision-making processes. However in cases where the executive dominates, parliament 
ability to be effective is weakened by political party politics that undermine the importance of 
separation of powers and the independence required. More so the lack of institutional and 
technical capacity and knowledge to deal with ICT issues, especially at committee level, often 
results in confusion and delays in implementing legislative activities. 
 
The Parliament of South Africa is described as ‘custom based, significant and critical in policy 
shaping and as a custodian and sponsor of the legal framework’ (according to respondent 
Cohen), building a reputation that has influenced the seriousness with which certain 
organisations respond to parliament led interventions. Parliament of South Africa, through its 
committee systems, engages the Ministries of Communications and Telecommunications and 
Postal Services, its agents, civil society, operators and the citizenry as a whole as part of its 
decision-making process through written and oral submissions, public hearings, reports, and 
oversight visits. The Kenyan parliament, on the other hand, continues to battle with integrity 
issues, where some committee members expect ‘kickbacks’ (Transparency International, 2010) 
as a result of poor management of resources. There are reported low staffing levels, a limited 
number of committees, lack of time for scrutiny of proposed legislation and poor support from 
government agencies, which slow down committee work and undermine effectiveness (Africog, 
2013).  
 
Increasingly both formal and informal consultations with the private sector and civil society are 
making a significant impact on the decision-making process, especially as observed in the 
Parliament of South Africa. With regards to factors driving these consultations, it is evident that 
each party has a different reason for participating.  For the most part, the main reasons for 
engaging include lobbying, information dissemination, protecting investment interests and 
ensuring certainty and credibility.  While parliament seeks conformance with constitutional 
requirements to provide engagement with a broad range of stakeholders as part of the policy-
making process, the process is often viewed by the private sector as motivated by the needs of 




It is evident from an analysis of the two countries that presidentialism and parliamentarian 
promote differing arrangements for facilitating decision making. The results in both cases are the 
promotion of practices such as executive dominance that go against policy intentions. 
 
 
7.2.3. Linking interest groups to government agendas 
Key players such as civil society, the private sector, and regulators have vested interest in the 
reforms process and depend on the prevalence of an enabling environment to participate 
successfully. Theoretical underpinnings of this research suggest that ICT policy formulation 
requires the participation of a broad coalition of stakeholders that include government, business, 
academia, research organizations and civil society.  Empirical findings in Chapter 6 indicate that 
parliament links the different ICT sector stakeholders to government processes and solicits input 
through mechanisms such as public hearings, submissions, and calls for.  
 
Parliamentarians are mediators for constituents in dealings with government agencies and can 
either act individually or collectively to represent constituent interests in the policy-making 
process. Both Kenya and SA have a formal system that allows citizens to voice their concerns, 
issues and interests by working with the varied structures of parliament. Parliament is expected 
in return to utilizing structures, including through political party structures, to get input for 
decision making from those it represents. A significant difference between the two jurisdictions 
thus lies in the model for linking stakeholders to the government agenda. 
 
Parliament, through the committees, interfaces and collaborates with stakeholders on sector 
related issues, with potential for consolidating interests and enhancing principles of participation 
in the decision-making process. If individual legislators and committees are powerful, then 
interest groups need only influence at that level. However, political party interference (in the 
case of South Africa) or executive dominance (in the case of Kenya) has resulted in practices that 
undermine the multi-party and participatory structure of parliamentary processes to achieve party 




Both the interests and the stakeholders are diverse and vast, ranging from civil society lobbying 
for pro-poor access and civil liberties in order to address the causes of poverty in its various 
forms, to business that aims to make a profit from offering a service, and a government that is 
meant to facilitate all perspectives. The high stakes and diversity of players and diverse interests 
makes the sector very contentious, with interdependencies among key players influencing the 
interplay of power and consensus building.  This complex and contentious nature of the sector 
weakens the ICT legislative capacity.  
 
Formally through the committee system, parliament provides a political node for negotiating 
conflict.  In South Africa, parliamentary the emergence of engagement models has 
institutionalized participation and consultations to ensure parliament remains representative. In 
Kenya, according to questionnaire respondent Ndemo: 
Parliament deals with political issues on behalf of the Ministry and most 
importantly sponsors the legislative framework for the sector in parliament before 
the bills become an Act of Parliament”. 
 
The findings suggest that public participation, through defined engagement models and 
consultations, is critical for decision and policy making. The South African case presents an 
institutionalized engagement model that utilizes a parliamentary liaison office concept with 
senior managers from the private sector sitting in on committee meetings.  This model facilitates 
structured collection and aggregation of information from parliament and the expression of 
concerns, opinions and preferences of the stakeholders. This creates an important platform for 
requisite participation in the affairs of the country, thus holding the government to account for its 
actions. The existence of capacity and the repeated experiences gained within the parliament of 
South Africa has culminated into a public participation engagement model with predictable 
patterns of interaction. Key players within the ICT sector have confirmed the existence of a 
variety of mechanisms through which they engage the portfolio committees to make input on 
important matters for the sector. The engagements are both formal and informal, have a 




Kenya on the other hand, whilst acknowledging the importance of institutionalizing engagement 
models for the sector, still has very weak and basic structures in place and is yet to 
institutionalize any significant and repeatable public participation model. The impact of this is 
felt by both the civil society organizations and the private sector as they don’t feel that the 
parliament is responsive, nor does it create sufficient opportunities to receive input into the ICT 
policy making process. Civil society claimed that they often have to “pressure the committee into 
action”, according interview respondent Munyua in 2012 and media reports in 2015). 
 
The findings further suggest that parliament has become an important yardstick in guaranteeing 
certainty to investors that their investments are protected through a trusted legal framework. 
Parliament filters government information and decisions back to stakeholders through published 
information sources on debates and hearings.  It is in light of this that Parliamentary Monitoring 
Groups (PMOs) are emerging as an important alternative and reliable source of information on 
parliamentary proceedings and actions.  However, access to parliamentary information remains a 
common challenge even with such organizations as PMOs in existence, as there is a huge 
reliance on the accessibility and openness of parliament and often times there is resistance from 
within parliament to their activities.  The Kenyan case presents this very challenge. Despite 
having a similar organization like the one prominent in SA, the currency and reliability of 
parliamentary information is questioned by a number of stakeholders. Whilst SA seems to be 
making headways, the Kenyan case is different, as observed by representatives from both PMOs 
and civil society interest groups there.  
 
The SADC-PF standards prescribe that parliament should resolve conflicts among key players in 
the policy arena. This requires effectively utilization of the multi-party nature of the committee 
system.  This is evident in the South African case where both committees often meet to resolve 
conflict issues arising out of implementing policy directives.  Parliament uses its powers, 
subpoena government officials to gather evidence and input from the ministry and regulator on 
the issue of contention. Parliament is also well positioned to seek input from the rest of the 




7.3. Conclusions  
This chapter has provided a comparative analysis of the formal legal system and its play out in 
practice to influence ICT policy outcomes in Kenya and South Africa. The formal legal system 
shapes and defines political and power structures but is often underutilized and ineffective in 
influencing parliamentary effectualness. Different governments use the state instruments such as 
parliament in different ways - with some having no accountability, others interfere, and yet 
others forcing through decision - making on the basis of majority or consensus in national 
interest.  Whilst the decision making processes in the broader governance environment articulate 
the formal power structures, it is the legislative rules in parliament that then decentralize decision 
making to multi-party parliamentary committees, thereby offering an opportunity to deal with 
specialized and technical requirements of policy and law in this dynamic sector, away from the 
party and/or government leaders.  
 
The chapter identifies three significant practices that are firmly anchored and influenced by the 
governance and political environment within which the parliaments operate.  Firstly parliament 
structures the principal-agent relations at three levels: constituent, government ministry and 
government agency levels. Secondly, parliament is a veto point meant to provide checks and 
balances within existing sector veto configurations that are defined by the sector legal 
frameworks. Lastly parliament links interests groups to the government agenda and provides a 
negotiating platform for resolution of conflict.   
 
Parliamentary effectiveness is influenced by how the principal-agent relationship is structured to 
influence outcomes, among other political, legal, social and institutional factors. Formally the 
electoral system, which determines the constituency-parliament relationship, is a critical enabler 
for influencing policy outcomes by providing means for effective public participation based on 
the type of political system appropriate to the policy direction a country wants to pursue. It 
creates the necessary legitimacy that parliament requires to set it up for effectiveness. Any 
parliamentary consultations with stakeholders within this political system that are happening 
both formally and informally become key elements for ICT policy and decision making. The 
interplay between the formal powers of parliament and the practical exercise of these by 
government, especially when it has an overwhelming majority, means it is able to utilize  
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parliament, both as a veto point in the decision making process and to structure political 
participation and link interest groups to its agendas.  
 
The formal system established, and its play out in practice, influence to a large extent ICT sector 
arrangements for both Kenya and South Africa. In both countries, the nominal progress made in 
achieving policy objectives of increased affordable access to a wide range of ICTs is influenced 
by the level of legislative delegation to the regulator based on an internationally recognized 
reform model that has been adopted by both countries. In theory, the legal framework (Acts) 
guarantee regulatory independence from political influences in practice the reform model has 
failed to consider the institutional endowments in play at operational levels. This is compounded 
by the fact that inadequate institutional capacity and individual competencies of appointed 
regulators are a result of interference in the appointment processes by government and political 
parties, stemming from a system that is underutilized and ineffective.  The system assumes high 
political culture and ethos that influence patronage, and impacts on the exercise of autonomy of 
statutory institutions affecting accountability and transparency.  
 
The next chapter summarizes the main points of this comparative analysis to answer the research 












CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.0  Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the main points of a comparative analysis of parliamentary 
participation in the ICT sector reform in Kenya and South Africa and concludes this thesis with 
some recommendations. As policy research this thesis makes some policy and practice 
recommendations that are geared towards practicing parliamentary and ICT experts, government 
and parliament, besides demonstrating the original contribution of this work to the body of 
knowledge in the area of sectoral and institutional reform.   
 
The research problem identified in Section 1.3 contextualizes the limitations of political 
governance and institutional capacity hindering parliamentary participation in emerging 
infrastructure industries to meet the demands of a globalised economy, while ensuring universal 
access to services. Analyzing the effectiveness of parliamentary participation in ICT sector 
reforms has been guided by a primary question that sought to answer what role parliament plays 
in enabling or constraining ICT sector reform. To answer the primary question sub-questions 
relating to institutional and governance arrangements, political context, parliamentary 
mechanisms, policy practices, and capacity and knowledge levels of the ICT industry were 
examined in order to understand how these factors shape the participation of parliament in the 
ICT sector reforms process (see Section 1.4).  
 
 The solutions proposed by this research reflect a paradigm shift in the positioning and 
structuring of parliament as a significant political institution within the broader political and 
sector governance frameworks. The focus is directed toward the operationalization of 
parliamentary mandates through effective mechanisms, tools, practices that influence effective 







This chapter concludes the comparative analysis that has unpacked the determinants of 
parliamentary participation to understand the role parliament plays in developing infrastructure 
industries.  Using the cases of Kenya and South Africa, two countries that have become ICT 
leaders in Africa rising and declining respectively, and with relatively different political and 
colonial traditions, this study has brought to the fore critical insights that can shed light on the 
sector governance arrangements and internal designs at both a political and technical levels to 
influence outcomes within the ICT sector.  
 
8.1 Enabling ICT sector reforms 
ICT have a significant bearing on inclusive and sustainable development in the information era 
and as such have become a concern for public policy especially in developing countries. With 
this recognition most governments are implementing far-reaching sector reforms74 to respond to 
historically low telecommunications penetration rates. Both Kenya and South Africa have at least 
formally followed the orthodox ICT reform model that has resulted in the establishment of a 
regulator, liberalization of the market and at least partial privatization of the incumbent. As a 
result of these reforms not being fully implemented or getting the sequencing wrong the 
anticipated positive competitive outcomes and associated consumer welfare have in many 
respects not been realized. Although Kenya and South Africa perform relatively well on the 
continent, ICT sector reform in Africa still lags behind global averages75.  
 
However, increased democratic practices in Africa in recent years have influenced parliamentary 
                                                          
74 The reforms take the form of restructuring, de-monopolization, introduction of competition policies, encouraging 
private participation among other strategies giving rise to new regulatory laws, institutions, contracts, regimes, and 
processes, establishing new approaches to regulation (Jerome, 2002; Kessides, 2004; Noam, 2010).  
 
75 It has been observed (Chapter 1, § 1.1.2) that progress in achieving ICT objectives has been hindered by the 
inadequacy of the legal and regulatory environment; lack of capacity of relevant institutions to facilitate the 
liberalization of markets, with pervasive infrastructure, and a reduction in prices for ICT services; and the 
adoption of incorrect reform sequences and time frames which are in themselves influenced by a number of 
social, economic and political factors.      
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involvement in policy-making processes including that of ICTs shown in the findings of this 
thesis. Parliamentary participation is explained within the context of a complex and adaptive ICT 
ecosystem, it being part of a constellation of global and national institutions that determine 
national and sector outcomes (Chapter 2). The parliaments of Kenya and South Africa participate 
in setting national policy objectives, overseeing implementing agencies and shaping policy 
outcomes within the ICT sector. While the law provides them with legal standing, their 
effectiveness is constrained by a number of key challenges from political, ICT governance and 
internal institutional designs perspectives76. The thesis unearths several determinants77 of 
parliamentary performance that influence parliamentary participation. These set conditions that 
determine the basic relationship that parliament can pursue with meaningful impact in the sector 
to influence policy, facilitated by internal factors and designs that reinforce capacity.  
 
 Parliament is more than a neutral, legal structure and is positioned as a significant power broker 
and key political entity reflecting the competing interests of the various key players. These 
players and parliament are within a constellation and accumulation of different institutions with 
the capacity to intervene and make a decision in a complex regulatory policy undertaking within 
a complex ecosystem. Placing parliament at the center of the reforms provides insights into an 
understanding of the institutional structures and their effects on decision-making processes as 
relevant to achieving desired policy outcomes.  
 
 By establishing appropriate legislation and providing scrutiny of both process and outcomes 
parliament is meant to achieve regulatory accountability. The parliaments of Kenya and South 
Africa have both supported the reforms process through a legal environment established by 
                                                          
76 Challenges affecting parliamentary participation in influencing sector reforms include capacity for parliamentary 
accountability, parliamentary scrutiny, legislative delegation, and guaranteeing the independence of regulation 
(Chapter 2, § 2. 1).  
 
77 Determinants of parliamentary performance include the surrounding governance context within which it operates 
that defines the mandates of parliament, its relationship with other government arms and stakeholders; the level 
of institutional development and capacity that support effective committee systems and increase budgetary 
oversight capabilities; the ICT sector arrangements that define how, and why parliament should participate in 
sector reforms (Chapter 2, § 2.2).   
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enacting ICT laws, and facilitating regulatory governance processes to ensure public confidence, 
inclusiveness, and transparency in the sector. The effectiveness in practice of both parliaments is 
influenced extensively by political and institutional factors shaped by a political environment 
that define the formal/legal/constitutional roles and functions of parliament within the 
institutional arrangements of the state. 
 
The institutional structures of the sector can assume a variety of arrangements and models, 
(Chapter 2 § 2.2.3). The two most common approaches pursued are the supra-ministerial and 
ministerial approaches with a number of models under each78. The prevailing ICT sector 
arrangements of Kenya and South Africa are highly fragmented and decentralised following a 
ministerial-based model with policy functions distributed to several agencies. While this is 
reflective of a common approach used by most African countries mainly because of the 
immaturity of the market and other political factors, the adoption of this arrangement is 
influenced by an intention is to diffuse concentration of power and provide required checks and 
balances (Chapter 5, § 5.5).  
 
However, external decision making processes especially from a political governance perspective 
impact these sector arrangements in practice. The sequencing of the veto configurations within 
the sector open the process to manipulations as the different veto players seek to achieve their 
interests and the preferences of their masters resulting in executive and political parties 
dominating the outcomes. South Africa for example has de jure separation of powers yet de facto 
parliamentary decision-making is dominated by the executive through the overwhelming 
dominance of the party. The multiparty portfolio committee system in SA for example, tries to 
draw on the expertise of other parties, ideally to gain consensus through compromising in the 
national interest. But dominance of the ruling party is so strong that although it’s used to gain 
some level of consensus it often just put deadlocks to the vote.   
 
A hybrid methodology (outlined in Chapter 4) was applied to examine the existence of certain 
capacity elements required to implement parliamentary mandates, performance determinants and 
                                                          
78 Models institutional arrangements ( Chapter 2 § 2.3.2) 
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internal designs and structures that influence the capacity of parliaments to set policy objectives, 
oversee implementing agencies and contribute to ICT policy outcomes. The methodology 
emphasizes qualitative data and analysis combining a self-assessment survey by members of the 
ICT parliamentary committees, complemented by high-level interviews with key industry players 
and triangulated with findings from an extensive document analysis. The challenges encountered 
with data collection (Chapter 4 § 4.2.5) were mainly at the primary institution level in Kenya, 
reflecting how likely parliamentary institutions in presidential systems are closed in practice 
despite claims of openness and transparency on paper. This was further confirmed by other key 
participants from the sector who, even though available, often expressed lack of knowledge and 
capacity to respond to parliament related issues, an indication of very weak inferences and 
ambiguous patterns of exchange.  
 
The thesis identifies key elements critical for parliamentary participation. These are hinged upon 
formal legal and processes (see Chapter 5) that assigns parliament legislative authority and 
power anchored in a constitutional mandate to conduct representation, legislation and oversight. 
However the formal legal system that exists to shape and define political and power structures, is 
underutilized and ineffective in influencing parliamentary effectualness in both countries.  
Underlying political economic interests of key stakeholders and political interplay between the 
state institutions influence outcomes within the sector.  Effectiveness of parliament is hindered 
by a number of factors that include:   
 the  practice of principal-agent relationships that result in contradictions and inherent 
conflict; 
  inadequate internal design for inclusive participation that limits parliament’s ability to 
facilitate core legislative activities; 
  an executive and political party dominance that weakens parliamentary oversight; 
 insufficient parliamentary capacity and technical knowledge in the ICT sector which 
causes confusion and delays; and  
  an electoral system with constitutionally stipulated powers at stake (either directly or 




Section 8.2 makes observations that answer the research questions raised. 
  
8.2. Observations on findings 
Drawing on the political economy tradition and in particular historical institutionalism, and 
guided by a practical and realistic paradigm, this thesis explores how the underlying policy and 
legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and market conditions within developing countries 
have promoted or constrained parliamentary participation in ICT sector reforms. The thesis 
highlights a formal legal system that exists to shape and define political participation and the 
requisite power structures which is often underutilized and ineffective in influencing 
parliamentary effectualness. In practice the way the law plays out in the context of the 
constellation of rules and the internal incapacity of the relevant institutions, fails to guarantee the 
political space, political will, independence and legislative power required for effective, 
meaningful and sustainable participation of parliament in policy-making. The formal processes 
that exist are manipulated and maneuvered as political actors seek preferred outcomes. 
 
8.2.1 ICT policy outcomes  
The comparative analysis of Kenya and South Africa reveals different legal traditions that 
contribute to an understanding of the underlying policy and governance practices influencing 
parliamentary participation in sector reforms. The thesis has demonstrated that both countries 
have nominally made progress in implementing ICT sector reforms with increased access and 
low prices over time obtainable (Chapter 5 § 5.4.5) as reflected by global indicators placing the 
two countries in the top performing African countries category, Kenya on the rise, South Africa 
on the descent.  
 
Formally, the institutional arrangements sustain parliamentary participation in sector reforms as 
part of the broader national constitutional and institutional arrangements. In both cases the role 
of parliament in the sector development is anchored in legal frameworks as determined by the 
constitution and supported by the epistemic community through alignment with international 
standards. It is partly through implementing the legal and institutional architecture for the 
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parliament that national and international ICT legal frameworks79 (Chapter 5§5.4.4) have been 
set up to influence policy achievements over the years. However it is essentially the unofficial 
power relations that exist alongside the formal institutional arrangements that influence the level 
and quality of parliamentary participation. 
 
While the formal link between the national arrangements and those of the ICT sector exist, there 
are constraints that arise upon implementation that limit the effective participation of key 
stakeholders to influence outcomes. Both countries have overarching legislation with primary 
Acts (ECA, 2005 and KICA, 1998) implemented to support the reforms process and sector 
development. A separate Act in the case of South Africa, (ICASA, 2000) especially enacted to 
establish the regulator. In Kenya the primary act contains provisions for the establishment of the 
regulator Section 3 Kenya Communications Act, 1998). These laws are enacted to provide 
arrangements that reflect a constellation of institutions at a broader level of governance that can, 
with the right capacity, and in the absence of other political and economic factors such as 
executive and political dominance (South Africa) and fragmentation (Kenya) meaningfully 
influence sector outcomes.  
 
South Africa has in place a well-designed, parliament–led system that reflects compliance with 
formal legal systems and international reform mechanisms as required for appointing the 
regulator. While the ICT laws (ECA, ICASA) enacted provide the sector arrangements to be 
implemented, it is the local realities, economic interests, and the underlying political forces that 
limit the power of parliament to fulfill its functions and roles; and utilise the mechanisms, 
structures and processes to safeguard dominant interests. To ensure their preferred outcomes 
from the formal parliamentary processes the dominant party is able to use parliament as an 
intermediary between the principal, the executive for example, and agent, and an appointed 
regulator for example. In the end, a process which looks protracted and consultative on paper can 
be manipulated by strong political actors seeking to ensure preferred outcome. In the absence of 
a supportive framework, parliamentary processes are manipulated and fail to make government 
                                                          
79 Chapter 5 presented both countries as having set up overarching legal and institutional frameworks through the 




accountable. Over and above the incentives of the political actors, the veto configurations 
prevalent, and the internal capacity, all influence parliament’s inability to facilitate legislative 
process by failing to provide opportunities for the different interests to input into the legal 
processes.     
 
8.2.2 Parliament legitimacy and mandates  
Parliament is widely acknowledged by all key players in the sector as significant player (Chapter 
6 § 6.2.1), a power broker representing competing interests in policy formulation and 
implementation for the ICT sector.  However, its ineffectualness in fulfilling this role is Kenya 
and South Africa that is equally frustrating efforts to contribute meaningfully to sector outcomes. 
As a uniquely custom based institution, critical in shaping policy, parliament acts as both a 
custodian and a sponsor of the legal framework dealing with political issues on behalf of the 
government.  
 
Parliamentary practices evolving over the years, and described below, are used to implement the 
three traditional functions of representation, legislation, and oversight. Parliament advances 
effective political participation through structuring principal-agent relationships at three distinct 
levels80 (Chapter 7, §7.2.1), which influences the levels of participation by principals and agents 
interchangeably, while defining a political environment required to support growth of the sector.  
Both countries purport (Chapter 6, § 6.2.2) to have high levels of democratic participation with 
requirements and support structures set in an administrative justice framework. On paper, the 
processes often looked tedious and protracted with all the checks and balances in place to ensure 
compliance with formal legal systems and international reform mechanisms as required. 
However, the reality reflects rather the dominance of ruling party and/or executive ensuring 
                                                          
80 Chapter 7, through a comparative analysis , identifies three levels of principal-agent relationship as: (1) occurs 
when citizens’ delegate decision making to members of parliament specifically through a constitutional mandate 
with power to set constitutional rules and to replace members of parliament at election time; (2) internal 
organisation of the executive and parliament through creating ministerial positions as well as the committee and 
agenda control mechanisms, structuring the composition of parliament and determining whether or not cabinet 
members sit in parliament; (3) delegation to various agents specifically to the regulator by parliament through 




preferred outcomes for ICT sector processes such as legislation and appointment of the regulator.  
This is a clear case of the failure of regulatory models developed on best practices to take into 
account local realities and institutional endowments in the country which influence the 
procedures and approaches taken upon implementation. 
 
Structuring of principal-agent relationships by parliament drives participation levels of key 
stakeholders within the policy arena, defining a political environment that supports the 
development of the sector in a particular way. Furthermore, by exercising veto powers over the 
decision-making processes (Chapter 7 § 7.2.1) of the sector parliament contributes towards 
achieving policy stability. However, the roles and responsibilities of the different veto players 
and the aggregation rules (how decisions are made) are not effectively implemented, in 
countries, resulting in lengthy legislative processes that reflect conflict among key stakeholders 
(South Africa) and executive dominance (Kenya).  
 
Parliament serves as the link between interest groups and the government agenda as it mediates 
on behalf of stakeholders with government agencies. The high stakes and diverse interests of the 
different stakeholders make the sector contentious, with interdependencies that influence 
interplay of power and consensus building; this can effectively weaken the ICT legislative 
capacity. Stakeholder interests vary. Economic interests to protect investments from disruptions 
provide the motivation for private sector engagement with parliament. Private sector is also 
motivated by a need to provide committees with sector related information to solve the capacity 
gap and likely information asymmetry if parliament becomes highly dependent on information 
from the executive. Social interests driving civil society to insist on political solutions to the 
digital divide. It is through parliament that the voices of stakeholders represented by KICTANET 
in Kenya are expressed. KICTANET as multi stakeholder grouping of people and institutions 
with varied interests in ICT development in Kenya is a powerful platform that exerts pressure on 
parliament and government to respond to current issues. Similarly in South Africa, parliament 
was a useful link in the discussions around the cost of communication and termination rate. The 
engagement with stakeholder made it possible for parliament to engage and ultimately represent 
competing interests in seeking a solution that influenced government agenda, bringing down the 
cost significantly.  
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8.2.3 Wider governance arrangements  
Institutional arrangements at the national and sector levels influence parliamentary participation 
in a number of ways. When veto power is exercised by government on an agent such as the 
regulator, it is expected that parliament has the ability to guarantee independence from political 
influence.  While delegating state power to a regulatory agent rationalises the number of 
institutions involved in the ICT decision making process, it increases the number of veto points, 
introducing duplication. Kenya’s ICT sector is highly fragmented with dispersion of 
responsibilities distributed in different agencies with little coordination; huge overlaps amongst 
key players81 and no formalised relationships between the regulator Communications Authority 
for Kenya CA, and other agencies such as the Monopolies and Prices Commission; which has 
resulted in no mechanism to regulate competition in the industry. Having a bicameral system of 
parliament and a federated government has increased the fragmentation even more as decisions 
required more stakeholders to input into the process, increasing the transaction costs and 
lengthening the legislative processes.   
 
While the formal legal system confers parliament with the required constitutional power to 
implement related policy mandates through defined functions, structures, mechanisms, and 
processes, these are arguably ineffective in ICT policymaking. The inadequacy of the legal 
environment of the ICT sector reforms continues to be recorded in literature. There are several 
possible reasons for this. It could be an indication that in practice parliament has not 
implemented or has encountered challenges that could affect the ability to implement its role as 
required. Alternatively, perhaps in some cases such as in South Africa it reflects rather a lack of 
agency capacity and competency and other problems affecting implementation, but also, possibly 
market forces that have been left to define who participates. 
 
                                                          
81 Overlaps exist between the national communications secretariat and Kenya ICT board with respect to advisory 
services to government on ICT issues. More overlaps found in the implementation of key E-government 
applications by the Kenya ICT Board and e-government directorate with no clear coordination. Yet more 
overlaps exist in the implementation of universal access projects by the ICT Board with no clear coordination 
with CCK which has the universal access mandate. 
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8.2.4 Parliamentary capacity 
The legal and technical capacity of parliament is a significant factor influencing parliamentary 
participation, especially when decision making in a sector is fragmented and with an executive 
that is likely to be dominant (Chapter 5, § 5.5).The capacity of parliament resides within the 
committee system that has dedicated responsibility for the ICT sector.  An analysis of the 
different capacity requirements of committees in Chapter 6 determined key parliamentary 
practices apply to the ICT sector to reveal a wide range of factors for understanding the realities 
of parliamentary participation. Of importance is that insufficient ICT capacity and technical 
knowledge cause confusion and delays, while the inadequate internal design for achieving 
inclusive participation limits parliament ability to facilitate core legislative activities. 
 
The empirical findings further show underpinning parliamentary challenges relating to internal 
designs and capacity as well as broader governance problems that influence or constrain the 
participation of parliament in sector processes. Principal-agent relationships often result in 
contradictions and inherent conflict.  Political party dominance influences the agendas of 
parliament, raising the question of the legitimacy of the committee system as a multiparty entity 
affecting the essence of participation and effectively not upholding public interests. 
Parliamentary processes become relatively seamless when the executive interferes with the 
decision-making processes and party preferences are filtered through ruling party dominated 
committees and whipping practiced to ensure favorable outcomes. The case of SA shows the 
African National Congress as the ruling party in South Africa conferred with legitimacy through 
an election. However, the exercise of the majority has undermined consensus building at the 
committee level, and arguably the input from the public process is simply overruled. 
 
8.2.5 Emerging challenges  
In practice there a number of challenges parliaments have to contend with in implementing their 
role. A huge burden comes from executive dominance that often results in political parties 
overstepping their formal bounds of oversight to ensure preferred outcomes. Outcomes are 
further influenced by how the electoral system impacts and influences MPs incentives to 
determine actions, with a parliamentary system seeking party votes and a presidential system 
seeking individual votes.  In the latter case, it is common for MPs to use the position to influence 
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development within their constituencies as this will get them re-elected.  By the nature of the 
political system MPs in Kenya have substantial incentives to compete against one another, 
promoting intra-party competition and influencing sector outcomes. The South Africa system, on 
the other hand, is party centered; voters have no ability to affect which of the party candidates, 
actually represent them in parliament cultivating mainly party votes and being less of incentive at 
the individual level of MPs.  
 
Structural conflict of interests undermining positive policy impacts the ability of parliament to 
act in the broader interests of the sector, or even the economy as a whole, without affecting 
negatively on party interests.  This is revealed in outcomes such as the Minister in South Arica 
being responsible for the appointment of the regulator, on the advice of parliament, with the 
incumbent, with the state a significant shareholder in the incumbent. 
 
The institutional fragmentation within the sector has not served the sector well in either country; 
rather it has resulted in arrangements that are less of a safeguard against centralized decision-
making than as a check on delegated power. The veto powers assigned to parliament in the ICT 
policy-making process has created serious regulatory bottlenecks, with critical sector policies or 
regulations, such as spectrum or termination rates in South Africa and competing international 
gateways for a long time in Kenya, being delayed in parliament for months and even years.  It 
then takes the interested bodies to lobby the committees around decisions in accordance with the 
public processes required by law.   
 
While the committee system supports effective scrutiny and accountability of government 
actions as well as provides opportunities for public engagement and involvement in the reforms 
process, parliament does not always have the capacity to exercise fully its powers to hold the 
government to account. This insufficient institutional and technical capacity results in the limited 
utilization of established mechanisms, tools and processes that would build consistent practices 
to facilitate sector outcomes. This lack of capacity results in confusion and delays in 
implementing legislative activities. The bill review and hearing processes of both countries 
provide a good example of how insufficient capacity influence parliamentary participation and, 
consequently, sector outcomes. There is rarely sufficient time allocated to it to effectively 
241 
 
support citizen involvement and gathering of evidence from the executive.  Furthermore, there is 
no capacity to track the impact of legislation and power to send back legislation to the executive 
for review effectively. Parliaments end up just rubber stamping in a bid to meet policy 
requirements.  
 
8.3 Contributing to theory and practice of parliamentary and ICT sector development  
Utilizing a political economy perspective and, in particular, that of historical institutionalism 
(Immergut, 1998) and drawing from the concept of neopatrimonialism (Mkandawire,2013; 
O’Neil,2007) this thesis has highlighted the role played by parliament in facilitating or stifling 
ICT sector reforms.  This thesis contextualizes institutional analysis in the specific political and 
economic circumstances of the two countries in order to understand the relevance of parliament 
in sector reforms. It reveals how the constellation of the institutions operating within a complex 
ICT ecosystem, in which parliament is centrally located, enable or constraint the ecosystem’s 
self-restoring adaptation to its dynamic conditions. In this way the thesis extends the research of 
existing institutional, regulatory and ICT ecosystem work traditionally applied in the area of 
ICTs (Levi & Spiller, 1996; Immergut, 1998; Gillwald, 2002, 2009, 2011) by highlighting the 
significant role parliament plays in policy and reform but with institutional challenges that can 
constrain its effective participation. It does so through a comparative analysis of Kenya and 
South Africa, which confirms parliament as a significant political institution and key veto player 
in constraining and influencing the realization of policy outcomes.   
 
It is the contention of this thesis that parliament as a representative democratic institution 
becomes ineffectual if it is not properly mandated and capacitated to structure political 
participation in policy making. Major hindrances to parliamentary participation are identified as 
unsupportive institutional arrangements for parliamentary participation, both within the broader 
constitutional and legal framework and within the ICT sector context, which determines the 
institutional relationships (Chapter 1§1.3). The comparative analysis showed that while 
parliament is confirmed formally as a significant player in ICT sector development, in practice, 
its ineffectualness is a cause of negative or suboptimal policy outcomes. Parliament is critical for 
ensuring political participation through structuring principal-agent relationships, as well as 
vetoing the decision making the process to provide the necessary checks and balances and 
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ensuring that stakeholders’ interests are linked with government agendas.  
 
The insights yielded in this thesis make practical contributions that provide opportunities for 
intervention in national policy and practices, and that would guarantee parliament fulfills its 
democratic functions of legislation, oversight and representation effectively. Furthermore this 
thesis can be used as a foundation for theorising about the role of parliament in the institutional 
arrangements of regulated sectors in Africa. Clearly the transposition of current political and 
parliamentary theories patterned from western models to African governance is problematic 
(Chapter 3 Section 3.2).The western model alone fails to take into account the traditional and 
patrimonial underpinnings of the African context that define the behavior, attitude and decision 
making practices of political actors, the legitimacy of political institutions, and the power 
relations that determine them. Although the analysis of these two cases highlights the importance 
of context which makes them in many ways not generalisable, the findings and conclusions do 
highlight key common informal relations, impacting the nature of the African state and its formal 
institutions such as parliament. These include political and colonial conditions, political interests, 
traditional power structures, informal power and practices, political legitimacy. Building on these 
findings existing theory in relation to the institutional analysis of regulated sectors in developing 
countries could be extended within the political economy tradition.  
 
On the basis of this the section below proposes a set of recommendations that if implemented 
would enable parliament to fulfill its role more effectively, with more public interested outcomes 
for the sector and the nations.  
 
8.4 Recommendations  
This thesis recommends that the mandate of parliament in ICT sector development be clearly 
articulated to ensure it has the authority to structure political participation and effectively carry 
out its functions. Specifically, governance structures, processes, and parliamentary practices 
should evolve in the following aspects to effectively fulfill the mandates: 
 




1. Effective parliamentary participation in sector reforms requires that constitutional 
mandates and the ensuing arrangements be clear, safeguarded, reinforced and upheld 
within the ICT sector.  It is these mandates that define the extent of application of 
legislative power by parliament. The mandate also defines relational and power structures 
that parliament can utilise to structure its engagement with key stakeholders whose 
interest it represents.  As argued by interview respondent Barandse when parliament has 
power and authority to influence ICT sector development, it is taken seriously by the 
interested parties. While this is achieved though getting the legal environment right, it 
should be balanced with the autonomy that parliament enjoys making decisions on 
sectoral issues that do not necessarily reflect political party affiliation or the preference of 
the executive. Institutional arrangements defined in the broader governance within the 
confines of the constitution should, as Ostrom (2009) argues, allow for effective political 
participation in policy making at the operational level.  Parliament should thus lead in 
ensuring the transparency and accountability required to implement the constitution 
through better representation and improved public engagement.  
2. Decision-making rules for the ICT sector defined in legal frameworks must clearly 
articulate the role of parliament in monitoring and enforcing sector arrangements as is the 
case in South Africa. Such clarity facilitates effective implementation and sequencing of 
veto configurations decisions to manage potential conflicts that would otherwise result in 
unintended outcomes. The laws, upon implementation, should reflect public interests and 
provide adequate opportunities for citizens to input into any legislative process. These 
opportunities should be contained in the rules of procedure or other law/ instrument that 
are made public. 
3. ICT is a particularly dynamic and complex sector, the need for dedicated committees is 
essential.  Through dedicated committees parliaments ensure timely establishment of 
legal (acts, bills and laws) and a regulatory (regulatory governance regime and the 
regulatory substance) environment that facilitate an effective reform process. Through the 
committees, parliament effectively provides the requisite checks and balances to assure 
policy outcomes.  However, the lack of capacity of parliament to fulfill the mandate 
requires attention. Training and knowledge are required to build the capacity of the 
committees. Internal mechanisms defined in Chapter 5 and decision making processes 
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evidenced in chapter 6 should allow for effective participation of all stakeholders 
including minority groups and opposition parties. 
4.  ICTs are an international market increasingly with global governance and players. 
Implementing national policies as if they can be insulated from international 
developments defeats sector development. The limited knowledge and participation of 
parliament in international occurrences needs to be addressed as often the process is 
predominantly executive-led. This has ramifications for the domestication/ratification 
process for international instruments, which becomes a prerogative of parliament as often 
there is information asymmetry between the two government bodies. The participation of 
parliaments in the international governance arena is recommended to ensure sufficient 
capacity and knowledge to implement international instruments as required.  
 
8.4.2 Internal designs and parliamentary practices  
The internal designs of parliament constrain or influence its effective participation in ICT sector 
development in a number of ways. The internal design and parliamentary practices should evolve 
in the following manner:  
1. Effective representation is required for setting of national policy objectives. 
Representation depends heavily on the ability of parliament to be accessible. 
Accessibility depends to a large extent on the degree of openness and transparency that 
drives public knowledge and understanding of parliament’s work.  From an internal 
design perspective, effective representation requires parliamentary frameworks, 
strategies, and processes that promote citizens’ knowledge and understanding of the role 
that MPs play in the ICT policy-making process. Guidelines in the rules and procedures 
and/or other laws should govern the relationship between parliament and other related 
institutions. This will increase public participation in parliamentary processes and be 
supported in the wider governance context through electoral systems that clearly define 
position (set of positions or roles that participants assume) and boundary (entry and exit) 




2. Decision making rules that design veto configurations in the sector should allow for 
effective utilizations of veto power by parliament to assure policy outcomes.  This will 
ensure parliament’s internal decision making processes through different mechanism and 
tools in place to mediate political conflicts based on norms and rules that support making 
of public policy decisions, such as participation of minority groups and opposition 
parties. In most cases the power of the parliament to make laws is in the constitution, but 
what’s often lacking is the implementation power which provides adequate opportunities 
for citizens to input into any legislative process. These opportunities should be contained 
in the rules of procedure or other law/ instrument and made public 
3. ICT committee should be established with the sole mandate to review ICT policy issues. 
This will allow building expertise in this area to facilitate the critical examination of 
issues. Committees allow parliament to build its capacity to participate effectively in a 
legislation process that often emanates from outside the institution.  Appointment of 
membership to the committees should take into account interests and existing knowledge 
in the area of specialty. Where it does not exist parliament should invest in creating that 
specialty.  With the capacity and knowledge, parliament should then be provided with 
sufficient time to review a bill, with at least three months lead time.  This will result in an 
effective bill review and hearing process that supports citizen involvement and gathering 
of evidence from the executive.  Furthermore the ability to amend legislation and bills 
and track the impact of the legislation will be enhanced once parliament can send back 
legislation to the executive for review.   
4. The internal designs of parliament, through reforming rules and procedure, should enable 
the oversight function to be performed by all sector- related committees as well as other 
special committees. For effectiveness, these committees must be conferred with 
investigative powers enshrined in the rules of procedure or other laws, and regularly 
enforced by implementation processes including budgetary aspects. Based on the position 
rules set, committees can, without prejudice, confidently call for special audits or invite 
officers of respective state owned enterprises to testify before them as required. With 
sufficient mechanisms in place, committees should be able to obtain information from the 
Executive, without fear of state capture, to exercise its oversight function in a meaningful 
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way. Where possible oversight committees should be adequately resourced with a 
separate budget to undertake their activities. Due to the multiparty nature of oversight 
committees, it is the entity that can provide meaningful opportunities for 
minority/opposition parties to engage in effective oversight of government expenditures. 
5. Parliament requires institutional support to be effective in the conduct of its mandate. In 
this respect parliament should be enabled to exercise its power to determining of its 
budget for the year which the executive cannot vary.  Ability to determine its budget will 
facilitate parliament to secure adequate logistics capacity and resources including office 
space to enable it to perform its functions.  Where constituency development funds are 
available for constituency projects, it should be independently managed by the Member 
of Parliament.  Where applicable parliament should follow a structured system for 
receiving technical and advisory assistance from external sources. 
8.4.3 A missing capacity dimension- reinventing parliament for outcomes 
There is a missing capacity dimension in parliamentary development which may be a candidate 
for future research.  This is informed by what respondent Cohen referred to as the “lack of 
tangible outcomes from the entire work parliament does”. The development of a results based 
management capability would provide a proactive approach and a coherent framework that 
utilizes a disciplined methodology such as offered by the ISO standards to solve the problem of 
intangible results and reinvent parliament for the outcome and accountability. A disciplined 
approach will facilitate the institutionalization of required engagement models and patterns of 
interaction that lead to predictable outcomes for parliamentary participation in policy making.  
8.5  Conclusions 
Weak institutional arrangements and designs in both Kenya and South Africa are identified as 
limiting the participation and independence of parliament from the executive and sometimes 
industry, both of which can compromise parliamentary oversight and visionary leadership 
expected from specialized portfolio committees. In South Africa, the reason is an underlying 
parliamentary system that promotes the political party and executive dominance which 
undermine parliamentary processes in order to achieve party preferences and control policy 
outcomes.  In Kenya, while the combination of distinct separation of powers and a constituency 
based electoral system provide a legal basis for parliamentary participation, the highly 
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fragmented sector arrangements compounded by a lack of internal capacity to implement 
mechanisms constrain parliament’s participation.   
 
In concluding this chapter, this thesis recognises two significant parliamentary practices that can 
be generalized to infrastructure industries. The establishment of dedicated parliamentary 
committees as a structure of parliament that both links key stakeholders with government agenda 
and is a useful source of information on government priorities82 to provide investors with a 
degree of credibility and certainty required for decision-making. Committees are an important 
determinant of effective parliamentary participation and accountability to the citizenry, at least 
through formal electoral process. 
 
It is at committee system level that engagement models are institutionalized as mechanisms to 
increase participation and allow effective consultation. In this way, parliament remains 
representative of public interest. In the absence of institutionalized models, such as the Kenya 
case, engagement remains unstructured, with the continued outcry from key stakeholders in the 
sector83. The effectiveness of the committees is, however, influenced by political and social 
factors that include political party dominance and inadequate capacity to utilise tools at its 
disposal.  Political party dominance influences outcomes based on party preferences that do not 
take into account public interests and technical requirements of the sector. Furthermore, the 
institutional arrangements within the broader governance limit committee participation with 
independence from the executive and sometimes the industry compromising the oversight role of 
                                                          
82 Chapter 6 revealed the importance to stakeholders of the information that resides in parliament to an extent that 
high level delegations, at the level of CEO, sit in proceedings as the information available from parliament is 
relevant in shaping their strategies. Furthermore, the use of a parliamentary liaison office is becoming 
institutionalized, specifically in South Africa. 
 
83 A number of media reports showing key stakeholders are not consulted. See links below:  
http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/256-kenya/235462-kenya-stakeholders-squabble-over-ict-
dominance (accessed 26/11/2015). 
 http://allafrica.com/stories/201511180525.html  http://www.telecompaper.com/news/tespok-seeks-involvement-in-






Key to effective participation is having clear, safeguarded, reinforced and upheld constitutional 
mandate and arising institutional arrangements within the sector both formally and informally. 
Such arrangements provide parliamentary leverage within the sector allowing for the effective 
fulfilment of its oversight, legislative, and representation functions. While legislative power is 
legally derived from the constitution, in, practice it is highly dependent on key stakeholders’ 
perceptions of parliament. With the appropriate mandate parliament can manage political 
interests by structuring the principal agent relationships, vetoing ICT policy and decision-making 
processes, linking interest groups to government and party agendas, resolving conflicts and, 
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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND PROTOCOL  
Documents 
Reviewed 
South Africa Kenya 
Primary 
Documents 
The Constitution of  the Republic of 
South Africa (1996) 
Rules of Procedure for National 
Assembly, South Africa 
Terms of Reference of Committees 
Responsible for ICTs for Parliament 
of South Africa 
The Constitutions of the Republic of 
Kenya (2010) 
Rules of Procedure for Kenya 
National Assembly 
Terms of Reference of Department 




 Parliament of SA Website 
 Parliament of SA Strategic Plan, 
2014 
 Oversight Model,2009 
 Oversight and Accountability 
Model in South Africa,2009 
 Kenya National Assembly 
Website 
 Africog Report (2013) 
 Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights report (2012) 
 Elections, Representations and 
the New Constitution, Society for 
International Development(2011) 
 SID Constitution Working Paper 
Series No 1(2010)  
 Murray C (2010) Kenya’s 2010 
Constitution 
 Working Structures of 
Parliaments in East Africa,2010  
 African Parliamentary Index 
(API) Report (2012) Round 2 
Country Self-Assessment  
(Kenya), 
 Measuring Parliamentary 
Performance - The African 
Parliamentary Index 
(API)(2013), A Summary Report 
of the API Round II Assessments 
in Seven African Countries.  
 Parliamentary Centre. (2011). 
Africa Parliamentary Index 
(API): A Report for Seven 
African Parliaments, 







South Africa Kenya 
Legal 
framework 
Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act  
ICASA Act. (2000). 
Kenya Communications Act 
 
ICT data and 
information  
 PMG Committee reports , 
minutes and presentations  
 Committee Reports of 
Committees Responsible for 
ICTs  
 Hansard (debate records) of the 
Parliament of South Africa 
 Comparative ICT Sector 
Performance Review (RIA 
2009/2010);  
 ICT Sector Performance Reviews 
of South Africa (RIA 2009/2010) 
 ITU ICT Indicators Database  
 ICT Strategies / Action Plans 
/ICT Policy guideline of the 
Ministries Responsible for ICTs 
in South Africa Withdrawal of 
Regulations relating to 
Interconnections and Facilities, 
2000. 
 Overview of electronic 
communications regulation in 
South Africa 
 ICT Sector Review, 2010 
 ICT Strategies / Action Plans 
/ICT Policy guideline of the 
Ministries Responsible for ICTs 
in Kenya  
 Comparative ICT Sector 
Performance Review (RIA 
2009/2010);  
 ICT Sector Performance Reviews 
of Kenya (RIA 2009/2010) 




 World Economic Forum Report 
 SADC Protocol on Transport communications and meteorology  
 Regional e-government framework( East Africa) 
 Guidelines on Interconnection and access for telecommunications 
networks and services within the East African Community 
 Global Governance processes, frameworks and protocols 
 SADC PF- Self Assessment Toolkit, 2012 
 Africa Parliamentary Index Report 2012 














Questionnaire respondents  High level Interviews 
Parliament 
representatives  
1. South Africa- Mbombo Maleka 
representing Hon Sikhumbuzo 
Kholwane, Chairperson of 
Communications Committee (4th 
Parliament)  
2. South Africa- Hon Mmamoloko 
Kubayi Kunene, Chairperson 
Telecommunications & Postal 
Services ( 5th Parliament) 
3. Kenya - Used raw data from 
similar survey conducted in 
2012 by the Parliamentary 
Centre 
 
Regulators Willie Currie, ex Commissioner, 
Independent Communications Authority 
of SA  
Mercy Wanjau, Communications 
Authority of Kenya 
Mercy Wanjau, Communications 
Authority of Kenya, September 2013 
Private Sector  Anonymous1, CellC 
Anonymous 2, CellC 
Dominic Cull, Regulatory Advisor, 
ISPA   
Tracy Cohen, Chief Corporate Services 
Officer, Neotel,  March 2015; 
Andrew Barandse, Legal Affairs Director, 
Vodacom South Africa, March 2015 
Experts and former 
government 
officials  
Ndemo, Former Permanent Secretary  
Keith Weeks, EX -Competition 
Commission 
 
Civil Society  
organisations  
Rashaad Alli, PMG 
Conrad Akunga,  Mzalendo 
Jessica Musila, Mzalendo 
 
Rashaad Alli, PMG, March 2015; 




APPENDIX 2:  QUESTIONNAIRE 
FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION:  WHAT ROLE DOES PARLIAMENT PLAY IN 
ENABLING OR CONSTRAINING ICT SECTOR REFORM? 
Discussion Questions  
1. To what extent is power vested in parliament?  
2. What have been the main areas where you have required parliamentary intervention? 
How has parliament received your requests?  
3. Do you feel parliament engages private sector sufficiently? How could this be improved? 
Does parliament adequately provide private sector with opportunities to input into the 
legislative process 
4. Do you have a parliament liaison office?  If so what motivated its establishment? What 
are the activities for this office? How has parliament received this? 
5. How do different interest groups outside government (e.g. private sector, NGOs, 
consumer groups, the media) seek to influence policy? 
6. How effective is parliament as a forum for debate on questions of public concern 
7. Does parliament have a recognized constitutional role in the ICT Policy making process? 
Is the power of the parliament to make laws contained in the Constitution? 
8. In your opinion does parliament have a role to play in ICT sector development? What 
role is it?  
9. Do MPs consult their constituents and represent their interests in the ICT policy making 
process 
10. Does parliament influence government decisions and behaviour in ICT matters? 
11. Do oversight committees exercises sufficient oversight of the expenditures of state owned 
enterprises through calling for special audits or inviting officers of respective state owned 
enterprises to testify before them. 
 
SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION: TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE TWO COUNTRIES 
IMPLEMENTED ICT SECTOR REFORMS AND WITH WHAT OUTCOMES? 
Discussion Questions  
1. How the sector is financed (e.g. public-private partnerships, user fees, taxes, donor 
support)? What is the balance between public and private ownership? 
2. What are the dominant ideologies and values which shape views around the sector? To 
what extent may these serve to constrain change? 
3. What reform sequence has each country followed? 
4. What are the policy trends for price and access over the last 5 years  
5. How has Kenya/SA fared on the global rankings for ICT  
6. How have international developments influenced sector reforms? Which International 





THIRD RESEARCH QUESTION:  HOW HAS THE SURROUNDING GOVERNANCE 
CONTEXT (NATURE OF STATE AND IT RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER 
STAKEHOLDERS AND THE MARKET; EXTENT OF POLITICAL SPACE; IMPACT OF 
GLOBAL VILLAGE) SUPPORTED OR CONSTRAINED THE EFFECTIVE 
PARTICIPATION OF PARLIAMENTS IN INFLUENCING ICT SECTOR REFORMS?  
Discussion Questions  
1. How are decisions made within the sector? Who is party to these decision-making 
processes? 
2. What are the decision making rules guiding who makes decisions when and how in ICT? 
Who is the custodian of these rules?   
3. Once made, are decisions implemented? Where are the key bottlenecks in the system? Is 
failure to implement due to lack of capacity or other political economy reasons? 
4. Do political parties mobilize and organize their members to participate in the ICT policy 
process? 
5. Is the relationship between parliament, CSOs and other related institutions governed by 
clear guidelines in the Rules and Procedure and or other laws?  
6. Do the procedure and or other laws provide entry points for civil society and other 
stakeholders to make input into the work of parliament 
7. How effectively can parliament scrutinize appointments to posts and hold their occupants 
to account 
8. Who conducts the oversight function of parliament? Is it performed by all sector related 
committees and other special committees?  Do these committees have investigative 
powers over implementation issues including budgetary issues? Are these powers 
enshrined in the rules of procedure or other laws and are regularly enforced? 
9. How adequately does the composition of parliament represent the diversity of political 
opinion in the country (as reflected membership of committees)?  
10. How are members assigned to Committees?  
11. Is parliament open to citizens and the media? Is this guided by a framework and 
communication strategy of parliament? Does a communication strategy exists and does it 
focus on accessibility by citizens and the media? Is there pressure from organized groups 
to make parliament more open? 
12. Is the power of the parliament to make laws contained in the constitution or convention 
or Act or has no legal backing  
13. Do oversight committees exercises sufficient oversight of the expenditures of state owned 
enterprises through calling for special audits or inviting officers of respective state owned 




FOURTH RESEARCH QUESTION: DO INTEREST GROUPS (GOVERNMENT, 
INDUSTRY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY) ACCEPT PARLIAMENTARY LEGITIMATION IN 
THE SECTOR REFORMS?  TO WHAT EXTENT HAS PARLIAMENT APPLIED ITS 
LEGISLATIVE, REPRESENTATIVE, OVERSIGHT AND BUDGETARY MANDATES TO 
INFLUENCE ICT REFORM PROCESSES? 
Discussion Questions  
1. Do you feel you are getting on-going and consistent parliamentary support to achieve 
your objectives? What would be your suggestions for improvements? 
2. How often and through what means do you engage with parliament? Is this an 
institutionalised process?  
3. Does parliament promote citizen's knowledge and understanding of the role of MPs in the 
ICT policy-making process? Are there carefully structured processes to support this?  
4. Are there mechanisms to promote public understanding of the work of parliament? Is this 
supported by a carefully structured process? In the absence of mechanisms does 
parliament make an attempt to promote public understanding of its work at all? 
5. Who conducts the oversight function of parliament? Is it performed by all sector related 
committees and other special committees?  Do these committees have investigative 
powers over implementation issues including budgetary issues? Are these powers 
enshrined in the rules of procedure or other laws and are regularly enforced? 
6. Does the ICT Committee and other committees hold public hearings on ICT policies in 
which evidence from the Executive and the public is taken  
7. Does parliament provide the required framework to support growth of the ICT Sector? 
How can this be improved? 
8. Does parliament have power to amend bills? With or without limitation?  
9. Do adequate opportunities exist for citizens to input into any legislative process? Are 
these opportunities contained in the rules of procedure or other law/ instrument and made 
public 
10. Can parliament amend a bills without limitations or requires the consent of the Executive 
through the relevant ministry? 
11. Who manages the constituency development fund used for development projects in the 
constituency? Are there any ICT projects initiated? 
12. Do adequate mechanisms exist for parliament to track legislations that has been enacted?  
Is this supported with access to resources to provide evidence on the impact of ICT 
legislation? 
13. Are the rules and procedure and or other laws empowering parliament to send back 




FIFTH RESEARCH QUESTION: HOW HAVE EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, 
POLITICAL COMPETENCY, AND SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE LEVELS WITH 
REGARD TO ICT, WITHIN PARLIAMENT ENABLED OR HAMPERED ITS 
PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPING ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR ICT SECTOR 
REFORMS?  
Discussion Questions  
1. Do MPs have the knowledge and skills to participate effectively in the ICT Policy 
making process? 
2. Does parliament provide opportunities for MPs to improve their knowledge and skills 
3. Do political parties assign parliamentary responsibilities to Members based on their 
knowledge and skills? 
4. Does parliament have an ICT committee with the sole mandate to review ICT policy 
issues? 
5. Are there sufficient mechanisms for committees to obtain information from the executive 
to exercise its oversight function in a meaningful way? Can the committees request and 
receive response on actions taken by the executive on the Committees/Parliaments 
recommendations and is this supported by adequate powers in law  
6. Does parliament determine its own budget for the year which the executive cannot vary? 
Are oversight committees adequately resourced to undertake their activities with a 
separate budget 
7. Do Oversight committees provide meaningful opportunities for minority/opposition 
parties to engage in effective oversight of government expenditures 
8. Parliament has adequate logistics including office space to enable it perform its functions 
9. Who manages the constituency development fund used for development projects in the 
constituency? 
10. Parliament has a structured system for receiving technical and advisory assistance from 
external sources. A fully staffed donor coordination unit exists 
11. Parliament has a highly competent specialists research and other staff that provides MPs 





APPENDIX 3: CODIFICATION SCHEDULE 
Area of investigation Theme Codes Tally 
Role of parliament in 
ICT sector reforms 
 Representation and 
participation 
 Policy adoption and 







Power relations  
Interests 




 Source of information 
on government 











 Legislative delegation 
 Effective review and 
tracking of bills 
 Legal mandate 
Legislative capacity  
Principal – agent 
relationships 
Law-making  









Area of investigation Theme Codes Tally 
Influence of  parliament 
in ICT sector reforms 
measured 
 Balance of power 
among state institutions  
 Power to exercise 
oversight 
 Legal and technical 
expertise  









Level of institutional 
development  
Independence to determine 
budget  
 
Separate budget  
Constituency 
development funds  




Capacity indexing Total  
Assessed  










 Accessibility and Openness   
1.  The parliament  is open to citizens and the media     
2.  Mechanisms to promote public understanding of the work 
of parliament  
   
3.  Promoting citizen's knowledge and understanding of the 
role of MPs in the ICT policy-making process 
   
4.  Relationship  between parliament, CSOs and other related 
institutions  
   





5.  Capacity indexing Total  
Assessed  










6.  Law making     
7.  Power to amend Bills     
8.  Opportunities for public input into the Legislative process    
9.  Mechanisms to Track Legislation     
10.  Power to send back legislation for review     
11.  Bill review and hearings     
12.  Period of review of any ICT legislation     
13.  Existence of an ICT Committee     
14.  Public hearings on ICT    
 Oversight Committees 
15.  Existence of oversight committees     
16.  Investigative powers of oversight committees     
17.  Oversight of spending by State Enterprises     
18.  Mechanisms for oversight committee to obtain 
information from the Executive  
   
19.  Power of oversight committees to follow up on 
recommendations  
   
20.  Access to resources by Oversight Committees    
21.  Opportunities for minority/opposition parties     
 Financial and material resources  
22.  Power of parliament to determine its own budget     
23.  Logistics available     
24.  Resources for MPs constituency development activities     
25.  Mechanisms for receiving and  coordinating technical 
assistance  
   
26.  Research and support staff     
 
 
